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on his doorstep in 2002, clutching an apple tart from one of the bakeries 
near his apartment in Paris, has been unstintingly generous with his time 
and unbelievably patient when listening to my criticisms of his ideas. 
We haven’t always agreed on the finer points of critical theory and tech-
nology but of his kindness there has never been any doubt. I will have 
succeeded if, based on our conversations, this book clarifies some of his 
arguments, or persuades more readers of the relevance of his interven-
tion. On points where he and I disagree, I hope to have provided material 
for further discussion that might itself clarify and develop the critical 
theory of technology.
Parts of some chapters have been presented as papers to different 
audiences, who have made comments and suggestions that helped me 
reach the version presented here. Chapter 2, on formal bias, benefited 
from a critical discussion with Yoni Van Den Eede and participants 
at the ‘Technology, Society, Change’ symposium he organised at the 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel in Summer 2011, and I am grateful to them. 
Chapter  1 was the basis of a sociology seminar in the University of 
Manchester in spring 2017, attended by several colleagues in the soci-
ology department and some people from elsewhere in the university. 
In summer 2019, I presented parts of Chapter 5 at the annual confer-
ence of the Utopian Studies Society in Prato, where the comments and 
questions received helped me when it came to writing the final draft. I’d 
like to thank everyone who participated in these events. I’d also like to 
record my appreciation of the students on my undergraduate course, 
Technology & Society, which ran at Manchester from 2007 to 2014 and 
included many fascinating discussions of Feenberg’s work, often initiated 
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Introduction: from critical theory 
to technical politics
Technical politics is the name for disputes over technology design 
involving social actors with different values, interests and ideas about 
the future shape of society. Such disputes are surely as old as technology 
itself but in the modern, industrial period they tended to involve quite 
narrow sections of society, and the resultant technology served very spe-
cific economic interests. In the digital era, this has changed as people 
everywhere are shaping and customising devices and networks to suit 
their own preferences. The new era of popular interventions in technical 
practice creates openings for progressive politics, in which values other 
than the narrow pursuit of profit might shape technical infrastructure. 
At the same time, the objective need for new technologies, to address 
climate change and other imminent catastrophes, has never been more 
obvious or urgent.
This book is a critical study of the work of Andrew Feenberg, philoso-
pher of technology and exponent of a unique version of critical theory. 
Grounded in the tradition of Marx and the Frankfurt School, Feenberg’s 
project is political and avowedly left- wing, even socialist in orientation. 
His work is distinguished from other versions of critical theory by its 
basically optimistic assessment of the role of technology in social change. 
Feenberg’s concept of technical politics attempts to mediate between 
the democratisation of technical practices on one hand, and the need 
for civilisational change to move humanity onto a sustainable footing on 
the other.
In this version of critical theory, technology retains the progressive 
role assigned to it by Marx – one that had receded to the horizon, or even 
been reversed in the work of earlier generations of critical theorists, who 
associated it with instrumental reason and the disenchantment of the 
world. Strangely enough, Feenberg also retains some of these negative 
ideas but incorporates them into an understanding of technology that 
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grasps it in terms of its fundamental ambivalence. He presents a defin-
ition of technology that is both conceptually nuanced and at the same 
time sensitive to historical variation in a way that distinguishes his work 
and sets it above even the most sophisticated positions in contemporary 
philosophy of technology.1
This work of conceptualisation is inseparable from Feenberg’s con-
viction that technology is profoundly political and, moreover, that 
the principal political challenge faced by humanity today concerns its 
technology. In trying to establish the truth about what technology is, 
Feenberg at the same time elaborates a thesis on the politics of its place 
in cultural modernity. This involves the claim that technological change 
is not merely a driver of modernisation, and neither is it a factor that 
impedes or delimits the scope of politics and the pursuit of enlightened 
or progressive social reforms. In disclosing the ‘historical essence’ of 
technology Feenberg reveals that it is the very medium of political trans-
formation: that activity conducted in the technical sphere, informed by 
extra- technical discursive factors, is the locus of political potential in 
modern societies. In short, he identifies technology as the site of political 
praxis: technical politics.
The idea of technical politics, then, combines Marx’s enthusiasm for 
technology as the driver of social change and political progress with crit-
ical theory’s suspicion of technology as the locus of societal rationalisa-
tion. Feenberg achieves this by locating both sides of this contradiction, 
so to speak, as internal to his account of what technology is, so that it 
is itself a constitutively contradictory phenomenon, while at the same 
time demonstrating that technology is always socially contested. Indeed, 
Feenberg goes so far as to say that technology is the distinctive form taken 
by politics today. His work speaks directly to the concerns of those who 
advocate technological acceleration as the route out of our contemporary 
crisis. Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams (2017), for example, converge with 
Feenberg in seeking to reclaim the project of modernity and, like him, 
they take reflection on technology’s potential as a kind of licence to ‘think 
big’ about the prospects for future civilisation. However, their analysis 
lacks any account of how the willed transformation of technology they 
seek is to be brought about, so they can only genuflect to the need for 
new networks of institutions, presumably brought into existence by the 
(not inconsiderable) force of their polemic. In contrast, Feenberg takes 
what they dismiss as ‘folk’ interventions in technology as a starting point 
but adds a strategic theorisation of the technical as political, and in so 
doing provides essential conceptual resources with which to move from 
wish fulfilment to tactical analysis.
Feenberg’s project is a synthesis of many currents of thought, and 
it introduces several important concepts that arise from this. Like any 
theory of such scale and ambition, his runs the risk of eclecticism, in 
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which disparate concepts and sources are forced together despite not 
really being compatible. One of the tasks of a book like the present one, 
which is part exposition and exegesis but also part critique, is to pull 
apart what has been carefully sewn together in order to give the reader 
a vantage point from which to judge the success of the larger project for 
themselves. It behoves the author of such a work to acknowledge that 
the putting together was much more difficult than the pulling apart. 
The conscience of said author is partly allayed by the fact that pulling at 
threads of this quality is very enjoyable and that the activity is a kind of 
compliment to the intelligence that wove them together.
The first duty of a book like this, though, is to try and convey a sense 
of the value and importance of the work that is being discussed. Why 
does Feenberg write about technology, and what is he trying to tell us 
about it? Why does he tell us that Heidegger’s insights are important 
and worth hanging onto, while at the same time demonstrating the 
depth and extent of error in the philosophy that gave rise to them? 
How can he draw on Foucault’s critique of the human sciences and 
also defend an idea of progressive technological rationalisation? Why 
does he condemn the Frankfurt School as miserabilists who often fail to 
deliver on their own promises, while calling his own theory the ‘critical 
theory of technology’? Is Feenberg some (any) kind of Marxist, or is he 
a utopian socialist? These questions, and others concerning the details 
of his system, are all addressed in this book, but first it is necessary to 
position his intervention in contemporary thought about technology 
and society.
My contention is that Feenberg’s primary focus has been the develop-
ment of a theory of technology as something that is always already polit-
ical. What he calls ‘technical politics’ is the central concept around which 
the rest of his system falls into place and in light of which its various 
points of obscurity and difficulty may best be clarified and understood. In 
this introduction I will attempt to situate it historically and theoretically, 
as well as providing an overview of the current book and describing the 
basis of my own critical perspective.
1 Critical theory in context
Feenberg began publishing on technology in the early 1990s, prior 
to which he published a study of Georg Lukàcs and the young Marx 
(Feenberg 1981). His interest in technology, however, pre- dates the 
published work and must have been present in his relationship with 
Herbert Marcuse, who supervised Feenberg’s doctoral studies in the 
1960s and early 1970s. This relationship is surely the most important and 
influential one on the development of Feenberg’s thought, and it is fair to 
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say that he has done more than any other thinker to update and extend 
Marcuse’s theory, to give it contemporary relevance.
A key moment in Feenberg’s intellectual formation was his involve-
ment in the 1968 events in Paris. There is a photograph of him outside 
the gates of the Renault factory where students and workers famously 
came together in a bid to wrest social power from the capitalist class and 
their political representatives.2 As documented in his co- authored book 
about those events (Feenberg and Freedman 2001), this bid was partly 
successful. For a few weeks the power of the government of Charles de 
Gaulle was undermined and the president fled the country. In Paris and 
elsewhere in France basic social functions like the distribution of food 
were taken over by informal networks of people motivated to create an 
alternative social system.
In common with others of his generation who participated in the May 
events, Feenberg has a special light in his eyes when they are discussed, 
and it would not be an exaggeration to say that les événements have the 
status of an article of faith for him. As is widely noted in the commentary 
on 1968, many of the people involved were profoundly affected by some-
thing they experienced then. The near religious character of the May 
events is evidenced by the way that disputes over their interpretation 
quickly involve accusations of betrayal. Among those, like Alain Badiou, 
Jacques Rancière and indeed Feenberg, who retain their conviction that 
willed, wholesale changes of social system in wealthy countries remain 
possible and desirable, 1968 stands as confirmation. As such, their col-
lective memory is an ideological bulwark against cynicism and nihilism, 
both of which serve as gateway drugs to political apathy and capitulation.
This has a profound bearing on the mature thought of the philosophers 
of the class of ’68. Feenberg’s theory is informed by his enduring convic-
tion that capitalist modernity is susceptible to radical, even revolutionary 
transformation. Like Rancière (2009), his understanding of this assigns a 
specific role to aesthetics and to the changing role of the human senses 
in history. For both these thinkers, as for the young Marx, the senses are 
shaped and reconfigured by social and cultural contexts that promote 
the need for sharpened perception in some circumstances while dulling 
it in others. Capitalism produces a sensory configuration attuned to a 
world based on equivalences and exchange, while socialist perception 
would be more diverse, offering access to a fuller, more sensuous kind of 
experience. Like Marcuse, Feenberg retrieves this idea from Marx’s 1844 
Manuscripts (Marx 1983), and deploys it as part of his account of the 
nature of technology under capitalism and the politics of technological 
transformation.
Marcuse famously visited Paris during the 1968 uprising and addressed 
meetings of the students and workers. For him, the upheavals of the time 
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and One- Dimensional Man (1964) he had speculated that the totally 
rationalised, sexually repressed societies of Western civilisation had a 
chink in their armour. Educated youth, especially those groomed for a 
role in the technical professions, might refuse to take the places assigned 
to them. Their possession of technical skills and knowledge could, para-
doxically enough, lead them to develop the possibility not of a less 
rationalised social system but of one in which rationality was developed 
to a new level, restored to the role set for it by the Enlightenment of 
improving human life rather than merely engineering the superficial 
‘happiness’ of the satisfied consumer.
Marcuse’s positive response to the 1960s student uprisings was in 
marked contrast to the attitudes of other members of his generation of 
critical theorists. His contemporaries, the Frankfurt School theorists Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, reacted to student demonstrations 
and occupations in Germany with fear and suspicion. Indeed, excessive 
caution seems to have marked their attitude to any direct political engage-
ment.3 Adorno is said to have been troubled to find that his ideas might 
have inspired any kind of spontaneous social movements and considered 
that this was based on a misunderstanding. That was not unreasonable, 
given his negative assessment of the redemptive powers of political dis-
course. Horkheimer’s revulsion at the behaviour of the students was such 
that he ended up expressing support for the US war in Vietnam.4 It is 
not difficult to see why, for Feenberg and other students of the 1960s, 
Marcuse was a more appealing figure.
At the heart of the difference between these two versions of crit-
ical theory is a disagreement over psychoanalysis and what it has to tell 
Marxist theory about the nature of capitalist societies and the prospects 
for revolution. According to Marcuse’s reading of Freud, consumerism 
enabled capitalism to move from straightforward, nineteenth- century 
repression of sexual instincts to a managed process whereby desires 
that might be destabilising to social order were re- cathected to the com-
modity, effectively channelling the basic drives into forms of consump-
tion. Gratification was achieved through the cultivation of false needs 
and the endless deferral of real satisfaction into the behaviour patterns of 
acquisitive individualism. The way out of this, led by a generation of pro-
gressive technocrats, lay in the recovery of natural embodied desires and 
demand for the satisfaction of real needs, which consumer capitalism 
could not provide. There is a direct connection between these theoretical 
views and the radical cultural politics of the students, which involved 
ideas like flower power, free love and sexual liberation (Neville 1971).
Adorno’s view was more austere and based on a different kind of refusal. 
Perhaps reflecting the mark made on him by the catastrophic events of 
the mid- twentieth century, he feared any project that might unleash the 
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that seeks reconciliation of subject and object, and for him too this 
involved a dimension that could only be adequately explored using the 
psychoanalytic concepts of desire and repression. He also described the 
culture industry in terms of false needs and misdirected desire. However, 
for him, the notion of real needs was more obscure, and identifying it 
with the liberation of desire in a kind of somatic condition of bliss was 
a false route, likely to lead nowhere or to somewhere even worse than 
consumerism.
As Espen Hamer (2005) points out, Adorno proposed a different 
understanding of the subjective dynamics of life under capitalism, in 
which liberation is modelled more closely on the struggle for a kind of 
Kantian autonomy, albeit one that is informed by a richer portrayal of 
psychic life than was available to eighteenth- century philosophy. The 
political implications of his approach are correspondingly less clear than 
those of Marcuse’s and probably more conservative.
Critical theory in Europe has moved on since Adorno and Marcuse, 
and second- and third- generation Frankfurt theorists have repudiated 
their forebears on a number of important points. Of obvious import-
ance here is the work of Jürgen Habermas,5 who has penned important 
critiques of both Adorno and Marcuse, and who has developed a very 
different version of critical theory based on theoretical foundations that 
have more in common with pragmatism than with the Marxist dialectic. 
His work also draws more heavily on ideas from development psychology 
than on psychoanalysis. Habermas is a few years older than Feenberg, 
and his work has framed the contemporary understanding of what 
Frankfurt School- inspired critical theory is in the twenty- first century. It 
is therefore worth itemising, albeit quite schematically, the major points 
of difference between his work and that of earlier critical theory, in order 
to place Feenberg’s contribution in this context.
First, Habermas (1990) claims that what he calls the philosophy of 
consciousness has been superseded by the philosophy of language. 
Assimilating insights from Wittgenstein and pragmatism, Habermas 
moves critical theory into a theoretical context dominated by the study 
of language. This has a bearing on all aspects of his work. Ethics, for 
example, is less a matter of seeking internal coherence for a subject whose 
actions should be in line with privately processed maxims of conduct, and 
becomes instead a matter of consistency with norms integral to structures 
embedded in speech and verbal communication. Habermas considers 
that interpersonal efforts of communication are premised on a founding 
orientation to consensus and that this imposes ethical constraints on 
social actors. This focus on communication leads him to distinguish ana-
lytically between contexts of action, depending on the kind and extent 
of communicative orientation they imply. The development of a cultural 
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of a systems sphere in which technical imperatives routinely determine 
what is done, without communicative deliberation. This pragmatic delin-
eation of action domains gives a functional- evolutionary conception of 
the social formation, which supersedes historical materialism (1985). On 
this basis Habermas rejects the key critical notions of historicism and 
totality. His model of society is autonomous in its key features from any 
historical considerations, and its two dimensions interlock on the basis 
of a sociological functionalism that posits no overall direction for soci-
etal or historical development (1989).
Habermas’s theory is ‘critical’ only in the fairly minimal sense that by 
clarifying the fundamental properties of the cultural lifeworld as ruled by 
norms implicit in communication, he succeeds in identifying the main 
threat to meaning in contemporary society through the idea of ‘internal 
colonisation’ (1985). The latter involves a corruption or distortion of 
communicative processes so that practices which ought to be mediated 
through speech and discussion aimed at reaching agreement are instead 
‘steered’ by money or power. The latter are systems media that can ‘reach 
through’ communicative acts to impose an alien logic on events in the 
cultural lifeworld. The practical thrust of this theory lies in the direction 
of containment of the systems sphere, which, through colonisation, poses 
the permanent threat of becoming overweening and eliminating the posi-
tive role of shared meanings as a factor in the mediation of collective life.
Feenberg’s theory incorporates ideas from Marcuse and first- 
generation Frankfurt theorists, but he combines them with an emphasis 
on communication that is, at times, quite Habermasian. He does not, 
however, completely repudiate the philosophy of consciousness, since, 
as we shall see, he retains an important role for both aesthetics and phe-
nomenological analysis of ideas, specifically those operative at the scene 
of technology design, in his account of technology’s alignment with social 
power and in his understanding of the politics of socio- technical change. 
Similarly, Feenberg retains an idea of the historical totality as a quasi- 
organic entity with its own dialectical developmental principles. His 
theory of technical politics is underpinned by the belief that more dem-
ocracy in technology design will issue in a more humane society, culmin-
ating in what he calls ‘civilizational change’. Moreover, while Habermas 
embraces pragmatism as a philosophy, with attendant limitations on 
what counts as real for social science, Feenberg retains from earlier crit-
ical theorists the notion of a wider reality that exceeds contemporary 
science and even plays an important role in social and historical change.
In all these ways, Feenberg is a traditional critical theorist who refuses 
the Habermasian update. At the same time, he introduces innovations of 
his own to Marcusean critical theory, also based on subsequent philo-
sophical developments. In particular, Feenberg does not accept the con-
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of theories of social and cultural meaning. Technology, he argues, can 
be more or less meaningful depending on its social and historical loca-
tion. One of his key innovations is to insist that both communication and 
the drive to create efficient and effective connections that characterise 
Habermas’s systems dimension are best understood as combined inside 
the technical sphere. This is a subtle introjection of the central oppos-
ition of Habermasian theory, and it has important consequences.
2 Digital technology and critique
Feenberg’s thesis that technology is essentially historical and ambiva-
lent was formulated under its own very specific historical and cultural 
conditions. The argument that technology  – its design and use  – are 
not merely political but actually constitutive of contemporary politics 
is plausible because it coincides with the rise of digital technology and 
culture. Since the 1990s in particular, much of what was formerly under-
stood as social activity, involving embodied actors in real- world places, 
has moved online. In this sense, the principal forums of social activism 
and debate about political issues are more highly mediatised than ever 
before. The rise of mass internet use, followed by the ongoing absorption 
of much of society into social media, has its origins in the same counter- 
cultural context that gave rise to the 1968 revolts.
Personal or home computer technology was first propounded in the 
mid- 1970s and swiftly found a place for itself in the liberal ethos of the 
US West Coast (Freiberger and Swain 1984). The first such computers 
were shaped by a counter- culture that identified them as tools for self- 
emancipation and for the revival of democracy and community, in 
opposition to consumer culture and ‘the system’. This culture had a strong 
‘do- it- yourself ’, craft ethos and was motivated by the search for social 
connection and authenticity. To an extent it was anti- technological, yet it 
included sub- groups for whom specific kinds of technology were viewed 
positively as tools of liberation. In this cultural setting the notion of a 
small computer had appeal because it presented the opportunity to take 
computer power from the system and give it to the people. Computer 
clubs and hobbyist groups sprang up to embrace the new machines, with 
slogans like ‘computer power to the people’ (Levy 1984). In his study of 
the social currents that shaped home computing, Fred Turner (2006) 
describes how counter- cultural icon Richard Brand’s ‘Whole Earth’ 
movement combined a ‘back to nature’ ethos with the idea of using 
computers to connect people who shared the same alternative values and 
facilitate their activities.
This social context informed the design culture of computing and, 
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were presented to the wider public. Within the emergent discipline of 
human– computer interface design the dominant trend was to create 
machines that did not seem or feel like machines and which interacted 
with humans through more or less ‘natural’ communicative processes. 
Austere command lines gave way to sumptuous graphical user interfaces, 
and computing culture became ‘post- modern’ (Turkle 1995) as it based 
human interaction with computers on simulation and play rather than the 
acquisition of technical knowledge. This tendency towards pleasurable 
computing developed in tandem with the popularisation of the Internet 
in the 1990s, itself made possible by the development of the world wide 
web and ‘user- friendly’, graphically enabled web browsing. A key value of 
the counter- culture had been play rather than work, and this was reflected 
in the emergence of online social spaces that included fantasy worlds and 
massive multi- player gaming environments. By the turn of the century the 
counter- culture may have passed away, but many of its values had been 
parsed into design principles of the digital revolution (Kirkpatrick 2013).
Key among those values was the notion of democratic participa-
tion. This was present in the aspirations of the early hobbyists and 
foregrounded again in the rhetorics of ‘Web 2.0’ in the first decade of 
this century. The meaning of technology has been transformed by this 
principle. In the industrial epoch technology consisted of machines that 
people were obliged to use as part of their work. Machines were progres-
sive in the sense that they enhanced productive efficiency, but few people 
were keen to work with one. To be sure, there were gadgets for the home 
and some dedicated devices for leisure use, but in recent decades tech-
nology has become as strongly associated with leisure as it is with labour. 
Connection to the Internet via a smartphone is almost a necessary condi-
tion for social participation, and this is experienced not as an imposition 
of the system but as a portal to opportunities for play, social connection 
and enjoyment. Technology has crossed some kind of line, and it has 
been pushed by the actions of millions of individuals driving its design 
and its acquisition of functions.
This change is vital to Feenberg’s project because the fact of popular 
involvement in technology design constitutes the definitive opening to 
technical politics. His point is not merely that technology design is pol-
itical because it conditions all of this activity. It is also not simply that 
nearly all social interaction is now mediatised and so political activity 
requires some kind of technological knowledge. For Feenberg, the fact 
that people consciously shape technology is the form taken by contem-
porary politics. In much the same way that Badiou (2006) dismisses most 
of what passes for politics in contemporary society as an empty exchange 
of well- rehearsed platitudes that changes nothing, so Feenberg basic-
ally agrees with his Frankfurt forebears that politics in the traditional 
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activity in connection with technology, challenging designs and modi-
fying practices of use, is real politics because it touches directly on the 
operation of structures of power in modern societies and presents an 
immanent challenge to the hold of that system. When Feenberg makes 
the case for technical politics, one of the things he is saying is that this is 
the only, or certainly the main, viable form of real politics today.
There is, then, a continuous thread that connects Feenberg’s involve-
ment with the student protests in the 1960s to his identification of tech-
nology as the principal locus of contemporary politics. Digital technology 
has opened up what seemed to be closed off, namely, the possibility of a 
political challenge to the system that, just a few decades ago, had been 
called ‘technocracy’. It is perhaps ironic that that this opening appears 
in the very dimension of social life that had seemed to be most strongly 
associated with the dominance of the system.
Moreover, the changes to technology associated with the move to 
digital culture involve alterations not only to the productive or eco-
nomic dimension of society. The rise of computers and of other digital 
techniques has changed the way that technology relates to culture and 
meaning. In effect, it raises the question of whether there is a single con-
tinuous meaning to the idea of technology, a definition that transcends 
such discrepancies and links all of its various instances. Is there some-
thing inherently or essentially technical that connects the Manchester– 
Liverpool railway of 1830 to 2019’s i Phone XS? According to Feenberg, 
the answer is not straightforward. There is an essential thread running 
through all instances of technology, but it is only ever encountered in a 
distinctive, contemporary social construction.
When he writes that technology has a historical essence, Feenberg 
takes the important step of incorporating a sociological element into 
the philosophical definition of technology. It is this move that enables 
him to comprehend the changes just discussed as part of the meaning 
of technology, and on this basis to identify the possibility of technical 
politics, while at the same time retaining a perspective grounded in 
critical theory. The latter, as we have seen, involves suspicion of instru-
mental reason and often identifies this with the essence of technology. 
The fact that Feenberg continues to invoke ideas formulated in the pre- 
digital context sometimes creates the impression of a prevarication on 
this point, something that is discussed at greater length in what follows. 
A key contention of this book, however, is that this is a misreading of his 
work, which is in fact avowedly and consistently anti- essentialist, in the 
sense that it refuses to identify technology with instrumentalism. The 
critique Feenberg makes of technology is premised not on the notion 
that it is instrumental in essence, but on the empirical observation that 
when it serves the ends of social domination this tends to coincide with 
a pronounced instrumentalism in its design. This explains why earlier, 
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essentialist philosophies sometimes ‘ring true’ even though their funda-
mental premises are false.
This is not to deny that there are problems at this point in his theory, 
however. I will suggest that rather than prevarication there is a hesita-
tion in Feenberg’s approach, by which I mean that once he has identified 
technology’s role in social domination with its instrumental aspects, he 
does not recognise that it can also be biased in other ways. The rela-
tionship between technology in which the instrumental dimension is 
more pronounced and the social employment of technology to exploit 
and dominate both people and nature may well be much as he describes, 
as a matter of contemporary social historical fact. But it is important 
to notice that, consistent with the anti- essentialist approach, this leaves 
open the twin possibilities of progressive yet nakedly instrumental tech-
nique and the use of aestheticised and ostensibly meaningful designs in 
strategies of exploitation and manipulation.
This raises the question of how regressive and positive features are 
to be discerned when discussing technologies in context. Since tech-
nology is political, indeed is co- extensive with the political in the sense 
described above, this is a vital question for the critical theory of tech-
nology. One hazard attendant on any theory that views technology as the 
singular locus of conscious struggles over social power is that of taking 
an aesthetic index as the obvious route to target problematic designs. 
Machines that clearly prioritise function over form, the efficient real-
isation of a purpose over qualitative questions concerning the character 
of use, will then seem to be obviously contentious, while those that get 
inserted more or less seamlessly into social situations and perhaps even 
serve overt communicative ends will tend to disappear from view. The 
ease with which technical politics might fall into this is one of the reasons 
why the critical theory of technology warrants examination and critique. 
It is perhaps especially important to clarify the aesthetic dimension of 
the theory, to make it into a primary means for addressing technologies 
as socially problematic, even before they become politically contentious.
The main point of critique pursued in this book concerns the Adornian 
principle of non- identity as the basic point of departure for critical theory. 
My suggestion is that Feenberg succeeds, in the theory of technical pol-
itics, in placing technology firmly within the problematics of identity 
and representation. It is when technology design stitches a new device, 
technique or machine into the web of currently accepted identifications 
and social meanings that it serves power most effectively. This may not 
coincide with it behaving instrumentally or with the proliferation of the 
kinds of ‘symptom’ associated with industrial- era technologies, like phys-
ical harm to workers or egregious resource depletion. Contemporary 
technical politics concerns the kind of ‘doubling’ that occurs when an 
app, for example, contributes to an ongoing process of subjectification, 
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condemning people to a narrowly specified course of action rather than 
promoting or accommodating reflection that might open up alternative 
personal trajectories. Such nodal points in the operation of specific tech-
nologies can be related to impositions of identity and conformity onto 
social subjects, and technical politics ought to focus on creating oppor-
tunities for alternative subjectivations, by urging design changes that 
reduce dependency and enhance informed technology use.
This question of how to diagnose entanglements of specific designs with 
webs of social power also has a bearing on the kind of technical- political 
action that ought to be considered ‘progressive’. Feenberg tends to identify 
positive developments in technical politics with action that points towards 
reconciliation of subject and object in a changed civilisation, in which 
technology has been redesigned to serve the interests of culture and com-
munication rather than the narrow, instrumental goal of enhanced pro-
ductive efficiency. Feenberg’s preference here is informed by his affinity 
with Marcuse, for whom society is an organic whole that has been split 
apart by capitalism and awaits re- unification. For Adorno, in contrast, any 
politics based directly on the search for reconciliation of subject and object 
risks imposing its own identitarian demands on both of them.
Feenberg takes from Marcuse the principle that critique should 
move beyond the retrospective exercise of judgement to explain what 
has happened in the past as a negative consequence of the totally 
administered life, in order to actively promote reflection aimed at illu-
minating a course to something better in the future. He alleges that 
Adorno and other critical theorists evade crucial questions when they 
fail to take this step, effectively regressing behind some kind of mealy- 
mouthed Kantian moralism – condemning everything while refusing to 
say what should be done instead. I argue that in his rush to identify and 
affirm positive, present potential, Feenberg makes a pre- emptive move 
towards politics that cannot but leave unanswered questions in its wake.
The critical purpose of this book, therefore, is to address some of those 
questions with the Adornian principle of non- identity in mind, not with 
the aim of knocking Feenberg’s theory down but rather in an attempt to 
support his efforts to identify and draw out the political significance in 
much of what is going on in contemporary digital culture. The result is 
that, while we reach slightly different conclusions, I argue nonetheless that 
Feenberg’s critical perspective serves as a much more productive approach 
than the available alternatives in contemporary thought about technology.
3 Technical politics
My account of Feenberg begins by identifying his central question with 
that of Marx. Their common problematic concerns the contradictions 
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of the capitalist social formation and how they result in the transition 
to a society that takes the maximum degree of individual human self- 
realisation as its organising principle. Chapter 1 introduces the idea of 
technical politics as, first and foremost, an attempt on Feenberg’s part to 
solve a fundamental dilemma of Marxism which, despite its urgent and 
as yet unresolved character and the enormous quantity of Marx scholar-
ship over the past two centuries, is rarely addressed head- on anywhere. 
Feenberg not only engages with it but, in the theory of technical politics, 
presents an ambitious solution.
In his theory of history, Marx (1970) locates technology in the material 
infrastructure of society, among its productive forces, which he considers 
more fundamental to the explanation of social change than superstruc-
tural features like ideas or legal rights. Living in society, ‘men inevitably 
enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely 
relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development 
of their material forces of production’ (1970: 20). The latter include tech-
nology and tend to expand in productive power over the course of the 
historical process. This development of the productive forces is a con-
dition of possibility of the transition to a socialist society, because that 
society has to be able to produce great quantities of material wealth if 
it is to facilitate the multitude of projects entailed by its emphasis on 
individuals’ self- development. Marxism therefore identifies technology 
development as the key to historical progress. Moreover, within this 
overarching historical process, capitalism is the social formation that 
most accelerates technology development. Overturning the constraints 
of tradition, the dynamism of the capitalist economy means that it is 
always innovating and producing new, more productive machines. The 
place of capitalism in Marx’s historical eschatology, immediately prior 
to socialism, is no accident: capitalism creates the material conditions, 
including the technical foundations, that make socialism possible.
However, Marx also describes in detail how technology in capitalist 
society is shaped to serve the interests of the capitalist class in their 
struggle against the mass of the people, who have to operate the machines. 
He shows that the principal motivation for capitalists to introduce new 
techniques is not to improve efficiency, or even to enhance their com-
petitiveness, but rather to act against their employees. From the perspec-
tive of the individual capitalist, machinery is primarily an opportunity to 
reduce reliance on workers and to thwart their efforts to take control of 
the production process. For this reason, capitalist machinery is designed 
to oppress workers and to contribute to their domination rather than 
their self- realisation.
The dilemma here is that capitalist technology is held to be both shaped 
to be unpleasant for workers and the foundation for a socialist society, 
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Feenberg discusses how the Soviets failed to address this problem and 
instead pursued a strategy of copying capitalist technology, combined for 
many years with a militaristic social organisation of the workplace. In 
consequence, the experience of living and working in Soviet society was 
no less unpleasant than life in a capitalist one, with the changed relations 
of ownership and control over production becoming something of an 
abstraction from the standpoint of the ordinary worker. Marx’s paradox, 
then, had a toxic practical legacy in the twentieth century.
Feenberg draws the lesson that technology is one of the things that 
has to change as a part of the transition to a superior, socialist society. 
What he calls ‘civilizational change’ involves not only a break with the 
capitalist economy but an equally, if not more, profound shift at the level 
of material culture, and technology is implicated on both levels. The 
working class, as conceived by Marx, are not the privileged agents of this 
work of transformation. Instead, the struggle to change technology is 
more diffuse and concerns everyone who is subject to the operations of 
power in modern society. Drawing on critical theory’s synthesis of Marx 
and Weber, Feenberg argues that the authority of technology discussed 
by Marx and Engels is not limited to the industrial workplace but spreads 
throughout society and culture.
Technology, in this argument, is not only shaped by capitalist interests 
and antithetical to workers’ well- being but is also a key agent of societal 
rationalisation. While the development of technology remains, as Marx 
maintained, ultimately progressive, it is also shaped by the tendency 
towards intensified use of instrumental reason to enhance efficiency 
and, as Weber (1974) had shown, a correspondingly diminished role for 
meaning in social processes. In this analysis, technology is reified so that 
it appears to be the ‘best solution’ in any given workplace scenario, and 
resisting it becomes near- synonymous with irrationality.
By following his critical theory forebears and making this synthesis 
of Marx with Weber, Feenberg only seems to have doubled his difficulty. 
Somehow, technology must be the vehicle to a better society, yet it is 
also shaped by the capitalist interest in domination and societal ration-
alisation. Feenberg’s solution is the theory of ambivalence: technology is 
both biased in the ways just described and remains the locus of a set of 
capabilities that could set humanity free. Technical politics mediates the 
poles of this contradiction, with the actions of social agents competing 
over the meaning of technology in a struggle that is now invested with 
political significance.
Recognising the activity of a range of social groups whose actions 
subvert or even democratise technology design and use as political, 
Feenberg opens up a theoretical space that both bears upon the very 
meaning of technology and helps to address Marx’s problem. The tran-
sition to socialism now includes a technical dimension in the sense that, 
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just as socialist culture and institutions need to be prefigured as part of 
counter- hegemonic struggle, so its technological foundations can also be 
presaged by struggles waged in the present. Where hackers produce soft-
ware to support striking workers by automating denial- of- service attacks 
on company servers, or when patients’ groups demand that drug testing 
regimes be liberalised to allow them access to experimental treatments, 
Feenberg identifies the seeds of a socialist technology. Where these 
struggles are successful they bend technology design and technical 
practices to human ends, and the result is ‘democratic’ or ‘subversive 
rationalisation’.
Technical politics consists of interventions that affect technology in 
ways that counter its existing bias. Chapter 2 discusses Feenberg’s account 
of the bias of technology under capitalism, which he calls ‘formal’ bias 
and rigorously distinguishes from the substantive version propounded 
by essentialist scholars. Feenberg’s inclusion of social factors in the 
philosophical definition of technology is in evidence here. According to 
his argument, technology is formally biased only when it is placed in a 
determinate social context. Cases of substantive bias, when a design is 
inherently detrimental to the interests of a specific social group (or even 
straightforwardly inhuman), are outliers. Yet technology never really 
exists as such outside of social contexts, and so a definition of it that 
disregarded that context would itself be a mere abstraction. Feenberg 
rejects essentialist theories, like those of Jacques Ellul (1964) and Martin 
Heidegger (2013), on that basis.
At the same time, though, essentialist critics identify bias in technology 
with certain traits with which it has long been strongly associated – in 
particular, the instrumental reduction of sometimes complex and mean-
ingful situations to ‘problems’ with a single solution. Efficiency is often 
associated with this kind of narrowing of focus onto the attainment of 
a clearly defined goal by the most expeditious means, and its pursuit is 
open to criticism when it leads to the neglect of important neighbouring 
features of the world. This leads Feenberg to acknowledge that substan-
tive critique sometimes has purchase, but, for him, this is a consequence 
of technology’s historically contingent role in modern rationalisation and 
its shaping by factors specific to that context, rather than of its substan-
tive character as technology.
The chapter concludes by arguing that Feenberg fails to follow through 
on this argument, with the result that he rejects the substantivist baby 
with the essentialist bathwater. In fact, technology is always substan-
tively biased, and this insight is made possible by Feenberg’s own move 
of including a social element in the definition. The substantive proper-
ties of technology that make it biased are not always the ones opera-
tive in capitalist modernity, which means that the question of its bias 
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In short, removing one kind of capitalist bias by making technology 
more meaningful or pleasurable to use may well lead to another kind; 
it will never make technology neutral. Feenberg knows this, of course, 
but does not, it seems to me, take full advantage of his own insight when 
reflecting on socialist technology, which will have to have its own kind of 
substantive bias.
The third chapter turns to Feenberg’s concept of technical politics, 
which, as I  have suggested above, is perhaps his central theoretical 
innovation. The idea of technical politics involves a further theoretical 
synthesis, this time of social constructivism with Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) theory of hegemony and radical democracy. In 
a number of influential works published in the 1980s, scholars in the 
new discipline of science and technology studies (STS) established the 
notion that social groups shape technologies by competing to attach 
their own preferred meanings to them in the early phases of their devel-
opment (e.g. Bijker and Hughes 1989). These labelling processes involve 
rival constituencies identifying capacities in new technologies that 
might be used to solve problems in a way that is relevant to their needs 
or interests. Perhaps the most important insight here, from Feenberg’s 
perspective, is that this process is competitive, because this is a clue to 
its political character.
If constructivists generally overlooked wider questions, like the social 
consequences of a particular group’s success in gaining control of a tech-
nology, Feenberg insists that disputes over what a technology is for com-
monly have far- reaching consequences that should not be bracketed out. 
More importantly still, the fact that such disputes can occur at all, and even 
seem to be happening more often, suggests that the totally administered, 
rationalised society described by Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) and 
Marcuse (1964) may have come unstuck. Dissent is surfacing close to 
the heart of that social formation, in connection with its most reified, 
authoritative element. This development is seized upon by Feenberg as 
the fulfilment of Marcuse’s idea that technocracy might be transformed 
from within by the development of an alternative technology.
Another fertile aspect of STS exploited by Feenberg is its emphasis on 
language and descriptive operations that represent technologies in such a 
way as to affect how they are initially perceived, which has consequences 
for how they turn out and are presented to the wider public. Technology 
design then emerges as a contest played out in games of description and 
counter- description, which are described in detail by STS scholars, albeit 
in a way that nearly always neglects the issue of social power. Drawing 
on Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) highly discursive conception of pol-
itics, Feenberg reinterprets these processes as agonistic articulations 
occurring within the parameters set by capitalist hegemony. Technology, 
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groups seek to make their own articulations of this code dominant, or 
hegemonic.
Technical politics, then, is played out through multiple local struggles 
to articulate technology in a dual sense:  (1) to provide the dominant 
expression or representation of a technology, so that it comes to be 
associated with some purposes rather than others; and (2) in so doing, 
to connect a given design to the global meaning of technology itself, in 
a move that alters the prevailing conception of what technology is and, 
importantly, what it might be in the future. The latter is the hegemonic 
codification of technology, which Feenberg takes to be crystallised in the 
works of essentialist philosophers, even if they are wrong to believe that 
this is all that technology can be.
The idea of technical politics is the centrepiece of Feenberg’s theory, 
providing his entire intervention with its rationale. The theoretical syn-
thesis of STS and politicised post- structuralism is ingenious, and it 
restores politics and the necessity of radical social change, in particular 
radical democratic transformation, to the centre of critical theory’s 
concerns. Chapter  3 describes why Feenberg identifies such political 
promise in contemporary popular interventions in a variety of tech-
nical fields of activity. However, the chapter also lodges a number of 
reservations.
First, the aggregation of multiple local struggles over technology 
need not ever amount to the kind of sweeping, wholesale system change 
implicit in Feenberg’s reference to ‘civilizational change’. Second, the 
theory seems to exaggerate the extent to which technical politics simply 
is politics, in which case technology and contests over the meaning of 
technology are the only available way for people to challenge the social 
system. This last impression is re- enforced by Feenberg’s characterisation 
of the current technical hegemony in terms that are drawn from essen-
tialist scholarship:  if that is an accurate account then the technocratic 
system as a whole is largely intact and its technology is, paradoxically, 
the only chink in its armour. Third, Feenberg’s move to view these social 
interventions as a progressive form of politics may be peremptory in the 
sense that it leaves out of account all those actors and social groups who, 
for various reasons, are not actively involved in changing technology but 
are excluded from its development and use. Why such exclusion happens 
is a sociological rather than a political question, and it could be argued 
that it is one that should be integral to any critical theory of technology.
Chapter 4 turns to the notion that technical politics has an important 
aesthetic dimension. As seen above, Feenberg takes from Marx (1983) 
the idea of an intrinsic connection between social power and the sensory 
configuration of the human creature. This relationship is, to a large extent, 
mediated through technology and technology design, since changes 
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feel of lived or sensed experience. Feenberg’s analysis of aestheticisation 
starts from the observation that, historically, all technology has been 
attentive to the question of how it fits with the rest of human activity. 
This concerns questions of meaning – specifically, how individual tech-
nical objects symbolise their function to putative operators. Such public 
symbolisation processes serve to situate objects in wider webs of signifi-
cance and meaning. The way that technology design addresses this issue 
in any given society will have a bearing on how technics and technique 
cohere with the wider cultural context and on what is meant by tech-
nology as a whole.
All technology has this symbolic dimension, but how it interacts with 
technical functionality is historically variable. According to Feenberg, what 
distinguishes the technology of capitalist modernity is that, unlike other 
cultures, it neglects this aspect of technology design, presenting its users 
with a peculiarly austere kind of technology. It is in this context that tech-
nology in modern societies is perceived (and theorised) as a narrowly instru-
mental, even brutal, dimension of society and often regarded as something 
that needs to be contained and limited to specific areas of activity. Feenberg 
emphasises that this is a contingent meaning, however, and points to other 
cultures in which technology represents other, positive values.
In traditional societies, for example, it was common for people to dec-
orate tools and machines, a practice that demonstrated their incorpor-
ation into the weave of cultural life. Similarly, facility with a particular 
kind of tool would often be associated with a social role or identity, with 
the consequence that the user and the tool would be held in a certain 
kind of esteem by the rest of the community. Residual traces of this more 
organic relationship between individuals, technology and culture can be 
discerned in modern, even industrial settings, where workers continue 
to decorate factory tools and some technical professions maintain a col-
lective sense of themselves as vocations. These things are harder to sus-
tain under modern conditions because technology is designed in a way 
that is neglectful of its symbolic aspect, reflecting (and contributing to) 
the fact that it has become abstracted from society and often seems to sit 
outside of culture.
Feenberg comprehends this difference in terms of his theory of 
‘instrumentalisation’, which is the focus of Chapter 5. Instrumentalisation 
has primary and secondary moments. Primary instrumentalisation refers 
to the historically continuous sub- stratum of human interaction with 
the physical and natural environment, which always involves a certain 
kind of violence associated with the displacement of items from their 
natural locations and their reduction to those aspects that are used to 
achieve a human purpose. There is a strong resonance between pri-
mary instrumentalisation and essentialist theories of technology, but 
Feenberg emphasises that no technology consists purely of its primary 
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instrumentalisations. Technology always also includes a second moment, 
in which it is articulated to meaning- making activities that constitute 
the society and culture of which it is a part. This is where Feenberg 
incorporates historical and social factors into the definition of tech-
nology. Just as when he includes instrumentality and communication and 
the opposition between them as factors internal to technology develop-
ment, so here he performs a kind of introjection whereby essentialist and 
constructivist elements are made to co- mingle in a single conception of 
what technology is.
The elements in this definition, then, are in play whenever there are 
disputes over the meaning of any given technical artefact. Feenberg 
maintains that capitalist modernity is characterised by a uniquely stark, 
stripped- down version of secondary instrumentalisation, so that its tech-
nology is marked by a tendency to erode and undermine the compen-
satory aspect of secondary instrumentalisation, revealing what appears 
to some as the violent heart of technical endeavour. However, tech-
nical politics makes it clear that capitalist technology runs up against 
an internal limit, in the sense that no merely instrumental technology is 
actually possible, and other forces, internal to technology development 
itself, will necessarily counter this tendency and attempt to insert sym-
bolic mediations that mollify primary instrumentalisation.
The notion that technology includes, as part of its internal rational 
structure, a meaningful aspect that might be expanded upon and 
developed is central to Feenberg’s suggestion that, contrary to Adornian 
pessimism, it might be possible to construct utopia from here, the nerve 
centre of technocracy. Moreover, by identifying democratic technical 
politics as the means through which secondary instrumentalisation 
might be expanded and infused with alternative meanings beyond the 
narrow pursuit of ends, he presents a vision of such change as demo-
cratic, rather than carried through by a progressive technical elite, as in 
Marcuse’s version.
Feenberg is particularly critical of Adorno for failing to include such a 
positive moment in his version of critical theory, calling the latter’s refusal 
to countenance utopia an ‘evasion’ that renders his theory largely irrele-
vant. In the final chapter I suggest that the real problem here is one that 
Feenberg himself does not fully escape – namely, that there is an epis-
temological problem for critique as a way of identifying social problems, 
which can be brought into relief by using utopia as a method for thinking 
the future. The book concludes with the suggestion that, especially in 
his own refusal to theorise the substantively biasing aspects of pro-
gressive technology, Feenberg’s technical politics also does not deliver 
on its utopian promise. Notwithstanding this, his theory offers crucial 
resources with which to move in that direction, and for that reason alone 
it demands our attention.
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Notes
1 This view is confirmed by Feenberg’s pre- eminent position in most anthologies 
and in discussions at all the relevant symposia on philosophy of technology, as 
well as the pride of place assigned to his pieces in prestigious collections like 
the one edited by Robert Scharff and Val Dusek (2003). He has secured a prom-
inent place for Marxian thought within one of the most important sub- fields 
of contemporary philosophy, an accomplishment all the more remarkable at 
a time when left- leaning academics have been largely excluded from many 
disciplines, including philosophy and sociology. While two edited collections 
(Veak 2006; Arnold and Michel 2017) have been devoted to his work, I believe 
this is the first monograph study.
2 This photograph can be accessed at: www.sfu.ca/ ~andrewf/ books/ may68.pdf. 
Accessed 9 December 2019.
3 ‘Adorno was unsympathetic to any form of revolutionary action, interpreting it 
as blind to its own motives and naïve about its likely consequences’ (O’Connor 
2012: 13).
4 Lorenz Jäger reports that Horkheimer ‘stuck demonstratively to the side of the 
United States, whose mission to save the world from the dangers of Eastern 
Communism he had made entirely his own’ (2004: 197– 198).












Critical theory and technology
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology is to a large extent constructed 
through a synthesis of concepts from several predecessor theories, each 
of them important to his work in different ways, and each a source of 
concepts that he modifies in order to incorporate them into his own syn-
cretic framework. This chapter describes the overarching rationale of 
Feenberg’s intellectual project, with reference to some of these sources. It 
suggests that the result is a new system in which concepts take on altered 
significance and are made to do quite different work than they did in the 
earlier theories. Exploring in detail the new philosophy that emerges is 
the principal task of this book.
Looking at the way he engages with the ideas of Marx, Weber and 
earlier critical theorists makes it possible to identify the problems 
Feenberg is trying to solve with reference to what he sees as the cru-
cial lacunae, errors and unsolved problems in his predecessors’ work. It 
also clarifies the meanings of key terms in Feenberg’s own corpus, for 
example when Feenberg introduces the idea of ‘democratic rational-
isation’, a phrase that might seem almost oxymoronic if its terms were 
not properly contextualised in the works of scholars who assigned them 
specific meanings. Moreover, to establish the key criteria against which 
Feenberg’s work as a whole ought to be judged it is important to grasp his 
main theoretical and practical priorities, and these emerge most clearly 
when he engages with other work in the critical theory tradition. Even his 
choice of key sources is itself revealing of Feenberg’s overall problematic 
and of the conceptual innovations he introduces.
Feenberg’s project is deeply informed by Marx and Marxism, though 
his main questions, which concern the politics of technology design, 
were almost completely overlooked in Marx’s own work. Of special 
importance is Marx’s concept of human self- realisation, a theme that 
informs all of Marx’s work from his earliest writings, through Capital 
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to his final reflections on the historical process (Stedman- Jones 2016). 
Marx was concerned with the social and historical conditions in which 
every human individual might be enabled to flourish and fulfil their 
potential. He referred to this as the ‘all round development of each indi-
vidual’ (Marx and Engels 1982:  117). He speculated (infrequently, it 
should be noted) that in a society with advanced technology and socialist 
economic relations people would be freed from drudgery and enforced 
labour so that everyone could cultivate all their talents, writing plays in 
the morning, hunting in the afternoon and doing a bit of literary criti-
cism after dinner.
This vision, which is a normative shibboleth of socialist ideology, is 
essentially preserved in Feenberg’s critical theory, where it is technology 
as much as capitalist economic and social forms of organisation that 
prevents it from being realised. The paradox that technology, which Marx 
believed made his vision feasible by greatly enhancing human productive 
power, should be one of the forces ranged against the self- realisation of 
the species is already there in Marx’s writings. Feenberg’s innovation is 
to tackle it head- on, and his whole theory can be read as an attempt to 
resolve this problem in Marx’s work.
Marx’s problematic was taken over in the twentieth century by the 
Frankfurt School of critical theory, and this movement is the second 
key source for Feenberg’s theory. Famously, thinkers of the Frankfurt 
School combined Marx’s insights on capitalism and the new forms of 
authority and social power associated with it, including the authority 
of machinery, with Max Weber’s thesis that capitalist modernity is a 
social formation in the grip of ‘rationalisation’. The increased emphasis 
on instrumental efficiency that runs through modern institutional 
forms combines with a capitalist economy to produce new intensities 
of domination and associated human anguish. This leads Adorno and 
Horkheimer to characterise modern capitalism as a ‘total society which 
embraces all relations and emotions’ and eliminates any vestige of 
individuality by imposing ‘isolation in the forcibly united collectivity’ 
(1997: 36).1
Technology clearly plays an important role in any such negative char-
acterisation of modern society, and Feenberg considers the Frankfurt 
School thesis ‘dystopian’. Like Heidegger (another important source for 
Feenberg), Adorno and Horkheimer find technology implicated in the 
worst excesses of a social system based on quantification as the basis 
of strategies of control whose operations are inimical to meaning, even 
though the latter is clearly an essential dimension of human existence. 
However, Feenberg’s main influence here is Herbert Marcuse, who was 
famously associated with the Frankfurt School and shared many of 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s views on history, society and culture, but con-
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In the years after World War Two in particular, Marcuse argued that 
the negative image of modernity advanced by other Frankfurt School 
theorists was excessively pessimistic and in some ways a regression 
behind Marx, who had always emphasised capitalism’s vulnerability to 
explosive social contradictions, as well as its facility for producing fresh 
strategies to maintain itself. Marcuse’s optimism about the potential of 
the student movement, noted in the Introduction, contrasted markedly 
with Horkheimer’s more pessimistic view, as did his more measured 
view of the Eastern bloc. In his One- Dimensional Man (1964) Marcuse 
presented an image of modern societies that was similar to the world of 
total administration depicted in Adorno and Horkheimer’s work, but he 
also identified positive political potential in a new generation of young 
technologists, who he thought might be inclined to design technics for a 
better civilisation (1964: 227– 229). This idea is an important launching- 
off point for Feenberg’s theory.
To develop this notion further, Feenberg engages with a third branch 
of scholarship, namely the constructivism associated with science and 
technology studies (STS), which came to prominence in the academy in 
the 1980s. Work in this school focused on the underdetermined char-
acter of technological artefacts, especially in their development phase 
(e.g. Bijker et al 1989). No strictly technical imperative leads from the 
discovery of wheels, pedals, handlebars, even pneumatic tyres, to what 
we know as the bicycle. Rather, the presence of such physical elements 
has to be parsed through the opinions and verbal behaviours of ‘rele-
vant social agents’ for such an object to be produced. The meanings that 
shape technologies are social products, while the uses to which they are 
put emerge retrospectively:  technologies and the problems they solve 
emerge in the course of the same social processes.
In constructivism Feenberg finds the opening he needs for critical 
theory to build on Marcuse’s insight. If technology is not historically 
determinate but rather itself a dependent variable of the social pro-
cess then it must be possible for human beings to influence its design. 
Constructivist studies of technology describe the social shaping of tech-
nology, showing how the beliefs and values of social groups affect the 
design of nascent technologies, especially in their development phase. 
Critical theorists had argued that technology framed modern society and 
culture, limiting the range of meaningful human experience. Marcuse’s 
suggestion is that technical transformation might be the way to address 
these issues. Constructivism equips Feenberg with tools for the devel-
opment of a political theory of technology applicable to the question 
of radical socialist transformation and thereby enables him to address 
the unresolved paradox in Marx’s thought on the issue. Each of these 
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1 Feenberg’s Marx
Feenberg shares Marx’s core conviction that, ‘the goal of a good society 
should be to enable human beings to realize their potentialities to the 
fullest’ (2002:  19). According to Marx, this society was coming within 
reach of humanity, largely as a result of the astonishing rate of develop-
ment of productive power made possible in the nineteenth century by 
industrial technology. Industrial society was so wealthy that for the first 
time in history, universal human self- realisation was becoming a prac-
tical possibility.
Marx was one of the first philosophers to place technology at the centre 
of his understanding of the human condition. Many of his arguments, 
while controversial when he made them, have become almost common 
sense today. In particular, Marx was the first to suggest that the histor-
ical process rests centrally on the development of the productive forces. 
He famously argued that human experience, culture and civilisation 
turn not, as his contemporaries tended to argue, on providence or the 
unfolding of some spiritual purpose, but on the material practices that 
people engage in to produce and reproduce their material conditions of 
existence. Technology, or the means humans use to manipulate the world 
in order to extract what they need from it to survive and thrive, is cen-
tral to this, and changes to technical capacity, in particular those that 
improve productivity, drive social change.
At the same time, Marx was also a critic of technology, especially 
nineteenth- century industrial machinery. He argued that in the capitalist 
organisation of production,
all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical 
inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation 
of the producers. (1990: 799)
According to his theory of history, capitalism is a necessary phase of 
development that human societies must pass through if they are to reach 
the level of productivity required to sustain socialism. As this citation 
indicates, however, it is not a pleasant experience for most people because 
in this society only a small number of people enjoy the benefits of the 
new levels of productive power. For the majority, the new machines are a 
source of suffering, both physical and in terms of changes to social exist-
ence that correspond to the domination and exploitation Marx refers to 
here. Ultimately, though, Marx writes in the Grundrisse that the tech-
nology designed to dominate workers reduces necessary labour to a min-
imum and, for this reason, ‘will redound to the benefit of emancipated 
labour and is the condition of its emancipation’ (1981: 701).
In Capital, Marx describes the capitalist development of industrial 
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the mid- seventeenth to the late eighteenth century and was based on 
the workshop. Workers who had formerly worked in their own homes 
using craft techniques and personalised implements found them-
selves reduced to the level of operating machines owned by capitalists. 
They lost their craft relation with the labour process, which they no 
longer controlled, and became deskilled. They also lost connection 
with the finished product, only engaging with the part of it that dir-
ectly involved their efforts. Marx writes that this phase:  ‘converts the 
worker into a crippled monstrosity … the individual himself is divided 
up, and transformed into the automatic motor of a detailed operation’ 
(1990: 481).
With the spread of steam power in the early nineteenth century, how-
ever, a further change to the organisation of the factory occurs. Human 
workers cease to be the power source, and the various machines are 
hooked up into a single system, in which the worker’s role is further 
diminished to providing ‘supplementary assistance’. From this point on, 
machines constitute an ‘automatic system’ which grows ‘spontaneously 
on a material basis … adequate for it’ (1990: 504). Workers become just 
a part of the industrial machine system; their activity is planned and 
imposed from outside by the mechanism. All parts of the process are 
subject to the same ‘technical law’ (1990: 465).
This development involves the emergence of a new form of authority, 
invested in the machinery itself. Marx’s lifelong collaborator Friedrich 
Engels clarified the role of machinery in social domination in the 
following terms:
The automatic machinery of a big factory is much more despotic than 
the small capitalists who employ workers have ever been … If man, by 
dint of his knowledge and inventive genius, has subdued the forces of 
nature, the latter avenge themselves on him, in so far as he employs 
them, to a veritable despotism independent of all social organisation. 
(Marx and Engels 1958: 637)
Technology here embodies social functions that are wider in their signifi-
cance than merely enhancing productivity and efficiency. The machines 
are authoritative in the sense that they represent, to their human users 
and to society as whole, the only viable course of action. Their rise to 
power, so to speak, is a function of the fact that in order to maximise 
its productive capabilities the workplace must be tyrannised by the 
articulated, steam- powered system. The human consequences of these 
developments include further deskilling and reduction of workers’ con-
trol over the production process, and their subordination to a new source 
of authority. These developments appear to the people involved as the 
inevitable consequence of new technology, as the price to be paid for its 
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When reflecting on its historical significance, Marx enthused about 
this development of the productive forces, arguing that for the first time 
in human history the species might reach a stage at which each indi-
vidual could fulfil their potential. If the productive power of the indus-
trial system could be freed from the constraints of having to produce for 
profit and instead be directed to producing to meet real human needs, 
he argued, then everyone would be free to devote their time to leisure 
and self- cultivation. The transition was deeply problematic, however, 
because of the multiple entanglements of technology and its liberating 
potential with existing society and culture.
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology and his notion of technical 
politics are situated within this, Marx’s problematic. Focusing particu-
larly on what Marx has to say about technology, we are confronted with 
the problem, alluded to above, that Marx is both an enthusiast for tech-
nology, viewing it as carrying humanity forward to a superior form of 
social life, and deeply concerned about it as a force that diminishes 
the meaning of human activity while becoming a locus of domination 
exerting control over human actions.2
Focusing on Marx’s critical comments on technology, Feenberg iden-
tifies three lines of argument, which he calls the design, process and 
product critiques (2002: 46– 48). The design critique concerns the way 
that technology is constructed and shaped to serve particular social 
purposes. Feenberg cites Marx when he points out that ‘it would be pos-
sible to write a whole history of the inventions made since 1830 for the 
sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against working class 
revolt’ (1990:  593). According to Marx, capitalists are motivated to 
produce technology that is harmful to workers in ways that underscore 
two further lines of critique. Machines are weapons against workers’ 
combining to oppose and resist capitalists at the point of production, 
since they foster job insecurity. They are also introduced to reduce the 
cost of production, and this is commonly about reducing the wage bill 
by shedding employees and getting machinery to do the work instead. 
The resulting diminution of quality in the work process itself, as workers 
become mere ‘assistants’, is what Feenberg calls Marx’s ‘process critique’.3
The third, product critique is present wherever Marx criticises 
wasteful or foolish employments of technical means. This particu-
larly concerns the production of commodities that correspond to 
artificial needs or even to things that are actually detrimental to 
human interests. An obvious target for the product critique might 
be the manufacture of weapons systems that are too powerful ever 
to be used, since this seems to be a misdirection of human technical 
capabilities.4 The category of artificial needs raises the question of 
what ‘real’ needs are and how they are to be defined. For now it is 






Critical theory and technology    27
27
privileged position in relation to the other two. This is because it is 
only as designed that technology is harmful to humans, wasteful or 
otherwise damaging.
If Marx assigns explanatory priority to machines and implements it is 
not because they are completely exempt from being themselves socially 
shaped. There are numerous references in Marx’s writings to social 
factors causing technology change to happen, even selecting specific 
technical designs. Describing the social changes that affected the cotton 
industry in eighteenth- century England, for instance, Marx writes that 
‘the revolution in cotton- spinning called forth the invention of the gin’ 
(1990: 505). As Alan Wood (2004) points out, the fact that technology 
turns out to explain social change even when it comes after it in time is 
not as implausible as it sounds.5 It does raise the question, though, of its 
entanglement with other, supposedly more malleable social factors.
Notwithstanding this, and the comment Feenberg cites from Capital 
above, there is not much evidence in Marx’s texts that he devoted any great 
critical energy to the social processes that shaped technology. Marx does 
not seem to see any paradox in his advocacy of technology as progress 
on one side and his critique of technology as regressive under capitalism 
on the other. His references to ‘dialectical inversion’ and ‘redounding’ in 
the sections cited above are masks on a potentially thorny question that 
he did not address directly.6 Feenberg’s project of developing a politics of 
technology design, or technical politics, is an attempt to make sense of 
this issue.
2 Sources of critique
If technology design is a dimension of the transition to a superior 
form of social life then Feenberg’s challenge in his critical theory of 
technology is to deepen the critical perspective on technology while 
maintaining a belief in science and in technology as basically progres-
sive. He needs to clarify what is wrong with capitalist technology in 
a way that is sufficiently profound and comports in particular with 
the critical explanation of modernity, while at the same time leaving 
a way open to changing it and preserving the basic Marxist belief in 
technology’s potential to be a force for human emancipation. To achieve 
this, he clarifies what is wrong with modern technology by drawing 
on insights from earlier thinkers both within and outside the Marxist 
tradition. Of particular importance here are the Frankfurt School crit-
ical theorists, who examined the implications of Marx’s core historical 
and economic propositions for twentieth- century culture. Simply put, 
Feenberg tries to use their ideas without lapsing into their stark con-
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Critical theory elaborates on three aspects of Marx that are of par-
ticular importance to Feenberg’s project. First, it builds on Marx and 
Engels’ argument, discussed above, about the relationship between tech-
nology and authority, showing that in capitalist modernity the two are 
linked through a mediating concept of social rationality. In the works 
of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, instrumental reason is the force 
that shapes the modern experience of the world. The Frankfurt School 
authors present a critique of modern science as the application of this 
kind of reasoning to the understanding of nature and the physical uni-
verse. They complain that this conceals or obscures aspects of the world 
and of experience that elude its in- built orientation towards measure-
ment and regularity.
This line of argument builds on Marx’s discussion of the sensory con-
figuration of the human creature and its modification over the course 
of the historical process. In early writings Marx described the ‘sheer 
estrangement’ in bourgeois society of all human senses in ‘the sense of 
having’ (1981:  94).7 In the rationalised version of capitalism, humans 
are geared up, so to speak, to relate narrowly to objects in the world 
in terms of what they can be used for or how they may be consumed, 
with a corresponding neglect of the full range of their potentialities. 
Underlying this perspective is the idea of a distortion of human and tech-
nical potentials as a result of what Feenberg calls ‘formal rationality’.8 The 
source for this idea is not Marx but Georg Lukàcs.
Lukàcs’s version of Marxism, as formulated in his 1923 (1981) classic 
History and Class  Consciousness, describes Marx’s philosophy as ‘the 
theory of totality’. On his reading of Marx, the standpoint of the prole-
tariat is unique because, while throughout history people who work have 
created social reality, industrial workers are the first group of such people 
who might become fully aware of their role and its implications. Whereas 
previous labouring classes have been in various ways fragmented and 
held apart by different social structures, in industrial capitalism their 
ontological role as creators is matched by their potential epistemic one 
as socially omniscient. Because workers are thrown together in a largely 
homogeneous social mass, sharing key experiences and a common cul-
ture, the working class are in a position to comprehend both the world they 
have created and their role in creating it. Thus, their self- emancipation 
is almost inevitable once they have access to the truth: why should they 
continue to produce enormous wealth, only for it to be appropriated by 
the bosses?
The main obstacle to proletarian self- emancipation, elaborated in 
Lukàcs’s account, is reification. This idea builds on Marx’s account of fet-
ishism in Capital, according to which the extraction of value in com-
modity production results in a strange inversion whereby objects that are 
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while the people whose labour produced them are exhausted and spent, 
coming to seem in their own eyes lifeless and inert. In reification the 
agents of history perceive themselves as incapable of effecting real change 
yet perceive their own collective products as vitally fascinating. Lukàcs 
generalises this analysis onto the whole of modern culture, arguing that 
reification is the central problem of modernity, resulting in the pervasive 
belief that the world is made up of causally interrelated objects whose 
logic overrides subjective considerations of quality, meaning and value.9
Lukàcs’s work was the focus of Feenberg’s first monograph study (his 
1981) and these ideas are central to the critical theory of technology. 
In that work Feenberg suggests that the most questionable element 
in Lukàcs’s theory is also his ‘most original and fruitful’ point, namely 
‘the discovery that linking all the phenomena of capitalist society Marx 
criticises, from fetishism to mechanisation and crises, there is a common 
structure, a pattern constituted by the imposition of formal rationality 
on the social world’ (1981: 76). Reification is a distorted perception of the 
world, then, that runs through modern science and culture and fosters a 
disposition to identify an instrumental pattern and connection between 
facts as the hallmark of a realistic understanding of the natural world and 
human social processes alike.10
Lukàcs’s idea of a distinctively instrumental reason as shaping modern 
experience is taken up by and becomes one of the unifying themes 
of Frankfurt School critical theory, uniting Adorno and Marcuse.11 
Instrumental or means- end reasoning is said to underpin modern science 
and to be implemented in the technology associated with it. Centrally, 
then, science purports to show the world as structured according to laws 
of causation that describe behavioural regularities. Science as such is 
true, in the sense that it consists, as Karl Popper (1989) would have it, in 
the open- ended refinement of propositions that are formulated to ensure 
they are falsifiable in principle. However, for Frankfurt School theorists 
the endless accumulation of yet- to- be- falsified statements that makes up 
scientific knowledge misses something deep as a result of a flaw in its 
fundamental orientation to the world.
Scientific reasoning works from the assumption that there is a 
knowing subject and an external world of objects. Taking this distinction 
as fundamental, it concentrates attention on the subjective image of the 
outer world and, by controlling experience through the construction of 
experiments and tests, seeks to refine that image by eliminating fallacies, 
misconceptions and falsehoods (these may originate in such things as 
deficiencies of reasoning, failures of language or lack of evidence). But 
what if the premise  – of a discrete, knowing subject and an opaque 
object – is itself wrong? Critical theory prefers to start by acknowledging 
that the subject is itself a part of nature; that the boundary between it 
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biological, to be sure, but is also shot through with social and cultural 
events and transformations. The appearance of an epistemic subject is 
itself one of these events, and it is no coincidence that it emerged at the 
same historical point (in the seventeenth century) as the ‘acquisitive indi-
viduals’ of bourgeois political theory (MacPherson 1962).
For Adorno, there is a basic tension between the success of science, 
especially its privileged form of rationality – deductive logic – and our 
more fundamental, intuitive sense of the world and our place in it. This 
tension is most clearly manifest in the continued existence of art as a 
social institution, which long since ceased to be based on standards 
of accuracy in representation (if it ever was) and presents images and 
experiences that are constitutively resistant to logical analysis. Art is a 
revealing anomaly in a thoroughly rationalised world. For Adorno – and 
indeed something similar obtains in Heidegger’s reflections on poetry 
(2014)12  – its continued existence and the fact that humans still seem 
to need it is suggestive of a fundamental dislocation within the spirit of 
modern life. Adorno maintains that what people get from art is reflection 
on and reaction against enforced identity, the subject– object split at the 
heart of modern science and technology.
This relates to Marx’s reflections on the experiential impoverishment 
of workers in capitalist society. In his 1844 manuscripts Marx bemoans the 
distorted development of the human senses, which become focused on 
owning things, while his later work highlights the brutalisation of human 
sensibilities in industrial labour. These developments have implications 
for the relationship of the species to the truth. Discerning a distinctive 
but largely implicit (unelaborated) epistemology here, Feenberg writes 
that Marx appears to be advocating ‘a unique form of phenomenalism’ 
(1981:  219). This is the basis upon which Feenberg advances an aes-
thetic dimension to his own critique of modernity and especially modern 
technology.
In Feenberg’s work the critique of scientific or instrumental reason 
in the Frankfurt School becomes the wry observation that scientific 
laws are ‘always subtly eccentric with respect to the real’ (1981: 274). He 
maintains that the goal of revolutionary politics is to change society, ‘in 
its most basic definition of reality, in its paradigm of rationality, in its 
founding practices’ (1981: 196), and he even claims that, ‘Marx founds 
a new concept of reason in revolution through an ontological treatment 
of social categories’ (1981: 2– 3; emphasis in original text). But even as 
he mines Marx for an implicit alternative epistemology, he redirects the 
efforts of critical theory away from a direct challenge to science or instru-
mental methods of analysis.
Feenberg also attempts to move beyond the principle of non- 
identity as the ground of critique. His inspiration for this is Marcuse. 
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having recourse to high art,13 it is possible to envisage a more political 
response to the rationalised cultural conditions described by critical 
theory. Paradoxically, this might even be made possible by developments 
within the sphere of technology itself. Marcuse provides a glimpse of a 
less dystopian perspective on technology when he entertains the possi-
bility that a new direction for technical development (1964:  227– 229) 
might arise immanently to the sphere of technology design, resulting 
in technics guided by freely chosen human ends and informed by aes-
thetic values (1964:  239– 240). He speculates that a new generation of 
technicians might create a less rationalised way of life not by renouncing 
technical reason but by putting a distinctive twist on it. The technics of 
the future might then comport with more liberated, experimental forms 
of social life. As Feenberg puts it, ‘Marcuse elaborated a positive theory 
of liberated technical practice’ (1981: 250).
Feenberg finds philosophical significance in Marcuse’s vision, arguing 
that it shows that non- identity is merely a negative principle which says 
only that science as it is now is not the whole truth while interpreting art 
as the sign of an insuperable absence, namely the missing reconciliation 
of humans with inner and outer nature. In his early work, Feenberg argues 
that Marcuse envisaged something more positive, namely the active rec-
onciliation of subject and object based on alternative technology:
Here the Frankfurt School’s insistence on non- identity is superseded 
by a different kind of identity, the identity of nature in subject and 
object, which recognises itself in reflection and aesthetic appreciation 
and mediates itself in a positing that affirms rather than transforms 
what is. (1981: 252)
This is an important passage because it highlights the fact that Feenberg 
skates close to the embrace of an ontological critique of capitalist mod-
ernity to be implemented, as it were, through a utopian technics of 
reconciliation. Critical theory’s attachment to non- identity as the only 
residue of meaningful resistance is here replaced by an organicist holism 
that affirms nature as the common basis in reality of subject and object. 
In declaring that his theory warrants a consciousness that affirms rather 
than resists identity and seeks a new, higher unity to be established on 
alternative technical foundations, Feenberg also theorises a political space 
within technology design, rather than denouncing technology as simply 
the agent of instrumentalism. This is the space of technical politics.
While the influence of Marcuse is clear in this discussion, it would be 
quite wrong to read Feenberg as simply recycling the ideas of an earlier 
generation of theorists. In particular, while he retains a critical focus on 
modes of rationality and the entanglements of scientific discourse in 
questions of social power, his critique of technology does not involve the 






32  Technical politics
that is common to Adorno and Heidegger. Feenberg detaches radical cri-
tique of technology from the question of whether science itself is biased. 
He writes that ‘we need not await the reform of science to reform techno-
logical design’ (2002: 28). This suggests that the nature he affirms in his 
vision of a future society is the same one that is studied by contemporary 
science. Feenberg is in this respect more philosophically conservative 
than earlier critical theorists but more politically radical: he drops the 
critique of identity- based epistemology but argues for the possibility of 
some kind of willed transformation of technology, which would be the 
solution to Marx’s paradox.
3 Ambivalence
Feenberg’s concept of ambivalence is intended to grasp the fact that the 
critical theory of technology sits between broad questions concerning 
the character of a civilisation and specific ones concerning how things get 
done. Culture, he says, is embedded in technology, which it needs to sur-
vive and to sustain itself as such, while technology is profoundly rooted 
in culture, from which it takes its challenges and problems. In this way, 
culture sets what he calls the horizon on technology while technology is 
a powerful determinant on social power relations within a culture. The 
web of dependencies here is central to Feenberg’s dialectic, which can be 
represented diagrammatically as shown in Figure 1.
For Feenberg, the ambivalence of technology consists in the fact 
that on one side it is a feature of daily life and as such routinely modi-
fied, contested and argued over with regard to specific things that it 
does:  solving or causing a problem, making a process more efficient, 
excluding some users, etc. On the other side, technology is closely bound 
up with the image people have of their society, even the civilisation of 
which they are members. The notions of ‘post- industrial’ or ‘informa-
tional’ society are used in a fairly routine way, for instance, and they 
suggest a mental map of the world that is coloured by a sense of tech-
nologies in their specific differences from others (this is explicit in the 
designation ‘post- industrial’, but implicit in the reference to IT, as against 
older machinery, in ‘informational society’).
Feenberg’s argument is that in ‘our modern society in which devices 
form a near total environment’ (2002: 17), everyday activities with tech-
nology touch upon the meaning of civilisation itself. Technology is 
shaped and moulded by social actors with competing and sometimes 
conflicting demands. When technology changes and new artefacts come 
into use, this feeds back into practice, changing the actors along with 
their requirements and expectations. Each such iteration, or twist in the 





Critical theory and technology    33
33
technology and, therefore, life itself. In a technical civilisation, or one 
that thinks of itself in those terms, these issues are mediated differently 
than in other societies.
The meaning of ‘technology’ in a society that has more mobile phones 
than humans is different than it was in one where most peoples’ experi-
ence of devices was the machinery they operated in the factory where they 
worked.14 Less obviously perhaps, this has implications for how people 
imagine the social world, including its possibilities, which Feenberg calls 
‘potential’, and the limitations set by society on what counts as ‘realistic’. 
A clear illustration of this point is the way that the use of social media 
has changed the meaning of ‘society’, raising hopes and fears in ways that 
scholars are still struggling to come to terms with.
There is a second dimension to Feenberg’s dialectic, however, which 
goes beyond the reflexive implications of new technologies for the 
meanings of old concepts. His argument is that the principled basis of 
social disputes over the meanings of specific devices also affects the 
cultural practices internal to technology development. In industrial 
society, he says, technology developed in a way that was largely autono-
mous, beyond the control of day- to- day struggles and contests. Large 
corporations and government research institutes controlled how tech-
nology was developed, with no interruptions from interested parties, 
citizen activists or non- expert groups. The result was a society that was 
largely deferential to the authority of technology and to its associated 
experts. This technocratic system was the dystopian social image targeted 
by the earlier generation of critical theorists discussed in the previous 
section.
Feenberg’s suggestion is that this part of the dialectic of technology 











Figure 1 Feenberg’s dialectic of technology
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technology design and even start to demand technologies that serve their 
interests rather than just those of powerful organisations and elites, so 
this has altered the way that they think about both technology and society. 
In this way, he says, the horizon on technology development – the kinds 
of things people expect technology to do and the ways in which they 
imagine it will do them – is being modified. Potentially, more democracy 
in the design of technology could bring about a wider, civilisational shift.
Iain Thomson, in his essay ‘Feenberg’s technical politics:  between 
substantivism and constructivism’, identifies a tension in Feenberg’s 
theory at this point. He writes: ‘the crucial question is: can ontic political 
decisions and resistance of the type Feenberg puts his faith in ever affect 
the kind of ontological change Heidegger seeks?’ (in Veak 2006:  60). 
This question is central to any assessment of the success or failure of 
Feenberg’s project, and therefore it is a central theme of the current 
work. Feenberg’s view is that, viewed in ontic terms, modern technology 
is ‘a human and environmental disaster’ (2002: 9). ‘Modern technology’, 
he writes, ‘embodies the values of a particular industrial civilization 
and especially those of elites that rest their claim to hegemony on tech-
nical mastery’ (2002: v). However, he doesn’t trace the negative impacts 
of technology to modern technology’s ‘essence’, as Heidegger does, but 
rather to its place in an ensemble of social and political relations.15
The problems posed by technology are in many ways cataclysmic, 
which sometimes leads Feenberg to write as if his theory participated in 
Heideggerian paranoia about the loss of a world, but his understanding of 
these problems and of technology’s role in them is consistently political, 
ontic rather than ontological. Feenberg is explicit in saying that this pos-
ition gives him access to the polemical and other features of what is known 
as a ‘substantivist’ critique of technology while maintaining a strictly 
social constructivist position. On this basis he consistently advocates a 
politicised constructivism, within which democracy is presented as the 
solution. When dealing with the threats technology poses, he writes:
The remedy is therefore not to be found in spiritual renewal but in a 
democratic advance. That advance implies a radical reconstruction of 
the technical basis of modern societies. (2002: 13– 14)
Whether this argument succeeds depends in part on the extent to which 
Feenberg’s reliance on characterising technology in terms of a distinctive 
rationality can really be distinguished from substantivist notions of 
enframing and a narrowing of worldview. It also turns on whether a con-
structivist, political grasp of technology as socially shaped can compre-
hend the kind of cultural and civilisational consequences that Feenberg’s 
critical theory highlights and purports to offer a way of changing. Finally, 
it depends crucially on whether democratisation and what he calls ‘re- 
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historical weight – of accounting for civilisational change – that Feenberg 
chooses to rest on them. These questions are central to the discussion 
that follows in later chapters of this book.
4 Technical reason
Feenberg sometimes freights technology with the kind of negative sig-
nificance assigned to it by earlier critical theorists and ‘substantivist’ 
philosophers of technology. At the same time, though, he maintains that 
the central concepts in his version of this negative characterisation are 
in fact ambivalent and reflect social determination, not conditioning by 
an unchanging essence of technology. This preserves a space in which 
technology might be contested and its design altered so as to facilitate a 
different kind of technical civilisation.
To clarify this, he introduces a key distinction between technical 
reason, which is present in any instance of technology regardless of con-
text, and what he calls ‘technological rationality’, which is specific to cap-
italist modernity and indeed hegemonic in that social formation. The 
thoroughgoing imbrication of these two – indeed, they are inseparable 
in practice – is what led the earlier generation of thinkers to view tech-
nology as irretrievably implicated in the dark side of modernity. In con-
trast, Feenberg maintains that technical reason might be liberated from 
its current entanglement in the socially dominant form of rationality and 
occupy a more benign place in an alternative constellation.
Calling technological rationality ‘hegemonic’ means that it is the 
dominant way of doing things and that it is so because it is perceived as 
objectively the right and ‘neutral’ way to solve problems. It is as a mani-
festation of technological rationality that technology is authoritative.16 
Technology as such is produced and sustained (in use) through a recip-
rocal interplay of technical solutions (devices and designs that work) and 
the prevailing conception of technology (as authoritative). There is cir-
cularity here: because technology ‘works’ it is seen as beyond question, 
and because it is authoritative it gets introduced into more situations, 
where it works.
Constructivist scholars have demonstrated that the idea of technology 
‘working’ is not as straightforward as it might seem. Their fables, which 
usually describe the early development of specific technologies, demon-
strate that the pattern in technology development is not the common 
sense one of a problem encountered and solved by a designed solution. 
Much more often, technology gets introduced to a pre- existing situation 
with a degree of indeterminacy about what it is ‘for’. Once it starts to 
operate then people discover how it ‘works’, in the sense that they learn 
how to operate it but also in the more surprising one that they learn its 
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capabilities and advantages and then restructure their practices around it, 
to extract some unanticipated (or barely glimpsed) benefit. As Feenberg 
puts it, ‘clarity on these matters is often the outcome rather than the pre-
supposition of technical development’ (2001: 79). A very clear illustration 
of this would be the home or personal computer of the 1980s, which, as 
Feenberg points out, was ‘launched on the market with infinite promise 
and no applications’ (2001: 85).
Technology, then, always appears to be the ‘obvious solution’ once it 
is present in a situation, and this is a key part of its peculiar authority. 
Machinery enters the workplace and is accepted because it is machinery – 
in Feenberg’s terms, it is ‘codified’ as such. Luddism – refusing to accept 
technology, or resisting the machines – has become the very paradigm of 
irrationality or eccentricity. Technological rationality is a codification of 
technical artefacts, which ensures that once they are in place in a given 
situation they reproduce the dominant structure of power. Technology 
both destabilises prior arrangements, since it imposes a change in what 
people do, and re- enforces social power relations to ensure that the new 
situation that emerges reproduces and extends the hold of dominant 
interests.
This seems very one- sided for a theory of ambivalence, but Feenberg’s 
metaphor of codification brings something to the situation that is absent 
when technology is conceived only as a mode of rationality, or ontologic-
ally as enframing the world. Codes are flexible: they can be interpreted 
and reinterpreted, and they can be turned around and used to make new 
programs, or ‘inscriptions’.17 If technical reason, the efficacious core of any 
given technology, is the key stake in the game, conditioning its employ-
ment and use, the moves in this game concern the details of design – that 
is, how that core of capabilities gets articulated to practical purposes, 
serving specific social interests in concrete situations. The meaning of 
ambivalence, therefore, is that while technology always advances social 
domination, it also tends to proliferate openings for people to exploit, 
through which they can resist power and extract unintended benefits for 
themselves.
Feenberg does not conceive reformed technology in terms of a 
different world- revealing, which would be the ontological conception of 
civilisation change, but rather anticipates that multiple, local contests for 
control over the meanings of different technological capacities will add 
up to a shift in the meaning of technology as a whole. Such a change 
would of necessity be part of a wider change to the way that people con-
ceive the social world and their place in it, and, as discussed above, for 
Feenberg technology would be central to this. As part of this transform-
ation, technology might lose its authoritative character and its asso-
ciation with dominant social interests, though this is not a possibility 
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what substantivists would understand as an alternative world- revealing, 
but, unlike his critical theory forebears, Feenberg is not focused on 
this aspect and it is not one of his objectives to set out a theory that 
comprehends civilisation change in those terms.
One strength of his theory is precisely that it considers technology and 
the question of technology design independently of ideas about science. 
Treating technology as autonomous of science saves Feenberg from the 
charge of prevarication between substantivism and constructivism. His 
disavowal of the critique of physical and natural sciences, which contrasts 
with his view of the human sciences,18 means that the question of alterna-
tive modes of world- revealing is, at the very least, deferred. Technology 
reform may ultimately issue in a change of civilisational paradigm, but 
the implications of this for how humans relate to and understand nature 
are a function of technical politics and not the other way around. In this 
sense Feenberg is firmly on the side of constructivists, who limit their 
analyses to accounts of proximal factors shaping this or that individual 
technology design. His focus is not on deepening such accounts in the 
direction of their implications for ontology but rather in broadening 
them to include an account of their political significance.
As stated in the Introduction, Feenberg’s engagement with construct-
ivism was decisive in the development of his theory. Constructivist 
scholars provide detailed historical accounts of the social shaping of tech-
nical artefacts. They show how the competing interests of different social 
actors at the scene of invention and in the various phases of product devel-
opment are manifest in (sometimes opposed or conflicting) descriptions. 
These latter are more or less determinate in their consequences for the 
resulting artefacts, depending on the support they get from wider social 
constituencies. For some people, bicycles were ‘safety’ bicycles, while 
others sought the more excitingly named ‘bone shakers’, and it was a 
social conflict or competition between these social groups that finally 
shaped the modern bike, rather than any narrow technical consider-
ations (Bijker et al 1989).
A widely acknowledged failing of constructivist work is that while 
these narratives disclose the importance of social actions and actors 
in making technologies what they are, they do so largely in abstraction 
from questions of social power or politics (Winner 1993). Constructivist 
studies in STS effectively relativise the whole question of what technology 
is to its social co- ordinates, highlighting the role of motivated human 
choices above all other factors in the shaping of artefacts. The focus is on 
a specific ‘semiotic hinge’ (Bijker 1997: 197), where words and meanings 
from limited practical contexts get folded into the specifications for a 
‘good’ tool. This is a strangely decontextualised approach to language and 
design communities, which almost always brackets out wider sociological 
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regarding the wider cultural context and how its meanings limit and con-
dition more proximal actors’ choices.
However, for Feenberg, constructivism puts a helpful spotlight 
on the role of human agency in technology design. Technology is not 
determined by science or by standards that are technical ‘in- themselves’. 
Rather, constructivists show that technical choices are ‘underdetermined’ 
by such considerations: whenever any two technologists disagree over a 
design decision then social factors are in play. The constructivist scholar 
pores over diaries and notebooks to identify what they were and to chart 
the social ‘causes’ that inform each step (e.g. Bijker 1997). But while they 
identify ‘the social’ as the shaping force, they tend to overlook its contra-
dictory and conflicted nature, with the result that their narratives, while 
sometimes replete with surprising insights pertinent to the history of 
specific artefacts, lack critical force or purchase on the wider entangle-
ments of technological designs.
Feenberg agrees with the basic constructivist insight that ‘many paths 
lead out from the first forms of a new technology’ and that ‘there are always 
viable technical alternatives that might have been developed in place of 
the successful one’ (2001: 10). However, he politicises constructivism by 
observing that the social context itself contains contradictions and that, 
beyond the narrow set of group- specific rival interpretations that tend 
to manifest in laboratory disputes, social power is a factor in overde-
termining design. On this basis, Feenberg concludes that ‘The evolution 
of technology can no longer be regarded as an autonomous process but 
must be rooted in interests and social forces’ (2002: 49). His main innov-
ation in relation to constructivism consists in his understanding of those 
forces in terms of a theory of their historical and political significance.
By articulating the constructivist insight that the notion of ‘working’ 
technology is a product of multiple social determinations to the Marxian 
critique of technology design as shaped by class interests, Feenberg rad-
ically alters the significance of constructivism. The point then becomes 
not that inefficient technology might be ‘equally as good’ as efficient tech-
nology, whatever that might mean, but that efficiency itself is a socially 
contested notion, and one that is an important stake in many of the wider 
social disputes that shape technology development.
Feenberg (2003) explains what he means by this in an analysis of 
exploding boilers on nineteenth- century steamships. Company owners 
favoured boilers made with thinner outer skins because, using less metal, 
they were cheaper to make. However, these boilers were dangerous, as they 
tended to explode when pressure levels were high for extended periods 
of time. The explosions killed workers and cost the company money. 
Overall, though, in the eyes of the companies it was more efficient to con-
tinue using exploding boilers than to spend the extra money on safe ones. 
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Trades unions countered the idea that exploding boilers were best not 
by demanding less efficient machinery but by insisting that not blowing 
up workers should be part of the meaning of ‘efficiency’: machinery that 
occasionally kills its operatives cannot be considered efficient, even if it 
is more profitable.
Using this and other examples, Feenberg extends the constructivist 
insight that technology is technically underdetermined into controver-
sies and discussions that are inherently political, rather than merely gen-
erating intriguing little tales that narrate the emergence of this or that 
device. In this way constructivism becomes a methodological first prin-
ciple for technical politics. Feenberg argues that in recent decades there 
has been increased willingness among widening groups of people to 
engage in disputes about how technology should be used, including what 
the best and most efficient employment of it might be. Constructivism 
shows how social processes like this can alter technology design, focusing 
particularly on how rival social groups use language to shape technology 
to their ends by advancing descriptions that reflect the interest they take 
in it. This corresponds to Feenberg’s notion of a technical code that can 
be reworked.
To develop the idea that disputes over the way technology is described 
should be understood as a struggle for control of its code, Feenberg draws 
on Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse. Foucault’s studies of madness 
(1985) and medicine (1986) showed that bodies of scientific know-
ledge are both reliable representations of social reality and inscribed 
in practices that produce the world they describe. Psychiatry is both 
objective knowledge regarding mental illness and, as discourse, itself an 
objective structure that works through institutions and practices to sort 
the world into fixed categorical orderings (sane/ insane; well/ unwell). 
These categories are both true, in the sense that phenomena are pulled 
together under them in a way that ‘works’, and shot through with social 
power: the insane and the sick are silenced and assigned a passive place 
within the institutional order while experts are given rights and entitle-
ments to dispose over them.
Viewing technology as a mode of discourse enables Feenberg to extend 
the application of Foucault’s thesis of an intimate alignment of knowledge 
and power. His argument casts technology as a structural component of 
modern societies aligned to the aforementioned discourses and practices. 
Like language, or discourse, technology is a material force in the world 
and an agent of the imposition of a particular rationality. Coming to 
terms with this, as the example of Luddism shows, involves internalising 
certain norms and complying with the rules that flow from them – not 
breaking the machines, following the instructions, etc. This reckoning 
with the authority of the machine is part of becoming a normalised sub-
ject rather than a deviant one. As Feenberg puts it, ‘the condensation of 
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social and technical determinations tends more and more to appear as 
the very definition of rationality’ (2002: 67).
According to Foucault, reason itself is produced through these dis-
cursive codifications:  rational subjects are defined by their avoidance 
of behaviour that has been labelled ‘mad’. Being rational does not entail 
adherence to the rigorous procedures of logic – ‘mad’ people are often 
quite good at that  – it means having the code work its way through 
one’s body to produce a particular kind of interface with the wider social 
world. Those whose bodies do not accept the code find themselves on 
the wrong side of the lines drawn by discourse and become objects 
rather than subjects of discourse. As such they are effectively deprived 
of language as a resource for making sense of experience. Foucault’s 
avowed aim in his famous book about madness was to reinscribe ‘mad’ 
people’s experience in the historical record and in this sense to let 
unreason speak.
Some Foucault scholarship has highlighted the similarity between 
his thought and that of Heidegger (Eribon 2011: 85; Han 1998: 12). Both 
identify objective scientific- technical institutions and structures with a 
particular worldview that is associated with domination. For Foucault 
this is the modern episteme; for Heidegger it is Western metaphysics. 
Both thinkers highlight the role of reason and rationality as promoting 
a practice of sense- making that is exclusionary:  Foucault writes of the 
‘rarefaction’ of discourse (Foucault 1981:  58), the way that it excludes 
prohibited, illicit formulations and ways of speaking about and interacting 
with the world that are considered unacceptable by power. Similarly, per-
haps, Heidegger writes that the essence of modern technology is nothing 
technological but is rather a ‘world- revealing’ that only discloses raw 
material to be used, excluding other ways of being.
Feenberg draws on Foucault, however, primarily as a critical theorist of 
rationality.19 His interest is not in highlighting an ‘other’ of technological 
reason which might correspond to the utopian technologies of the future, 
but rather in another aspect of Foucault’s critique, namely his thesis that 
there is no power without resistance. Whereas Heidegger’s critique of 
modern rationality leads to a search for poetic language to articulate the 
fundamental homelessness of modern humans in a world fashioned by 
instrumental reason and domination, Foucault shows that the order of 
discourse can only produce a normalised subject because it (discourse) 
always encounters resistance. No one is completely normal:  everyone 
dabbles in madness, often positively framing it as ‘character’ or ‘person-
ality’. In the interstices of a legislated normality the more fundamental 
condition is strangeness, difference.20
Feenberg argues that such difference tends also to emerge in human 
relations with technology. This means that, viewed as the inscrip-






Critical theory and technology    41
41
only efficacious because it runs up against a buffer, namely the human 
element. This element is, of course, compliant; the program compiles 
and runs in the sense that human beings use the technology effectively. 
At the same time, however, they resist, not by smashing the machines 
(they aren’t ‘insane’) but by exploring possibilities and capacities within 
the devices. Gamers modify game code, for example, to unlock or even 
to create ‘cheats’, patients’ groups circumvent safety regimes to claim 
an active role in drug trials, unemployed people use hacked software to 
game government ‘job- seeking systems’ and so on.
Drawing on Michel de Certeau’s (1984) distinction between strategy 
and tactics, Feenberg writes that the strategic standpoint of managers 
implementing technology ‘privileges considerations of control and effi-
ciency’ (2002:  16), while the tactical standpoint of the managed is ‘far 
richer’. Tactical operations on the part of multitudinous subjects are 
grounded in the ‘everyday life- world of a modern society in which 
devices form a nearly total environment’ (2002: 17) and create openings 
in technology design. These diverse, widely diffuse practices of resistance 
centred on the contextual meanings of technology are challenges to the 
authority of technologists, managers and technology itself. For Feenberg 
they add an indispensable dimension to the extension of democracy 
envisaged in the Marxist critique of capitalism.
5 Technology and socialist transition
When Feenberg writes that ‘under socialism, workers … can change the 
very nature of technology’ (2002: 53), he envisages not a wholesale, all- 
at- once transformation in what we mean by ‘technology’ but rather a 
series of changes to tool and machinery design which, taken in aggre-
gate, will amount to a drastic overhaul of the material infrastructure 
of society and of the human relationship to that infrastructure and the 
world beyond it. Under socialism, thinking technically will carry with it a 
set of different connotations than those that come to mind at present. If 
capitalist technology symbolises efficiency, authority and enhanced con-
trol, socialist techniques will be disposed towards the solving of human 
problems, greater care for the environment and the qualitative enhance-
ment of human experience. Feenberg’s vision is firmly focused on polit-
ical change and the place of technology in securing and implementing 
that change, with the issue of fundamental world- relations, including a 
less instrumental relationship with nature, a more distant concern.
Feenberg upholds the constructivist principle that technology is only 
as it is codified and not anything ‘in- itself ’. Hence, the codification can 
be changed, pushing technology into new forms and, potentially at least, 
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the material reality of technology will be affected so that designs will 
bear the impress of a different cultural reality, and this in turn will alter 
the prevailing idea of what technology is or can be, and of what natural 
reality is like and how it should be approached. This way of construing 
things frustrates Thomson and leads him, in the above-mentioned crit-
ical essay, to view Feenberg as caught between essentialism and con-
structivism. Thomson’s critique misses the mark, but it highlights the 
problem that politics is a multi- layered practice operative across more 
than one temporal register. Workplace arguments over the most efficient 
use of e- mail, for example, are at several steps’ remove from more long- 
standing conventions and codifications that condition what technology is 
and can be. At times, in his development of technical politics, Feenberg 
conflates these two levels of analysis.
This enables him to suggest that principled interventions in tech-
nology design – in favour of designs that broaden participation, against 
those that deskill or dehumanise workers, for instance – obviously com-
port with a wider shift in the technological imaginary, or the place people 
assign to technology in their mental model of society. This is an intri-
guing claim, on which much else in Feenberg’s theory rests, but it also 
raises many questions, which, as we will see later, he doesn’t address. 
It must be acknowledged that there is a kind of evasion here when it 
comes to discussing and classifying actual technologies in terms of the 
political dramaturgy that underpins Feenberg’s thesis. How much of 
the discussion around any given technology is susceptible to analysis in 
terms of its democratic or aesthetic principles? Moreover, the notion that 
functioning artefacts are thoroughly shaped by such concerns seems to 
assume that they (the artefacts) have nothing to say about their role in 
the situations in which they operate.
Feenberg envisages a technical politics in which people enthuse about 
and participate in technologies and technical decisions without direct ref-
erence to wider ontological issues. His conviction is that in making design 
more democratic and in opening it up to aesthetic values that humanise 
technology, it will be improved. Feenberg writes that in a socialist society, 
‘reconstruction would not be determined by immanent laws of techno-
logical development but on the contrary by social and political choices’ 
(2002: 51). His argument is that these choices can be determinate for tech-
nology design and that the outcome of democratic design will be a change of 
civilisational model. The idea of technical politics connects these two things 
and is what enables Feenberg to evade the charge of prevarication levelled at 
him by Thomson. Feenberg is determinedly not an essentialist, but whether 
he succeeds in building a bridge between the ontic and ontological levels 
depends on your assessment of the overall success of his theory.
The vision of broad societal transformation effected by politicised 
technology development is informed by the affirmative principle that 
 
Critical theory and technology    43
43
a better world is possible and the belief that technology design is an 
important, perhaps the most important, part of how that world can 
be created. This attitude includes openness to, perhaps even faith in, 
the idea of a technological event that might produce the kind of global 
perspective shift required to take us into a new civilisation. There is, 
though, no account in Feenberg’s theory of how such an event might 
be willed into existence. Feenberg is not asking us to start imagining 
new technologies for a new world. The technology he affirms is the 
technology that is here now, among us. His theory reflects the fact 
that people seem to be engaging with that, arguing about it and chan-
ging it in ways that were unthinkable just a few decades ago. There is 
no ‘essence’ of technology to contend with and, even if there were, his 
technical politics does not go there. Technical politics involves chal-
lenging bias in existing technology designs. Feenberg’s theory targets 
the underlying logics that produce such bias and identifies openings for 
the development of alternative design principles, including aesthetic 
values, which might inform the development of an alternative tech-
nology for a better civilisation. These themes are the focus of the next 
four chapters.
Notes
1 They write that ‘today machinery disables men even as it nurtures them’ 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 1997: 37).
2 Marx writes, for example, that the dreadful conditions in nineteenth- century 
garment factories were ‘nurtured by the very nature of the sewing machine’ 
and says that the ‘fearful increase in death from starvation during the past 
ten years in London runs in parallel with the extension of machine sewing’ 
(1990: 601, 603).
3 There is disagreement in the literature over the ways in which this might 
matter. For those who focus on Marx’s later writings, the diminution of the 
quality of the labour process under capitalism will be offset by a reduction 
in the quantity of labour undertaken in socialism. Everyone will have to do 
a little bit of unpleasant work, but the real focus of life will be leisure time. 
For interpreters who are more influenced by Marx’s early works, especially the 
1844 Manuscripts, the realm of ‘all- round development’ entails a qualitative 
shift in the character of work so that it becomes, as Marx put it in one of his 
later texts, ‘life’s prime want’ (1978: 18). It is obviously harder to reconcile that 
view with the notion that communism inherits its technical foundation from 
capitalism.
4 Marx writes that ‘the field of application for machinery would … be entirely 
different in a communist society from what it is in bourgeois society’ (1990: 515 
fn 33).
5 Hysteresis is, or can be, a feature of functional explanations. Cohen (1978) and 
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6 Marx’s failure to address the question is largely reproduced in recent schol-
arly literature. For example, David Harvey, in his commentary on Capital, 
touches on the paradox discussed here but then defers serious reflection on 
it, writing only that ‘a socialist revolutionary project in the long term cannot 
… avoid the question of the definition of an alternative technological basis’ 
(2010: 219; my emphasis).
7 The abolition of private property would lead to the ‘emancipation of all human 
senses and qualities’, presumably meaning that the world would feel different 
to liberated humans (1981: 94).
8 This designation is not, of course, original to Feenberg – but he gives it a new 
priority, as will be explored further in the next chapter.
9 For Lukàcs, the solution lies in revolutionary praxis oriented to breaking 
down the twin illusions of the vivacity of things and the passivity of people in 
the process of building a revolutionary party.
10 Applied to technology, Lukàcs’s concept of reification bears strong resem-
blance to Martin Heidegger’s notion of enframing. As Lucien Goldmann 
pointed out (1977), Lukàcs formulated his ideas some decades earlier and 
was almost certainly an unacknowledged influence on Heidegger’s thinking.
11 One of the aims of the current book is to correct Feenberg’s pro- Marcuse bias 
and to show that on certain key points Adorno is a more useful ally to the crit-
ical theory of technology.
12 Heidegger (2013,  chapter 1) targets a sense that something is missing from 
modern experience which can be addressed not directly from within that 
experience but only allusively, using poetic language. The continued hold of 
poetry on moderns, who are taught from a young age to favour practical and 
effective modes of action, speaks to the sense of something profound being 
overlooked.
13 According to Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘With the progress of Enlightenment, 
only authentic works of art were able to avoid the mere imitation of that 
which already is’ (1997: 18) – that is, to escape the logic of equivalence and 
exchange.
14 Feenberg refers to ‘an earlier consensus’ that ‘brooked no interference with 
the decisions of technical experts’ and contrasts this with the ‘increasing 
weight of pubic actors in technological development’ (2002: 24). The latter 
seems to occur with the rise of digital technologies but is not limited to them 
in its effects.
15 ‘Substantive theory identifies the values embodied in current designs with the 
essence of technology as such … By contrast, the design critique relates the 
values embodied in technology to a social hegemony’ (Feenberg 2002: 64).
16 Identifying the authoritative character of technology with its purported 
rationality is now so ingrained in the Marxist tradition as to be almost a habit. 
For example, Gregory Claeys, in his introduction to Marx and Marxism, 
suggests that, for Marx, ‘technological rationality seemingly defines the 
limits of political will’ (2018:  211), yet the phrase never appears in any of 
Marx’s texts.
17 There is a parallel here with feminist theorists Dona Haraway (1991) and 
N. Katherine Hayles (1999), who also contrast the incorporation of technology, 
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inscription, which is a process of refashioning, rewriting the tool – quite lit-
erally, in the age of programmable devices and platforms. Like Feenberg, they 
identify positive political potential in these practices of inscription.
18 In this respect Feenberg’s critique resembles that of Michel Foucault, who 
also contrives to place the hard sciences outside the purview of his critique of 
epistemology (for discussion, see Eribon 2011: 358– 370).
19 Feenberg is quite selective in his use of Foucault’s ideas. It is worth noting 
that the latter rejected a strong association of his approach with that of crit-
ical theory, saying:  ‘I don’t think that the Frankfurt School can accept that 
what we need to do is not recover our lost identity, or liberate our imprisoned 
nature, or discover our fundamental truth; rather, it is to move towards some-
thing altogether different’ (2002:  275). This remark applies equally well to 
Feenberg’s project of redeeming technology by way of progressive rational-
ization articulated through democratic technical politics.
20 The priority of the pathological over the healthy was explored by Foucault’s 









The theory of bias and the ethics 
of technology design
This chapter focuses on Feenberg’s development of a theory of bias in 
technology designs. The idea of bias is central to his overall project of 
developing a critical theory of technology, since it explains the entangle-
ment of technology in issues of social power and domination. Feenberg 
argues that technology in modern societies is ‘formally biased’ and uses 
this idea to identify technology design as a field that is thoroughly polit-
ical yet rarely recognised or theorised as such. The notion of formal bias 
establishes a space for critical and ethical concerns within technology 
and technology studies.
Like other critical theorists, Feenberg presents a philosophical argu-
ment whose viability rests crucially on philosophy’s inclusion in its 
own discourse of insights from other scholarly disciplines, especially 
the study of politics and society. At the same time, the argument is 
intended to open a route for philosophy to ‘speak’ to other disciplines 
as well – in particular, to cast a critical light on contingent features of 
social reality that those disciplines study ‘up close’, so to speak.1 In the 
case of critical theory of technology, if it is to be anything more than 
a scholastic reflection on technology’s relation to society, Feenberg’s 
philosophy must connect with disciplines that study and participate in 
technology design.
Feenberg presents the idea of bias as a way to clarify issues of social 
fairness at stake in technology design because it enables critical theory to 
engage with and mediate ideas from technical and other disciplines while 
decisively liberating the theory from its essentialist heritage. Drawing 
on social theory rather than philosophy, Feenberg aligns the ‘neutral’ 
appearance of technology with Max Weber’s thesis that modern soci-
eties are characterised by ‘rationalisation’. Technology is viewed both as 
an agent in that process and as being itself shaped by it, which is why it 
appears to be both rational (neutral) and a factor in alienation and the 
loss of meaning associated with cultural modernity.
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In this chapter, I argue that the concept of bias is more useful when 
detached from the theme of societal rationalisation and deployed instead 
as the conceptual route towards a technology design ethics. Bias in tech-
nology design is better understood without invoking different modes of 
rationality, which are too broad to afford a secure grip on contemporary 
social phenomena. Instead, philosophical concerns can gain a foothold 
in technical politics by identifying normative principles immanent to 
design practice, understood as a special kind of communicative process.
Section 1 describes Feenberg’s preferred account of modernity and 
its relationship to rationalisation. This section shows how, rejecting the 
option of an essentialist critique of technology, Feenberg clears the way 
for a strictly contextual understanding of bias in technology design. It 
presents his argument that in capitalist societies technology can both 
be formally neutral  – that is, not obviously designed to be unfair  – 
and yet function to produce and reinforce social injustices. Feenberg 
explains this, the formal bias of capitalist technology, with reference to 
the uniquely formal character of rationality in modern societies, which 
he says skews contemporary technology design. This section identifies a 
tension or discrepancy between Feenberg’s emphasis on the problematic 
character of abstract ‘formal reason’ and his focus on concrete instances 
of bias in technology, of the kind that concerned Marx.
The next two sections present a detailed analysis of the concept of 
formal bias, concentrating particularly on Feenberg’s presentation of the 
concept in his (2010) Between Reason and Experience. There he suggests 
that there may be several versions of formal bias and focuses on two of 
them, which he calls ‘constitutive’ and ‘implementation’ bias. Subjecting 
this argument to critical scrutiny, Section 2 argues that the distinction 
requires further clarification. In particular, there appears to be some 
overlap between constitutive formal bias and the kind of substantive 
design bias Feenberg says he rejects.
The discussion then moves to the test implied by Feenberg’s discus-
sion for the presence of formal bias in technology design. This turns 
on two features of the situation, namely (1) the nature of the intention 
through which technology comes to bear the impress of social determin-
ations, and (2) the sociologically understood consequences of the design 
in practice. The formal bias of capitalist technology involves a distinct-
ively ‘neutral’, or value- free, consciousness on the part of technologists 
that is focused on efficiency gains. Paradoxically, this is what generates 
biased designs that systematically favour one social group. Technology is 
formally biased only in context, and the outcomes generated by a tech-
nology design are contingent features that emerge when the technology 
is operational in a specific social setting. Of particular importance here 
are outcomes that favour the reproduction of what Feenberg calls the 
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Formal bias is present when neutral intentions at the scene of design 
are conjoined with the socially regressive enlargement of operational 
autonomy for favoured groups. Section 3 highlights the existence of 
cases that are problematic for this theory and clarifies the ambiguity 
concerning constitutive formal bias. The purpose of this argument is to 
rehabilitate a version of substantive bias but without opening a door to 
Feenberg’s Heideggerian and conservative critics, whose substantivism 
consists in maintaining there is something essentially malign about 
modern technology. Instead, it becomes clear that substantive technical 
bias is a meaningful category because bias is a property of all technology, 
even though the precise nature of this bias can only ever be specified 
in social context. The point is that technology designs are biased – that 
is, they are substantively inclined to favour some interests over others – 
even when they do not fit either of Feenberg’s definitions (constitutive 
or implementation) of formal bias. These technologies are sociologic-
ally significant in their effects, and their problematic nature arises from 
their technological character (they present issues that rarely arise in 
connection with other classes of object).
Feenberg’s critics have misread his comments on substantivist critique 
of technology as reflecting an indecision on the question of the trans- 
historical nature of technology as something opposed to the human. His 
alignment of formal rationality with technical reason as a definitive prop-
erty of modern technology reinforces this impression, but, nonetheless, 
the critics are wrong – Feenberg’s true definition is thoroughly histor-
ical and relational. His point is that formal rationality biases technology 
design as a matter of contingent historical fact. The confusion, I submit, 
partially stems from the fact that this contingency has itself shifted, or 
ceased to obtain, so that technical bias is no longer well understood with 
reference to competing forms of rationality, especially not the opposition 
of technical or instrumental reason to communicative or other kinds. 
Feenberg’s real point, which is that technology is always biased in context 
and not in virtue of some inhuman or anti- human essence, stands.
Here it is useful to supplement Feenberg’s argument with ideas from 
post- phenomenological philosophies of technology, which emphasise 
the role of technical artefacts as agents or quasi- subjects rather than 
more or less inert objects. Feenberg’s attempts to comprehend this are 
impeded by his framing of technology in terms of its association with a 
distinctive kind of societal rationality. Detached from a rationalisation- 
based historical perspective, technical politics becomes more messy and 
requires more diverse tactics than a battle between two opposed forms 
of reasoning. To illustrate this, I present examples of substantively biased 
technologies that ought to be subject to a strategy of containment  – 
that is, considered unacceptable by critical theorists on terms that are 
immanent to design as a social practice. Section 4 considers Feenberg’s 
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objections to containment of technology development and argues that 
they do not apply to these cases.
In concluding, I make the connection between desirable kinds of con-
tainment and Jürgen Habermas’s idea of discourse ethics. Just as some 
discursive acts are ruled impermissible because they could not, in prin-
ciple, be assented to by all participants in a given debate, so I argue that 
some technologies ought to be disbarred on similar grounds, and that 
this standpoint can be useful in developing the idea of design bias in the 
direction of an immanent ethics. The latter ought to form a supplement 
to Feenberg’s project of democratic technical politics. A  sociologically 
informed ethical critique at the scene of design is one of Feenberg’s 
objectives, and clarifying the nature of technology’s bias is an important 
step towards its fulfilment. The argument of this chapter suggests that his 
attachment to broad, historically grounded rationality concepts obscures 
relevant sociological details and inhibits Feenberg’s successful pursuit of 
this goal, even though his introjection of social elements into the philo-
sophical definition of technology makes it possible.
1 Varieties of bias
Feenberg views technology as a fundamental institution of modernity 
and as a fundamentally modern institution. Making the case for bringing 
modernity theory into discussions of technology, he asks rhetorically, 
‘how can one expect to understand modernity without an adequate 
account of the technological developments that make it possible, and 
how can one study specific technologies without a theory of the larger 
society in which they develop?’ (in Misa et al 2003: 73). Technology is 
distinctive in modern societies because it bears the imprint of the cap-
italist and bureaucratic context associated with modernity. At the same 
time, technology is a catalyst or relay that amplifies some of the core 
tendencies of cultural modernity, so in this sense they work together. 
Technical systems work with causal propensities in the natural world 
by steering known physical regularities to achieve human ends, and, as 
such, they are inherently rule- bound. This imbrication with rules is par-
ticularly pronounced in modernity, and that is part cause, part effect, of 
technology’s relationship to other institutions in modern societies.
Modern technology presents as neutral, objective and obvious, so that 
to reject it is to be perceived as foolish, anachronistic or worse. Similarly, 
the institutions of modernity present themselves as formally neutral in the 
sense that their behaviour is controlled by rules that have three defining 
properties. They are transparent, which means that anyone who accesses 
a given system can, in principle at least, find out what the rules are and 
use the system accordingly. They are universal in their application, so 
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that everyone is equally subject to the rules without exceptions based 
on social status or individual identity. Finally, the rules that constitute 
modern organisations are enforced in a manner that is separate from the 
issue of their purpose or that of the organisation of which they are part. 
This often creates the feeling that the rules get between people and what-
ever service they expect an organisation to provide. However, whether 
a modern institution works or not is a matter of its processes and the 
extent to which these are well ordered and efficient. The goals of the 
organisation are separate from the question of its performance.
The fact of being based on these kinds of rules is part of what 
differentiates modern from pre- modern institutions. In Britain before 
the reforms of the 1820s, for example, and for some time after them, law 
and its enforcement were inconsistent across the country. A  local lord 
or bishop often had the authority to determine punishments and could 
vary them almost at will depending on their view of the plaintiff as well as 
their crime (Reiner 2000). The projects of standardising and publicising 
law are in large measure constitutive of the modernity of modern soci-
eties. Immanuel Kant placed particular importance on the publicity cri-
terion as essential to legitimacy in law, writing that no ‘actions affecting 
the rights of other human beings’ could be valid if ‘their maxim is not 
compatible with their being made public’ (1992: 126). All modern pol-
itical philosophy shares the conviction that systems are only fair if they 
apply equally to all and are objective in the sense entailed by the three- 
point definition of modern rule systems given above. Only such systems 
are untainted by direct, substantive sectional interests and, in this way, 
they achieve the appearance of neutrality. They are neutral and unbiased 
in the sense that they explicitly identify their correct functioning in terms 
of serving a general social interest.
Max Weber (1974) argued that the spread of such standardised, rule- 
governed systems constituted ‘societal rationalization’. He exposed a 
kind of circularity at the heart of modern, rationalised social structures. 
Describing the ‘spirit of modern capitalism’, as, ‘that attitude which seeks 
profit rationally and systematically’, for example, Weber says that this 
‘attitude has on one hand found its most suitable expression in capit-
alistic enterprise, while on the other the enterprise has derived its most 
suitable motive force from the spirit of capitalism’ (1974: 65). This relates 
to the third point above, about organisations’ distance from the ends or 
values they are supposed to serve. As modern societies develop increas-
ingly sophisticated methods for measuring performance independent of 
content, so their institutions tend to erode their own reasons for existing 
in the first place. Building on Weber, other thinkers in the critical theory 
tradition, most notably Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), argue that while 
ideology, especially religion, had served to legitimise domination in pre- 
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this function increasingly passed to science and technology, where it was 
justified with reference to efficiency.
In The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1997), Adorno and Horkheimer 
suggest that in what they called the ‘totally administered society’, the 
contradictions of capitalism were cancelled by being managed through 
strategies of knowing manipulation that secure a culture of compliant 
consumerism. At the heart of this social system is identity- thinking – the 
principle that things can be grasped quantitatively and thereby brought 
under technical control. Modern science only sees the measurable world 
that it assumes is there in the first place, excluding from view nature’s 
manifold qualitative aspects or considering them only as secondary. 
Modern culture extends this perspective to human beings and society, so 
that people are viewed as producers and/ or consumers, their individual 
idiosyncrasies seen as problems to be handled by the system. This stark 
characterisation culminates in Marcuse’s (1964) description of industrial 
modernity as a ‘one- dimensional society’.
What Feenberg presents as ‘modernity theory’ is a synthesis of ideas 
from these and other sources concerned with the inner connection 
between increased differentiation of social capabilities achieved by 
modern institutions and the deleterious consequences of a socially diffuse 
emphasis on instrumental efficiency. In his reading of Weber, Feenberg 
contrasts the formal rationality characteristic of modern social systems 
with what he calls the substantive rationality of pre- modern societies:
Rationality is substantive to the extent that it realizes a specific value 
such as feeding a population, winning a war, or maintaining the 
social hierarchy. The ‘formal’ rationality of capitalism refers to those 
economic arrangements which optimize calculability and control. 
Formally rational systems lie under technical norms that have to do 
with the efficiency of means rather than the choice of ends. (1991: 68)
Feenberg views the question of how technology, which seems to be the 
embodiment of a neutral, scientific understanding of the world in tools 
that work for human ends, can be biased, through the prism of its rela-
tionship to this formal rationality. Viewed in this way, technology is 
entangled in the Weberian tendency of modern societies to erode cul-
tural values in the pursuit of efficient procedures. Importantly, however, 
this is not inherent to technology but something it acquires under the 
unique cultural conditions of modernity. Feenberg writes:
The technical ideas combined in technology are neutral, but the study 
of any specific technology can trace in it the impress of a mesh of social 
determinations which preconstruct a whole domain of social activity 
aimed at definite goals. (1991: 81)
Feenberg here distinguishes between technology, the social context that 
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technical definitions of social situations and problems. Technology is 
shaped by capitalism, and this is what makes it biased in favour of the 
class interests of the bourgeoisie. However, this bias is not one that can 
be grasped in terms of deliberate, intentionally discriminatory warping 
of the substantive design of technology. That would produce machines 
materially adapted to serve some users’ interests while making life harder 
and less pleasant for others, and created because they had those effects. 
Rather, the bias of technology design rests upon its increasingly formal 
character. It is in its appearance as neutral, as the self- evident solution to 
a problem, that technology is in fact biased to serve some social interests 
rather than others.2
This might make it seem as if radical or democratic critique ought to 
reclaim a stake in what Feenberg calls substantive rationality and allow 
this to fashion a new technology or, indeed, to resist technology as the 
source of an alienating way of approaching the world. That is the pre-
ferred solution of thinkers like Albert Borgmann (1984), who denounces 
what he calls the modern ‘device paradigm’ as sustaining a false way of 
being and opposes to it other ‘focal’ cultural practices that enable people 
to resuscitate meaning and restore values to the centre of social existence. 
Borgmann writes, for example, of a ‘historic decline in meaning’ associated 
with the development of modern computing (1999: 15). A ‘focal’ practice 
is one that involves a relationship to some part of the world that is suffi-
ciently rich and subtle that it definitively evades capture in any quantita-
tive rubric (Borgmann 1984: 81). Borgmann gives the example of running, 
a practice that for him has meditative, even spiritual benefits.
However, as seen in the previous chapter, part of Feenberg’s project is 
to distance critical theory from substantivist conceptions which main-
tain technology has a negative essence that might cause it to be biased 
in the sense that it always impacts negatively upon human culture, and, 
as a result, steers modern societies towards various kinds of catas-
trophe. He argues that substantivist theory tends to confuse the lack of 
values in modern technology design with the essence of technology as 
such (Feenberg 1991: 66). Feenberg wants to focus critique instead on 
the social factors that make technology biased, which also involves dis-
tancing his theory from the critique of science implicit in Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s denunciation of identity- thinking.
What Feenberg rejects in the idea that technology might be substan-
tively biased is the notion that the technological as such is held to be 
inimical to certain interests, cultural practices or social groups. Instead, 
he insists that all of technology’s bias, all the ways in which it prefers some 
groups over others or implements contentious values, only arise when 
the impress of social determinations at the scene of design is conjoined 
to specific social contexts of implementation. Hence, he writes that when 







Theory of bias and ethics of technology design    53
53
as incorrigibly instrumental, they confound ‘the essence of technology 
with the hegemonic code that shapes its contemporary forms’ (Feenberg 
1991: 181).
Feenberg’s attitude to substantivist arguments like theirs, which focus 
on technical reason as itself inherently problematic, is circumspect and 
historical. At times he appears open to the idea that their analyses are 
persuasive representations of the negative impact of technology on 
modern society (e.g. Feenberg 2002: 19; 2010: 193; 2017: 69), writing that 
the ‘basic claims’ of Heidegger’s apocalyptic opposition of technology to 
culture ‘are all too believable’ (1991: 7). His clearly stated position, how-
ever, is that these arguments mistakenly impute something perennial 
to technology that is actually contingent on its design under capitalism 
(Feenberg 2002: 21; 2010: 194– 196),3 and he repudiates the substantivist 
fallacy of ‘opposing spiritual values to technology’ (1991: 10). If such an 
opposition were integral there would be no possibility of technical pol-
itics, still less of the ‘common ground between critical theory and the 
scientific and technical professions’ (1991: 19) which, following Marcuse, 
Feenberg considers vital to it.
Feenberg’s theory of the formal bias of technology is developed with these 
debates in the background. He seeks a theory that can account for the real 
and perceived implication of technology in the most problematic dimensions 
of modernity while at the same time holding open the possibility of new 
designs that will combine technical elements to solve human problems in 
ways that are not possible under capitalism. Feenberg wants to combine 
a sense of the gravity of humanity’s current situation and of technology’s 
implication in it, which is normally associated with cultural conservativism 
and political pessimism, with the optimism implicit in his thesis that ration-
alisation can be democratised.4 In addition, the theory Feenberg elaborates 
has to have a degree of sociological precision when it comes to identifying 
how and why technology becomes problematic. This will free critical theory 
from its romantic, anti- technology past and enable it to acquire renewed 
political purchase, or as Feenberg puts it, critical theory will identify tech-
nology as, ‘not a destiny but a scene of struggle’ (Feenberg 1991: 14). Viewed 
in this way, the theory of formal bias is a main pillar of his project.
2 The theory of formal bias
Feenberg’s rejection of essentialism must be distinguished from his dis-
cussion of substantivism and substantive bias. In philosophy of technology 
these two terms (essentialism and substantivism) are closely associated, 
because it would seem that if technology is always and everywhere in 
some sense pernicious, as essentialism claims, then this must corres-
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shared by all of its instances. Essentialists are committed to some kind of 
substantivism because they propound a non- relative property, or set of 
properties, as definitive of technology. However, substantivism need not 
entail essentialism. It is possible to maintain that technology always has 
some substantive impact and is therefore always ethically consequential 
(biased), without asserting that the character of this bias is always nega-
tive or regrettable.5
Feenberg associates substantivism with a kind of bias that might be 
found in social institutions or arrangements but which cannot exist 
in modern technological form. The pre- modern institutions referred 
to above might single out women or members of particular castes, for 
example, as unfit to own property or to have rights that other designated 
groups enjoy. Such social systems are designed by a biased intent. In 
Between Reason and Experience (2010), Feenberg argues that substan-
tively biased reasoning like this simply could not enter the scene of tech-
nology design because were it to do so it would cause breakdowns and a 
loss of coherence in the resulting technology. He explains that ‘substan-
tively biased decisions in the technological realm, where cool rationality 
ought to prevail, lead to avoidable inefficiencies’ (2010: 69).
Irrational hostility towards certain groups is grounded in feelings 
that would contaminate the kind of pure reflection on laws of motion 
of matter that is required to formulate a coherent technical design 
(2010:  163). Technical reason is irreducibly different from reasoning 
that includes a layer of feeling or prejudice. When Feenberg argues that 
technology is biased by contingent social factors specific to capitalism, 
he is not talking about prejudices or ideologies that issue from a ruling- 
class perspective on the world. Rather, the fact that technology requires a 
purely technical perspective leaves it peculiarly vulnerable to shaping by 
prevailing systems of thought and practice that are also unencumbered 
by values or meanings.
In place of substantive bias emanating from either irrational intentions 
at the scene of design or the purported negative essence of technology, 
Feenberg argues that modern technology is only ever formally biased. 
Formal bias ‘prevails wherever the structure or context of rationalised 
systems or institutions favors a particular social group’ (2010: 163). In 
other words, it occurs when a seemingly neutral system of rules is placed 
in a social context where it contributes to the systematic reproduction of 
unequal or unfair outcomes.
One possible point of confusion here concerns the role of the intentions 
that shape the technology. The point about intentions that produce for-
mally biased design is that they are detached from their outcomes in the 
manner characteristic of modern, rationalised institutions. Technologists 
and others empowered to feed ideas into technology design do not 
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intentions are narrowly focused on efficiency gains that will result from 
the new technology. As empowered agents in a capitalist economy, they 
understand the potential in new techniques in terms of productivity and 
performance, which they dispassionately associate with enhanced con-
trol for management at the point of production (Feenberg 2010: 70). The 
association of the goal of enhanced control over a process or practice with 
management interests is mediated by scientific and technical discourses 
on management and workplace design. Feenberg argues that there is a 
kind of innate convergence of such discourses with the similarly value- 
and meaning- free orientation of technical reason itself (2010:  185).6 
These are the factors that shape technology design in modern capitalist 
economies, and the result is technology that enhances the operational 
autonomy of specific, privileged social groups (2010: 71).
Formally biased design is present where design shaped by this ‘neu-
tral’ intention takes on a specific social function, namely that of unfairly 
enhancing what Feenberg calls the ‘operational autonomy’ (Feenberg 
2002: 75– 76)7 of privileged groups in the production process. Feenberg 
emphasises the systematic, sociological character of formal bias, arguing 
that ‘to show discrimination in the case of a technological choice … it is 
necessary to demonstrate that the discriminatory outcome is no acci-
dent but reproduces a relationship of domination’ (1991: 181). It occurs 
when a system designed to maximise efficiency, placed in a social con-
text, serves to generate, amplify or reinforce patterns of inequality and 
unfairness. Formal bias is only present in technology design when both 
aspects of this definition are found together. Technology is biased even 
though (in fact, because) the intentions that shape it are neutral and, des-
pite being mere physical matter configured in a certain way,8 it operates 
to reproduce unfairness in a given social context (Feenberg 2002: 81– 82).
Feenberg argues that formal bias has two forms, which he calls consti-
tutive and implementation bias (Feenberg 2010: 164). In each case there 
is the determining intention just described and a social function defined 
in terms of the reproduction of social power relations. Constitutive 
formal bias occurs when ‘values [are] embodied in the nature or design 
of a theoretical system or artifact’ (Feenberg 2010: 163). Here the rele-
vant test concerns whether it is conceivable that an artefact, placed in 
some other social context, might perform its function without system-
atically favouring the interest of a particular group over others. One of 
Feenberg’s examples of such a system is the design of a production line 
which deskills workers and makes their lives unpleasant, while enhancing 
the operational autonomy of managers. Such a technology is constitu-
tively biased because it is impossible to envisage a social situation where 
it might be used without having this effect. It is not substantively biased 
because it was not anyone’s intention to design a system that would be 
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or sentiment of hatred towards or fear of workers. What distinguishes 
substantively biased technology from constitutively formally biased 
technology is the presence or absence of such an intention (Feenberg 
2010: 163). In this case, the motivation for the design is the ‘neutral’ one 
of making production processes more efficient.
It is not clear, however, that constitutive bias really is distinct from 
some kind of substantive bias. As discussed in the previous chapter, Marx 
(1990: 562) wrote of technology designed by capitalists with the aim of 
disempowering workers, breaking up their associations and reducing 
their capacity to subvert employer domination. The prime motivating 
element there seems to be fear, though the practical implications include 
increased profits and a measure of efficiency, narrowly construed. This 
combination of motives and affects in an intention would efface the dis-
tinction from substantive bias that Feenberg seeks to maintain. What 
has changed since Marx’s time, perhaps, is that this mix of motivations 
and beliefs about economic practices and the merits of machinery is 
now routinely parsed through social science disciplines, especially 
management science and business studies. Feenberg treats the latter as 
discourses in the Foucauldian sense, as sites of condensation of know-
ledge and power.
Implementation bias differs from constitutive formal bias in that 
alternative implementations of the same artefact or design are conceiv-
able without the unfair outcomes. Here, Feenberg writes that ‘values 
[are] realized through contextualizations’ (2010: 165). In other words, it 
is only when it is placed in a specific social context that the technology 
takes on its formally biased character. This is the kind of unfairness 
that results from designing a system that works well in one, imaginary 
setting but generates unanticipated negative consequences when ported 
to another. In my view, implementation bias is a clearer specification of 
what Feenberg originally intended by formal bias. In his first formulation 
of the theory he wrote that ‘[t] he essence of formal bias is the prejudicial 
choice of the time, place and manner of the introduction of a relatively 
neutral system’ (1991: 180; emphasis in original text). In contrast, consti-
tutive formal bias is inscribed in the design of a system and travels with 
it across contexts, indicating that it is actually somewhat ambiguous in 
relation to the rejected category of substantive bias.
Feenberg clarifies the difference between substantive and formal bias 
with reference to the intention embodied in a design. What makes tech-
nical systems formally biased is the absence of human values in them, 
rather than the impress of malicious or prejudicial purposes. Formal 
bias occurs despite the absence of such intentions. Sociologically, it is 
what happens when the capitalist motivation to secure profits through 
improved efficiency and enhanced control over production processes 
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of technical reason. As seen above, Feenberg suggests that this conflu-
ence is a key dimension of societal rationalisation in the Weberian sense. 
At the same time, however, his test for the presence of formal bias is a 
thought experiment that involves asking of any given technical system 
whether it might feasibly generate different outcomes under varied social 
and cultural conditions, which would demonstrate that it is the location 
of the system in a specific context that accounts for its role in producing 
prejudicial social consequences (Feenberg 2002: 81).
The outcomes Feenberg is most concerned with here relate to the 
enhanced operational autonomy of managers. Technology is biased in 
context when we can see that the interests of a particular group are sys-
tematically favoured over those of others involved with the technology. 
Most commonly, this involves managers gaining more control over pro-
duction processes as a consequence of the application of scientific man-
agement and organisation principles. The latter are generic formulations 
that enhance efficiency, in a narrow sense, in proportion as they abstract 
the manager from production processes where they might have and feel 
obligations to the people they work with. In this way, formal bias mirrors 
societal rationalisation. As Feenberg puts it, ‘formal bias prevails wher-
ever the structure or context of rationalized systems or institutions favors 
a particular social group’ (2010: 163).
3 Operational heteronomy
There are, then, two aspects to formal bias, and both are necessary, while 
neither is sufficient on its own, to produce it. First, there is the distinctive 
kind of intention that shapes a technology design, namely one that is free 
of concern with values and meanings and therefore dovetails with the 
kind of thinking that needs to happen if there is to be technical design as 
such. Second, formal bias only arises when, once set to work in a social 
context, the resulting artefacts systematically enlarge the operational 
autonomy of a social group.
The critical theory of technology is a normative theory, and its crit-
ical focus is on the biased nature of technology in capitalist society. It 
is worth emphasising, therefore, that one of the – perhaps surprising – 
consequences of the theory of formal bias is that it narrows the range 
of cases with which the critical theory of technology is concerned. Even 
technology designed with explicit nasty intent, for example, will be 
deemed irrelevant if it does not have the requisite social consequences. 
Technology with negative social consequences that are not the effect of 
design informed by the valueless evaluations characteristic of modernity 
will not feature in technical politics. Perhaps most importantly, tech-
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also advantageous to others by enhancing their operational autonomy 
will not be within the range of the theory.
It is also significant that the theory allows for a potentially quite large 
number of technologies that do not raise any normative issues. In prin-
ciple at least, by insisting on the presence of a particular kind of intention 
in design and a specific kind of social outcome, Feenberg allows tech-
nology that might be considered ‘neutral’. This seems to be unintentional, 
given his insistence that technology is socially shaped all the way down 
and his fundamentally agonistic conception of the social (considered 
further in the next chapter). Such technology might be comfortably 
accommodated in a pragmatic, Habermasian framework, within the 
normal development of a ‘systems’ sphere.9
Moreover, Feenberg rejects the possibility of designs that are motivated 
by or involve prejudicial intent, and insists that only what he calls ‘cool 
rationality’ (2010: 69) rules at the scene of design. I have indicated above 
that Marx’s account of capitalist industrial machinery as designed to 
oppress workers would seem to be in tension with this requirement. 
Another example would be the printing technology described by Cynthia 
Cockburn (1983), which was designed with the malicious purpose of 
keeping women out of employment in nineteenth- century print fac-
tories. There, some machinery was kept deliberately and unnecessarily 
heavy as a result of agreements reached between unions and manage-
ment. Since women were prohibited from working with machinery over 
a certain weight, better- paid work was thereby effectively reserved for 
male workers. In Feenberg’s terms, the effect was to enlarge the oper-
ational autonomy of male workers, as well as managers and owners. In 
these examples, shaping intentions other than the one of cold neutrality 
appear to contribute to the regressive social outcome.
Feenberg addresses such cases through his category of constitutive 
formal bias, in which some groups of people are disadvantaged and 
excluded because designers fail to think about the variety of human 
beings who may be affected by or reliant upon the technology. In these 
cases bias is the result of neglect rather than malign intent, and Feenberg 
maintains that this kind of bias is most common in modern capitalism 
because of the focus on efficiency that dominates most thinking about 
technology and the narrow framing of the latter concept promulgated 
in disciplines like organisation theory and management science. He 
introduces the example of pavements that are too narrow to accommo-
date wheelchairs to elaborate on this (2010: 164). Another example might 
be the case of the Windows operating system, which disadvantaged blind 
and visually impaired computer users, putting many of them out of work 
(Goggin and Newell 2003).
Feenberg cites as an example of constitutive formal bias that is 
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 example  – that of factory machines designed to be used by children 
(2010: 163). The factory machines could be used by small adults or even, 
uncomfortably, by adults of average height, so that in principle they are 
only biased in context. The real biasing factor is not the shaping of the 
technology but its role in a context that includes a web of restrictive rules 
and conventions. In Cockburn’s study she points out that male workers 
and trades unions sought to preserve their wages, rather than to exclude 
women, which tends to support such an interpretation.
Interestingly, however, in these cases, while the requirement of a neu-
tral shaping intention is conserved, the clearest social consequence of 
the technology is not to enhance the power and privileges of a group 
but rather to adversely impact on a particular group, perhaps a minority. 
This would be better described as operational heteronomy than enhanced 
operational autonomy. It is quite conceivable, then, that technology 
could present no discernible benefit to ruling groups yet still have exclu-
sionary or oppressive consequences for others.10 In terms of Feenberg’s 
theory, even when some technology negatively impacts certain groups 
more than others, perhaps obliging them to perform actions or tasks that 
others do not have to perform, it remains formally unbiased.
Feenberg’s rejection of the category of substantive bias is, as was seen 
above, partly a result of his denial of any role for biased intentions in 
design, but it also follows from his insistence that bias is a contextual and 
not an essential property of technology. However, there are technology 
designs that are substantively biased in terms of his definition of the 
phrase and, in my opinion, they are too important for critical theory to 
overlook. An example of substantively biased technology in this specific 
sense is the mosquito device, which has been used in the UK to disperse 
groups of young people who are perceived as a nuisance by property 
owners.11 The device emits a sound at a pitch that can only be heard 
by people under the age of 18. Changes in the human ear after that age 
mean that it becomes inaudible. The sound is, apparently, uncomfortable 
to those who can hear it and the device discourages young people from 
standing outside shops or on street corners where the owners do not 
desire their presence.
This technology was shaped by an intention that was at least in part 
motivated by negative feelings about a target group in the population. 
It worked with knowledge of something specific to them and identified 
that thing as a target. Even if this attitude was subordinate to the one of 
seeking a kind of control over social spaces, which might be cast as neu-
tral, the intention to create a device that could only ever be experienced 
as uncomfortable by a specific group is surely prejudiced. The mosquito 
could be seen as enhancing the control of some groups of people, namely 
middle- class property owners, but a more exact description would be 
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the mosquito is substantively biased in the sense that variations in con-
text do not change the fact that it only has adverse effects on a selected 
group in society and is therefore inherently prejudicial. While it is debat-
able whether it actually empowers anyone except in the most tenden-
tious sense (the shopkeeper has the power to remove some people from 
the environment around his or her premises, but appreciating this as 
a ‘benefit’ seems to involve participating in paranoid and prejudiced 
fantasies), it is certain that it impacts negatively on the freedom of a 
targeted group to exercise the basic human right of association in a given 
public space.
Other examples of substantively biased technologies come from 
military designs. For example, the flechette is a particularly unpleasant 
kind of tank shell that is designed to disperse 4cm metal darts, which 
enter and can remain in targeted bodies. Once there, the shards of 
metal may take days or longer to kill. Although the rationale for 
the design of the flechette is that it enables offensive action against 
enemies concealed in dense foliage, it is difficult to see how the 
weapon constitutes any kind of an advance on regular shells, which 
can be so powerful as to assure complete destruction of their targets 
without taking the additional step of torturing them as well. The flech-
ette would seem to be a clear case of substantive bias in technology 
design. It is inherently inhuman in its conception and design and so 
seems to be biased ‘all the way down’; its cruelty is not something that 
it acquires only when placed in context.
It would be anomalous if the critical theory of technology pushed 
these and similar cases beyond the scope of its concerns. They are prob-
lematic for the theory because the intentions in their design are not neu-
tral in the sense required for formal bias and because their social effects 
are unfair even though they do not obviously enhance anyone’s oper-
ational autonomy in the sense Feenberg gives to that phrase.
What this discussion highlights is a discrepancy between the philo-
sophical cast of Feenberg’s theory and its reliance on sociological factors. 
The distinctions between varieties of formal bias and the rejected notion 
of substantive bias begin to break down on contact with the kinds of 
cases studied by social historians. Cockburn’s study of print technology 
designed to exclude women highlights an aspect of design that seemingly 
eludes the theory of formal bias because of the theory’s exclusive focus 
on enhancements to operational autonomy. The mosquito demonstrates 
the possibility of a technology that is biased by a malign intent and 
socially regressive without enhancing anyone’s operational autonomy. 
Feenberg’s reluctance to treat such negative and exclusionary impacts 
in themselves, independent of the question of how they are thematised 
in discourses of power, reflects the political orientation of his theory, 
especially its concern to identify potential sources of political agency.12  
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However, as presented, the theory of formal bias threatens to abstract 
technical politics from the sociological analysis of the dynamics of exclu-
sion and disempowerment.
4 Dilemmas of containment
The examples of substantive bias just presented indicate the need to con-
sider the possibility that technology will entail restrictions on the devel-
opment of certain kinds of technology, perhaps similar to moves taken 
internationally to abolish land mines in the 1990s. One of the things that 
a critical theory of technology ought to be able to say is that designs like 
the mosquito and the flechette are not legitimate. Feenberg rejects con-
tainment mainly because he views it as a conservative strategy, alien to 
a critical theory that sides with progressive rationalisation. If these cases 
are important, however, then this is an important oversight. The politics 
of technology design must include space for such a proscriptive element.
Feenberg gives four reasons for rejecting containment as a strategy, 
and it is worth devoting some attention to them because of what they 
disclose about the broader orientation of his theory. First, he says that 
technical politics should not be conceived in terms that cast culture as 
resistant to technological innovations and change but should instead be 
concerned with a design politics whose goal is to identify and cultivate 
technology’s currently neglected potentials. Here Feenberg aligns critical 
theory of technology with the Enlightenment belief in a positive direc-
tionality to the historical process based on the development of reason 
and deepening human understanding of the world. This casts critique 
and the advance of knowledge as breaking down ‘traditional’ barriers 
and overcoming ‘substantively’ instituted regimes of social power based 
on irrational prejudices and privileges. Such a view favours technology 
development rather than its inhibition and comports with Feenberg’s 
positive focus on politicising technology design rather than simply 
opposing modern technology.
Second, Feenberg maintains that a containment stance perpetuates the 
opposition of cultural values to technology, while a progressive position 
envisages their reconciliation. For critical theory of technology, it should 
be conceivable that social values and goals would be entirely consistent 
with those of technology development, which is why it is important to 
break with essentialism. Third, he argues that it is impossible to specify 
at this or any point in history which domains of social and cultural life 
should be ‘protected’ from technology, since change is pervasive and 
what seems permanent and important today can turn out to have been 
transient and weightless tomorrow, and vice versa. Finally, containment 
presents the paradox of an instrumentally conceived preservation of the 
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non- instrumental, which, Feenberg maintains, would have the perverse 
consequence of transforming the latter into a goal of technical action.
Feenberg rejects the idea of containment of technology by culture 
because he wants to distance the critical theory of technology from 
substantivist and conservative positions. However, he does acknowledge 
that there are occasions when containment of technology, in the form 
of an active proscription of some kinds of design, may be necessary. He 
writes that:
Objects introduced to technical networks bear the mark of the 
functionalization to which they have been submitted. Not everything 
of value can survive that transformation. Hence, we reject the idea that 
more or less technically efficient means can best accomplish things 
such as forming friendships and enjoying Christmas dinner. (2010: 76)
This way of construing matters is, it seems to me, back to front. It is not 
necessary to invoke special domains of cultural practice to see the neces-
sity of limiting or prohibiting certain technologies. Doing so plays into 
the hands of those critics who suggest Feenberg prevaricates over essen-
tialism.13 But the discussion in the previous section shows that inappro-
priate application of technical reasoning in human affairs is not the point 
at issue.
It is important to separate the idea that technology may be substan-
tively biased from essentialist and conservative readings of that bias as 
located in technology’s ‘instrumental’ character, which is held to con-
trast with other rationalities operative in special cultural domains, like 
the family or friendship relations. The point is not that such domains 
should be protected from technology in principle but rather that some 
technology is bad in itself and should be proscribed for that reason. 
Feenberg should be able to claim there are technology designs that are 
in conflict with the goals or rules of technology design, properly under-
stood, in principle.
As Feenberg points out, technology only becomes threatening when 
its design reflects a particular disposition or cuts a certain kind of path 
through social relations. The way that it does this, when it becomes 
problematic, is specific to technology (other kinds of natural object and 
human artefact do not pose the same menace), but it is not caused by 
the technical reasoning involved in any technological project. It is not 
because of the reasoning behind technology that it can be disposed in 
this way but because of the specific entwinement of social purposes with 
physical properties in what Latour (2005) calls ‘hybrid’ combinations, 
which give rise to a distinctive kind of agency.14 The mosquito illustrates 
that it can also involve a distinctive kind of social outcome, which is dis-
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This kind of bias extends beyond formal bias as Feenberg has presented 
the idea, since it involves recognising that, as post- phenomenological 
philosopher of technology Peter- Paul Verbeek points out (2006), tech-
nical objects act in ways that help some people and disadvantage others. 
They nearly always do this, and as such are inherently or substantively 
biased. At the same time, this is not substantive bias in the traditional 
sense:  the cases discussed in this chapter reveal nothing about the 
‘essence of technology’, except in the sense that they pertain to a par-
ticular modality of the intrusion of physical nature or brute causality into 
human affairs. Such intrusion can be associated with regret, especially 
when technology becomes a systematic agent of operational heteronomy. 
But equally, even ‘good’ technology would not be useful if it did not make 
a substantive difference with social consequences.
Verbeek argues that the complex imbrication of human intention 
and the agency of objects at the scene of design necessitates an ethical 
approach immanent to technology design practice. He presents his view 
as radically at odds with Feenberg’s,15 but detaching the definition of 
formal bias in terms of intentions and outcomes from the wider question 
of societal rationality makes it usable as the basis for just such an imma-
nent ethical foundation. Feenberg’s approach illuminates the range of 
intentions that might be present and suggests ways in which they might 
serve as conduits for unacknowledged social interests. Opening up the 
way in which an apparently narrow focus on ‘technical objectives’ might 
introduce foreseeable design bias is critical theory’s distinctive contribu-
tion. It is not necessary to relate technical reasoning to wider historical 
developments to achieve this. Moreover, if it were true that prejudice 
could play no part in technology design because it is grounded in irrational 
feelings, this would also be problematic for Feenberg’s project of a demo-
cratic transformation of technology, which surely presupposes a different 
mix of emotional, social and rational elements at the scene of design.
5 Immanent ethics of design
The emphasis, in the theory of formal bias, on a shaping intention makes 
it possible to articulate a formal principle that might realistically be 
operative within, or immanent to, the design process itself. Such an eth-
ical principle might consist in something akin to the founding principle 
of Habermas’s discourse ethics, according to which ‘only those norms can 
claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected 
in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse’ (Habermas 
1990: 93). To suggest that something like this might be operative in tech-
nical design contexts is not to commit the ‘fallacy of false concreteness’,16 
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technology design situation that ought to constrain what may reasonably 
be proposed there. Violation of this pragmatic foundation would involve 
the violator in a performative contradiction, in much the same way that 
some forms of political speech conflict with the rational foundations of 
democratic politics.
Just as Habermas (1990) distinguishes the rules of his ideal speech 
situation from the substantive principles discussed by participants in 
moral discourse, so Feenberg’s theory of bias puts him in a position to 
advance similar rules as immanent to technical practice. There is a benign, 
transformative orientation towards the future that underscores all tech-
nical thinking and activity, which Feenberg draws out most effectively 
when he discusses medicine (2010: 81), writing that ‘the value of healing 
practices presides over biological knowledge of the human body in medi-
cine’ (2010: 81). As such, technical activity contains implicit norms that 
can only be violated at the price of contradiction with the technological 
purpose itself, however this is manifest in a given society. This focus on 
immanent ethical foundations aligns Feenberg’s theory with Habermas’s 
pragmatic notion of ‘quasi- transcendental’ principles.
As we have seen, Feenberg includes a social dimension to the philo-
sophical definition of technology, bringing it into dialogue with other 
disciplines, especially sociology. As David Stump points out, Feenberg’s 
inclusion of a social dimension in the philosophy of technology is the 
single, ‘most powerful and innovative aspect of his philosophy’ (in 
Veak 2006: 5). To capitalise fully on it, however, he needs to go further 
in enriching his philosophy with sociology. Instead of deepening his 
engagement in this way, Feenberg chooses to embed the theory of bias 
in a historical conflict of rationalities. Drawing on Weber, he argues that 
modernity is defined by a capacity for conceptual distancing (2010: 173) 
that distinguishes modern societies from traditional ones, where the 
rationality involved in technical projects has not been ‘purified’ in ‘tech-
nical disciplines’ (2010: 177). Feenberg aligns this development to soci-
etal rationalisation, arguing that ‘modern societies are unique in the 
exorbitant role they assign social rationality’ (2010: 179).
However, a wealth of historical scholarship casts doubt on the distinc-
tion of modern from traditional societies in terms of the form of their 
technical knowledge. Martin Bernal (1987) famously demonstrated, for 
instance, that ancient cultures possessed advanced mathematics, which 
they used to make astronomical forecasts. Great engineering projects 
of the ancient world indicate high levels of technical understanding. 
Similarly, Zaheer Baber (1996) describes inoculation programmes in 
pre- colonial India, which presuppose medical knowledge, and Feenberg 
himself refers to proto- industrial activities in the pre- capitalist world, 
which could not have occurred without detailed knowledge of the pro-
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reasoning informed by abstract thinking in the centuries prior to mod-
ernity and in societies and cultures not normally included in it (e.g. Adas 
1989; Baber 1996).
Feenberg emphasises (2010: 173) that he is not concerned to make a 
case for the cognitive superiority of modern societies; his focus is on the 
socio- cultural mediation of knowledge, and it is here that he considers 
they are distinctive in placing emphasis on the abstraction of function 
from meaning and codifying this into arcane disciplines that enforce 
social power. Detaching this argument from the notion of a wider soci-
etal rationalisation does not have to entail that modernity theory is 
abandoned altogether.17 Marx’s characterisation (Marx and Engels 1967) 
of modernity as a period of unprecedented rapid change, in which com-
modities become increasingly salient, is an alternative reading that does 
not invoke the rather obscure idea of society- wide transformations under-
pinned by a novel form of ‘rationality’ but instead concentrates on class 
antagonisms and social contradictions as the drivers of technical change. 
Feenberg’s critical focus on the convergence of (neutral) technical reason 
with broad historical developments tends itself to abstract from the deep 
entanglements of technology with practices of domination.18
At the same time, Feenberg’s introjection of a specifically sociological 
dimension into the philosophical definition of technology makes it pos-
sible to advance the claims of critical theory in more detailed, situated 
kinds of enquiry. However, one of the hazards of incorporating a social 
dimension into the definition of technology is that society changes, for-
cing amendments to the theory. Feenberg’s concern with the operational 
autonomy of managers is a case in point because the interface of manage-
ment and workplace technology has significantly altered in the last three 
to four decades, associated with digitisation or informationalisation of 
technology and related new management practices. This is reflected in 
changes to the discourse on management and organisations, which, as 
seen above, was pivotal to Feenberg’s grasp of the biasing of technology 
in design.
Critical analysis of management science texts was one of the 
foundations for Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s pathbreaking study, 
The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005). Feenberg has been fairly dismissive 
of this work,19 but the challenge it presents to the category of operational 
autonomy is real. Increasingly, self- management, including a large degree 
of worker or user autonomy, is a presupposition of technology design.20 
Workers are now obliged to actively internalise system imperatives, 
converting them into personal norms of conduct. Meanwhile, contem-
porary work itself has to be seductive, appealing and exciting, leading 
some to characterise it as resembling an adventure, while others even 
write of a pervasive ‘gamification’ of the labour process.21 This restruc-
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the challenge it faced to its hegemony in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
It entails new, ‘streamlined’ workers who use their autonomy to benefit 
the system because they have internalised its values (competitiveness, 
esteem for material success, etc.), incorporating them into their sense of 
themselves in a way that represents a new level of penetration of societal 
demands into individual psychology and interpersonal relationships.22 
All this has implications for the theory of bias in technology design.
Feenberg’s vision is partly inspired by these developments, in the 
sense that he prefers to think through the transformation of technology 
in terms of a widening of the cultural and normative inputs to the scene 
of design rather than advocating a defensive, conservative strategy aimed 
at limiting the development of new technologies. However, there is a 
tension between his declaration of the impossibility of substantive bias 
and his vision of a future technology shaped by wider values.
Democratising technology opens the way to designs (Feenberg some-
times calls them ‘concretisations’) that incorporate ethical and aesthetic 
values excluded from modern technology. This, he suggests, will create ‘a 
new direction of technological progress’ (2002: 150), which he calls ‘pro-
gressive rationalisation’.
There is a kind of implicit, positive substantive bias in this vision of 
a society in which ‘values would be installed in the technical discip-
lines themselves’ (2010: 81). In the society of the future, technology that 
promotes equality, for example, will not be less subject to social distortion 
than contemporary technology. Rather, such technology would harness 
the agency of physical objects to benefit some, currently disadvantaged, 
social groups rather than others. Feenberg shies away from utopian 
speculation on these possibilities, preferring to identify interventions 
that challenge ‘elite power structures inherited from the past in technic-
ally rational forms’ (2010: 71). But what Boltanski and Chiapello’s work 
demonstrates is that in many ways this technocratic form of social organ-
isation is already largely superseded in informational capitalism, while 
the need for technical politics remains urgent.
In this chapter I have argued that in the theory of formal bias, Feenberg 
includes a sociological dimension in the philosophical definition of 
technology, while making a decisive move to free the critical- theoretic 
conception of technology from its essentialist, dystopian heritage. This 
opens up a perspective in which it is possible to clarify the combination 
of ruling intention and sociological outcome that characterises sys-
tematic and pervasive bias in technology design. To some extent these 
achievements are concealed by Feenberg’s attachment to the transcen-
dental thesis of a historically ambivalent societal rationalisation. As 
technology sheds its association with bureaucracy and top- down man-
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sharpen focus on an ethics immanent to technology design, an idea that 
is crucial to Feenberg’s theory of technical politics.
Notes
1 Habermas writes that the task of philosophy today is to ‘mediate intepretively 
between expert knowledge and an everyday practice in need of orientation’ 
(1992: 17– 18).
2 This is a very different line of attack to that of Marx, a difference Feenberg 
neglects to examine. As we saw in the previous chapter, Marx described a 
direct, intentional shaping of technology by capitalists, the substantive con-
sequence of which was machines that were horrible to work with and limited 
workers’ abilities to influence the production process or to build effective soli-
darity with one another.
3 It’s important to note that this distinction is also present in Adorno, for whom 
technological rationality has a ‘historical essence’ (2000:  25). Defenders of 
Heidegger maintain that he also is not an essentialist, and Iain Thomson alleges 
that Feenberg ‘simply us[es] essentialism as a descriptive term to characterize 
a fairly wide range of theories about technology with which he disagrees’ (in 
Veak 2006: 65).
4 The sense of this claim will be explored in the next two chapters.
5 This conflicts with an intuitive sense that all bias is wrong because it involves 
systematic disadvantage to some individuals or groups, played out in ways 
that are not thematised and legitimated through public discourse. However, 
I would contend that all societies include bias in this sense in their fundamental 
structures and this is not always a matter of normative concern. A  socialist 
society would institute measures to systematically prevent the materially 
better- off from gaining further advantage: indeed, if it failed to establish such 
bias it would not warrant the name ‘socialist’. These arrangements would not 
be regrettable because they were not discussed on a regular basis.
6 It might seem as if technical reason is then an essential and indeed substan-
tive property. Feenberg’s proposal is that it is a historical essence in the sense 
discussed above – that is, it becomes an essential feature with the emergence 
of the modern social formation.
7 Feenberg takes this phrase from organisation theory (personal correspondence).
8 Latour argues that technology’s behaviour in any situation is not susceptible, 
merely by dint of its material or substantive nature, to proper explanation by 
seemingly applicable scientific or causal laws. In his view, the reality in excess of 
science mournfully identified as essential yet unattainable by critical theorists 
is directly accessible now, in the sense that much of practical life already 
operates with a reality that ranges beyond what is sanctioned by the regime of 
epistemology, and always did (Latour 2013b: 70– 71; 85). At one point he even 
observes that the ‘material world’ is simply not big enough to accommodate 
the multiple ‘modes of existence’ produced by actors (2013b:  103). Here as 
elsewhere, however, Latour neglects the practical entanglement of questions 
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9 Feenberg tends not to acknowledge this, perhaps because he has a polem-
ical interest in charging other second- and third- generation critical theorists 
with neglecting technology. Once recognised, though, it becomes a matter of 
judgement how important the critique of technology is to the wider project 
of developing a critical theory of society. Notwithstanding this, detaching the 
critique of technology from global claims about the evils of societal rational-
isation is a theoretical advance implicit in the theory of formal bias which, in 
my view, Feenberg does not fully capitalise on.
10 Such negative effects will remain out of view until they are successfully 
highlighted by the affected groups. Feenberg’s neglect of this category turns 
out to be telling in an important respect, since it highlights the disjunct 
between the critical theory of technology as formulated and sociological ana-
lysis of the processes whereby injustice gets thematised by affected parties 
in the first place. Since the theory excludes technology that is not currently 
perceived as problematic, it seems to lack the resources to account for the 
struggle those subject to operational heteronomy face to articulate their 
concerns and gain recognition for them. I revisit this point in the next chapter, 
on technical politics.
11 The device has been banned in some European countries. See www.guardian.
co.uk/ society/ 2010/ jun/ 20/ teenager- repellent- mosquito- banned- europe. 
Accessed 19 June 2012.
12 This reproduces Marcuse’s focus on the radical political potential of technical 
elites.
13 For example, David J. Stump writes that Feenberg ‘keeps the general analytic 
framework that essentialism makes available while rejecting essentialism’ (in 
Veak 2006: 8).
14 In other words, it is possible to say that there is something specifically 
technological about the way that some technologies are bad, without thereby 
claiming that there is badness in all technology.
15 In a review article Verbeek (2013) misrepresents Feenberg as the exponent of 
an unreconstructed modernism in which the sterile oppositions of traditional 
critical theory are all intact. I discuss the real differences between the two fur-
ther in Chapter 5.
16 Habermas applies this phrase to arguments that purport to identify actual 
situations corresponding to his ideal speech situation.
17 As recommended by Latour (1993).
18 The identification of technology with the allegedly distinctive rationality of 
modernity is a bugbear of critical theory that limits its contemporary rele-
vance – a point I return to in Chapter 4.
19 Curiously, Feenberg maintains (in Khatchatourov 2019) that studying man-
agement science literature, which is their principal methodology, is not 
a good way to understand contemporary labour processes and argues that 
the fundamental dynamics of workplace control have not shifted since the 
pioneering studies carried out in the 1950s and 1960s (Braverman 1974). It is 
worth noting that already in the 1960s Marcuse had observed that technology 
demanded that workers participate more in their own subjection as part of 
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20 Boltanski and Chiapello overlook the issue of technology, neglecting to con-
sider the ways in which the changes they describe to the labour process have 
been facilitated by new technology and have themselves shaped things like 
user interface design and the highly specific and limited use society has made 
of networked computing.
21 See Kirkpatrick (2015) for discussion of this and critical theory’s response.









Technical politics is the central concept of Feenberg’s critical theory of 
technology, the point around which everything else turns. Even the onto-
logical dilemmas in his theory are resolved here, in his thinking of the 
technical as political. Whereas earlier critical theorists perceived tech-
nology as the most dense point in a system that smothered the human 
capacity for self- emancipation, Feenberg argues that it now presents 
openings for democratic intervention, and he puts forward a strategic, 
political conception of the kinds of dispute over technology design and 
use that are increasingly common in digital culture. Feenberg’s project 
differs markedly from that of earlier critical theories, then, in finding 
overt political significance in technical practices.
To develop critical theory in this direction, Feenberg advances a dis-
tinctive concept of hegemony, a close conceptual relative of the idea 
of reification discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 2). As we saw in the last 
chapter, the bias of technology is maintained by a sheen of neutrality 
that ensures it comes to appear necessary while resistance to it seems 
nothing short of irrational. This reified appearance can be broken down 
in practice when people engage in active experiences that move beyond 
compliance and become experimental. In this way, technical activity has 
the potential to become a form of political praxis, breaking the hold of 
controlling illusions. Once people learn to dabble in technologies and to 
achieve more with their devices than the set of functions stipulated by 
the manual1 then technological reality begins to come into focus. That 
reality is one of indeterminacy and open- ended experimentation, in 
which objects are remediated by their users and may become resistant 
to the identities imposed on them by manufacturers, corporations and 
governments.
Reconfiguration of their sensuous relationship with devices and 
machines dissolves the illusion of objective necessity and points tech-
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uses. This dissolution of technology’s authority in a popular culture of 
hacking and dabbling is, in Feenberg’s theorisation, a political process. 
People breaking the rules of technology use has consequences which, 
taken in the round, constitute an extension of democracy. Feenberg 
argues that technology as currently designed is a key element in the main-
tenance of political hegemony and that popular technical interventions 
are subversive of this. Progressive technical politics involves articulating 
and channelling these interventions into a concerted struggle against 
technological hegemony.
The concept of hegemony is central to Feenberg’s thesis that popular 
interventions in technical domains constitute the principal form of 
authentic politics in contemporary societies. Hegemony, as formulated 
by Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, is a form of domination that 
works through cultural media of representation.2 A party or social class 
is hegemonic when its favoured version of the elements of cultural life, 
in which a society represents itself to its members, are embraced and 
accepted by the majority. There is a clear affinity between this idea and 
formal bias, in which specific designs present themselves as the neutral 
form of current technical capabilities and this appearance of neutrality 
is a sheen on injustice and exclusion. Hegemony is a political concept, 
though, and understanding how it works gives insight into its thoroughly 
contested character and the possibility of political strategies based on 
this. Section 1 describes Gramsci’s theory and provides a brief discussion 
of his understanding of the role of technology in maintaining capitalist 
domination.
Feenberg extends the idea of hegemony into the domain of modern 
technology design and use through his idea of the technical code, which 
is the focus of Section 2. The technical code structures the field of tech-
nical politics. Its impress is what connects individual technologies into 
the wider web of connected artefacts that constitutes the technical in 
modern societies. It is written into all objects that are recognisable as tech-
nology. As previously noted, as code it is both determinate for the social 
position of the artefact, conferring upon it a certain reified status in the 
eyes of its human users, and subject to modification by them – it can be 
rewritten. It is in grasping the space of underdetermined play with tech-
nical elements, and the possibility of multiple alternative concatenations 
of elements into designs that may serve different purposes, that Feenberg 
finds the radical potential in constructivism.
As discussed in Chapter  1, constructivist studies of social shaping 
identify the social processes that constitute new technologies in devel-
opment. Viewed through the lens of critical theory, constructivist studies 
display the reality of technology as a social process as against its conven-
tional appearance as a realm of reified facts that embody and corroborate 
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works through the agency of constructivism’s social groups to ‘condense’ 
particular social values with technical considerations in specific designs, 
politicises constructivism’s central insights.
Section  3 discusses the relationship between technical politics and 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) theory of radical democracy. 
Their famously ‘post- Marxist’ interpretation of the politics of counter- 
hegemony is focused on the capacity of political discourse to produce 
radical re- articulations of dominant ideas aimed at shifting the dominant 
conception of society, which they construe as a limit or horizon, in order 
to change the prevailing sense of what is possible. Feenberg adapts these 
ideas to advance his idea of democratic technical politics as a series of 
contests for control over the technical code. This involves synthesising 
the idea of the technical code with the concept of political hegemony.
According to Feenberg, hegemony in contemporary societies is 
technological in character. The technical code is open to contestation 
and dispute, as constructivist analyses show, but these disputes go on 
under a horizon that limits what can count as a valid intervention or a 
legitimate technical statement. Just as political discourse has rules that 
constrain what may be said and done as consistent with social reality, 
so only some kinds of action will be recognised as technical. This sense 
of what technology is (its identity) is how human beings experience the 
weight of what Feenberg calls hegemonic technological rationality. It is 
the culturally dominant, hegemonic articulation of the technical code 
and, as such, it pervades people’s experiences with modern technology.
On Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of the political, it involves 
changing the way that society is experienced as real – that is, the nature 
and position of the limit it sets on what may be proposed and what may be 
done. The politics of articulation involve attempts to shift this boundary 
by loosening the hold of hegemonic equivalences and creating spaces for 
excluded and suppressed experiences to gain expression. This resonates 
with Feenberg’s search for a bridging concept between the small- scale 
disputes over individual artefacts described by constructivism and the 
wider concern with democratic change that defines his critical theory.
Section  4 examines Feenberg’s synthesis of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
concept of politics with the issue of technological transformation. The 
political theory of radical democracy rests on a distinctive ontology, 
which is the notion of a necessary yet intolerable absence, and this nega-
tive ontological premise is central to Feenberg’s thought. Just as polit-
ical institutions, law, morality and other ‘superstructural’ layers are 
social products perceived and lived as ontological givens over which 
people have no control, so technology is a reified social product. Just 
as radical democracy tries to shift the limits of what the state and other 
institutions can do, and even the form they can take, by creating subver-
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is aimed at moving what Feenberg calls the ‘boundary of technique’ 
towards a more ambitious, more humane technology than the machines 
that have been produced to date.
Section 5 explores Feenberg’s understanding of the goal of the technical 
politics of transition, which he sometimes characterises as ‘civilisational 
change’. At this point in the theory he posits a kind of aggregate outcome 
for the various fronts of struggle and contestation opened up by demo-
cratic technical politics. Just as the technical code involves a series of 
equivalences and articulations that reproduce modernity’s idea of itself 
as ‘technological civilisation’, so, Feenberg argues, socialist civilisation 
will manifest the unity of a different hegemonic ordering defined by a 
culture of vibrant democratic participation and a humanised aesthetic. 
In conclusion, the chapter lodges some reservations about the viability 
of technical politics, asking in particular if Feenberg moves too quickly 
to a political theorisation of technical practices at the cost of a neglect of 
social factors that bear upon exclusion and marginalisation in technical 
culture.
1 Hegemony and technology
The principal source for the concept of hegemony is Antonio Gramsci, 
a Marxist thinker of the 1920s and 1930s, contemporary with Lukàcs. 
Whereas the latter, and later the Frankfurt School, concerned themselves 
with the cultural ramifications of reification, Gramsci’s main focus was on 
political strategy.3 The key question that confronted all of these thinkers 
was how to move from multiple specific practices in which the dominant 
illusion, or the illusions that sustained domination, were decomposed 
and broken down to a broader perspective that applies the same realism 
to the question of the character of society as whole. Feenberg draws on 
the idea of hegemony to advance a strategic conception of technical pol-
itics, in which hacktivist and grass roots technical interventions and 
movements are connected through an internal logic that points towards 
wider change.
In practice, the experience of an individual or a group of workers 
includes demystification, in the sense that they really get to know how 
things work (or don’t) and view management ideas, for example, with a 
healthy scepticism. Extending such demystification into a critical per-
spective on society at large is not straightforward because of reifica-
tion and the hold of dominant ideological representations. As we have 
seen, the Frankfurt School largely neglected to explore this as a political 
question, considering such a level of thematisation as essentially out of 
reach in a society where every successful intervention was liable to be rap-
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them, the irrational and all- encompassing character of the system could 
only be glimpsed through critical reflection, mediated by difficult art and 
theory, not opposed or countered directly through political practice.
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is a strategic rethinking of the political 
with the more orthodox Marxist aim of creating a political revolution 
out of social praxis. He describes hegemony as a condition in which ‘the 
development and expansion of one particular group are conceived of, 
and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a 
development of all the “national” energies’ (1982: 182). Under modern 
conditions political power is secured by the social class that succeeds in 
working the weave of representations that comprise a national culture 
so as to create the impression that their interests are those of society 
as a whole. The autonomy of the political and its distinctive logic are 
located in the struggle to achieve this. For political representatives of the 
working class it involves using elements of popular culture to break down 
the appearance of necessity that attaches to social relations as currently 
constituted, in order to supplant it with a vibrant sense of the alternative 
social orderings that are possible.
Writing when Fordist production methods were revolutionising the 
modern factory, Gramsci already noticed the essential role of new tech-
nology in forging the hegemony of the capitalist class. Building on Marx’s 
observation that the power of the workers comes to appear to them as 
an alien force owned by the bourgeoisie, Gramsci notes that indus-
trial technology reinforces each individual worker’s sense of their own 
contribution as minuscule and unimportant, while their appreciation 
of the productive capacity of the system is magnified so that it seems 
overwhelming, like an objective force of nature.4 This appearance, he 
says, is an effect of social power combined with the awesome scale of the 
new mechanised form of production. In reality, new technology is a his-
torical product and it can be broken down:
For the individual worker, the junction between the requirements of 
technical development and the interests of the ruling class is ‘objective’. 
But this junction, this unity between technical development and the 
interests of the ruling class is only a historical phase of industrial 
development, and must be conceived of as transitory. The nexus can 
be dissolved; technical requirements can be conceived in concrete 
terms, not merely separated from the interests of the ruling class, but 
in relation to the interests of the class which is still subaltern. (Gramsci 
1982: 202)
In this way technology was already, in Gramsci’s writings, one of the 
elements in a prevailing hegemony: a weaving together of specific soci-
etal interests into a distinctive formation in which one class achieves 
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The essential dynamic in the theory of political hegemony is the peri-
odic dissolution of seemingly objective and immutable structures through 
a process of critical action that proceeds in the first instance by unlocking 
ideas and modes of thought in the political subject. Through revolu-
tionary praxis (that is, action that anticipates or prefigures a superior 
way of life)5 the greater realism and authenticity of that way of living is 
demonstrated and experienced in practice. Alternative representations 
of reality then become possible, even necessary, to make sense of this 
experience, and in Gramsci’s theory this is political.
2 Politicised constructivism: the technical code
As Feenberg points out (1995), technocracy was the dystopian cultural 
backdrop that informed the thinking of the previous generation of crit-
ical theorists. As the physical incarnation of a pervasive instrumentalism 
that menaced meaning and threatened to leave society at the mercy of 
experts whose only concern was efficiency, technology appeared to be 
beyond reform. In this context, theorists’ efforts were largely aimed at 
defending the possibility of non- technological meaning- making as the 
true human vocation.6 For Feenberg, however, disputes over the meaning 
of any given technology promise to change the global meaning of tech-
nology itself and, ultimately, even hold out the possibility of a change of 
civilisational model.
In effect Feenberg inverts critical theory’s attitude towards technology 
by identifying it as the locus of political opportunity for radical social 
and cultural transformation. This move is made possible in large part 
by his engagement with constructivism, especially the principle that for 
any problem a technological capability might be used to solve there will 
invariably be more than one equally feasible design. Social actors select 
from among the available alternatives, and in this way technology is 
shaped by, rather than determining of, social relations.
Constructivism places emphasis on how technologies are described 
by groups of people and on the social processes through which these 
descriptions become stabilised. Constructivist studies identify the 
emergence of more than one distinctive vocabulary applied to a tech-
nology in its development phase and show how different social groups 
prefer some descriptions to others because those descriptions tend to 
produce artefacts that comport with the interest they take in the tech-
nology. Once a particular description takes hold, artefacts are reshaped 
to better suit the interests of the winning group, and in this way their 
shaping is both symbolic and material.7 A new technology is said to be 
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For Feenberg, the importance of constructivism lies in the way that 
these studies break down the illusion of necessity that inheres in tech-
nologies once the shaping process has achieved closure in this way. The 
authority of technology is undermined by awareness of its contingency 
on social choices made by human beings, and this is a crucial step in 
countering its reification – the appearance that technology is something 
people have to submit to and work with, rather than a thing they might be 
involved in shaping. The pre- eminence of language in these explanations 
adds to the feeling of arbitrariness in the events they describe; in effect, 
social actors might make any kind of sense they like when confronted 
with a new artefact.
Constructivism has been criticised for detaching its fables of inven-
tion and technology development too radically from any wider social 
picture (Winner 1993). The appeal of constructivist narratives lies at 
least partly in the way that social groups are manifest in descriptions 
and appear themselves as social constructs that emerge in the course 
of engagement with the nascent artefacts. Cycling communities, for 
example, form around the emergent bicycle rather than as combinations 
of human individuals already laden with pre- established social histories 
that affect their attitudes and behaviours. Partly to remedy this, Feenberg 
folds the basic insights of constructivism into a richer theorisation by 
replacing the openness of natural language with the Foucauldian notion 
of discourse and with his own idea of the ‘technical code’.
The technical code is centrally concerned with how values get 
impressed on artefacts at the scene of design and the related question 
of how technology as a whole comes to be aligned with dominant social 
groups and to serve their interests. Feenberg agrees with constructivism 
that technology is shaped by social processes all the way down:  there 
is no, ‘inviolate level’ (Feenberg 2010:  xxiii) of purely technical deter-
mination that ensures any one design will be selected from the range 
of equally effective options.8 For Feenberg, constructivism’s focus on 
‘socially relevant groups’ abstracts our understanding of social shaping 
from wider social networks and webs of meaning. Indeed, such is their 
excessive focus on the sociological minutiae of each case that some con-
structivist studies even lose sight of anything that connects the disparate 
instances of technology as technology.9
In contrast, Feenberg maintains that the technical code is mani-
fest wherever social interests are at work shaping technology designs. 
Feenberg describes it as ‘the realization of an interest in a technically 
coherent solution to a general type of problem’ (Feenberg 2002:  15). 
On one side, then, the technical code constitutes some objects as tech-
nical, which obliges a certain kind of response from human agents. On 
the other side, the object’s status as technical is conditional on agents 
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Resulting designs bear the impress of the technical code and, as a result, 
they are in alignment with and re- enforce the current social and political 
hegemony.10 As well as informing the actions of proximal social actors, 
each manifestation of the code ‘serves as a paradigm or exemplar for a 
whole domain of technical activity’ (Feenberg 2002: 20).
The ‘code’ metaphor includes three related sets of ideas. First, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, ‘it is most essentially the rule under 
which technical choices are made in view of preserving operational 
autonomy’ (Feenberg 1991: 80). Here the emphasis is on the routinisa-
tion of design practice so that choices result in artefacts that support and 
re- enforce existing power structures. Second, while artefacts are shaped 
to facilitate the pursuit of certain ends, they must also communicate 
their function to other social actors and enrol them in relevant activ-
ities.11 Feenberg writes that ‘organisations must encode their technical 
environment, not merely associating technology with certain signifiers, 
but installing these signifiers in its very structure’ (1991: 81). Finally, the 
technical code is a discourse in the Foucauldian sense; it is ‘a “regime 
of truth” which brings the construction and interpretation of technical 
systems into conformity with the requirements of a system of domin-
ation’ (1991: 79). Here the technical code extends beyond local sites of 
technology design and is inscribed in norms of perception and practice 
that pertain to technology but are operative over wide social domains.12
Feenberg writes that ‘Modern societies … build long networks 
through tightly coupling links over huge distances between very different 
types of thing and people’ (2010: 76). The technical code runs through 
these networks, controlling the description and shaping of new artefacts, 
where it is a rule of participation: the appearance of technology qua tech-
nology, where it is a kind of signification, and extending to the socio- 
cultural horizon, where it places technology in the categorial ordering 
specific to that society’s idea of itself, or its imaginary. At each of these 
points the technical code is met by countervailing forces that may affect 
its operation.
For example, a society might become ‘more technological’, altering 
the place of technology on its horizon. Feenberg argues that modern 
societies think of themselves in this way, and that this difference from 
other cultures (classed as ‘traditional’) then becomes a matter of iden-
tity for people. Similarly, people’s expectations and perceptions of what 
counts as a technology may be altered as a result of ideological or pol-
itical pressure. Feenberg gives the example of environmentalism, which 
he says has succeeded in installing the question of sustainability close 
to the heart of what technology means. Constructivists have shown 
that disputes arise all the time when new artefacts are in development. 
Feenberg’s theory shows that these conflicts stand in a wider context, and 
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and procedures, designs and artefacts that routinize the pursuit of power 
and advantage by a dominant hegemony’ (1991: 14).
While the outcomes of the contests described by constructivism are 
not determined, struggles over the meaning of technologies are waged 
in a distinctive social context. The fact that they are technical in char-
acter constrains the choices made by those involved in the design pro-
cess, ensuring that some values (and corresponding social interests) are 
more likely to prevail than others. The scene for constructivist struggles 
has been set, so to speak, by the previous history of such struggles, since 
these leave a legacy that is both technical and social in character. The 
technical code, therefore, is always already hegemonic. As Feenberg puts 
it, ‘Since technology is not neutral but fundamentally biased towards a 
particular hegemony, all action undertaken within its framework tends 
to reproduce that hegemony’ (Feenberg 2002: 63). The prevailing logic of 
technology design, which he calls hegemonic technological rationality, 
ensures that the values of managerial control, a narrowly defined idea of 
efficiency, and a stern absence of other values are pervasive at the scene 
of design.
However, the fact that a hegemonic order exists and is inherited 
from the past does not mean that it cannot be challenged. An important 
point of introducing the code metaphor is precisely this. Using the idea 
that technology is a constitutive codification of certain objects enables 
Feenberg to characterise struggles over design as a particular kind of 
contest with distinctive rules. Regardless of whether social actors realise 
it or not, in the many small disputes that mark technology design and 
use, the meaning of technology is at stake and open to change.
3 Technical democracy
The idea of the technical code is therefore pivotal for Feenberg’s thesis 
that disagreements over nascent technology design are not mere histor-
ical curiosities but, potentially at least, matters of political importance. 
He develops this insight into a theory of technical politics by drawing 
on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s development of the idea of 
hegemony. For them, ‘the concept of hegemony supposes a theoretical 
field dominated by the category of articulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985: 93). Their emphasis on articulation grasps the autonomy of political 
action from infrastructural determinants, while the move to autonomise 
what might once have been called the ideological ‘superstructure’ defines 
their post- Marxism.
Focusing on language as the medium of politics,13 Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that emancipatory struggle has moved from being a matter of rival, 
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had suggested in earlier work (1979), to being one in which articulation 
of difference is the measure of radicalism. According to this theory, the 
discursive coherence of politics is obtained at the price of fixity, which 
might be thought of as upholding the law of identity in the field of polit-
ical and cultural representation. It necessarily entails the withholding of 
recognition to marginal or misrepresented groups, or to the validity of 
their claims of unfair treatment. Hegemony is established when antag-
onism over who and what gets to ‘appear’ in politics, and get counted as 
important enough to matter,14 is placed out of view by the operation of 
power. The idea of society as a given, beyond the reach of contingency 
and articulation, then emerges as a kind of horizon on legitimate polit-
ical activity.
In this understanding, radical democracy is a permanent polit-
ical struggle to reopen the question of who and what counts and gets 
included in politics. Radical democracy succeeds in its struggle against 
hegemony when ‘social logics replace ontological foundations’ (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985: 183). Prevailing conceptions of what counts as possible 
or realistic can be changed, and the hold of a narrow, ‘common sense’ 
view of society upheld by politics can be loosened by a political prac-
tice that deploys strategic re- articulations of the elements of political dis-
course. When what matters in politics is extended to include new groups 
and non- traditional concerns, there is a corresponding alteration to the 
meaning of ‘society’ and to the kind of limit this represents. The theory of 
hegemony maintains the neutrality of the elements of political discourse 
until they are combined in determinate articulations, which can reflect 
either this focus on difference or the attempt to close it down and affirm 
established identities.
This conception of politics as an agonistic, discursive practice shaped 
by articulation mirrors Feenberg’s notion of formal bias in technology 
design. As seen in the last chapter, he emphasises that the technical code 
works through concatenations of neutral technical components, which 
produce designs that are only biased in context. Interestingly, however, 
Laclau and Mouffe exclude technology from the field of contingency and 
articulation. The struggle for hegemony is waged in terms of control over 
syntactical elements of political discourse, and while the areas of life that 
are open to articulation in that way expands in the capitalist era,15 it does 
not extend to those dimensions of the social formation that are para-
digmatic, or systematised. For this reason, they exclude things like the 
‘reorganization of an ensemble of bureaucratic administrative functions 
according to criteria of efficiency or rationality’ (1985: 136) from the pol-
itics of hegemony because such practices are not located in contingency.16
Undeterred, Feenberg presents the struggle over the meaning of tech-
nology as an instance of hegemony and radical democratic counter- 
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(popular culture, political ‘news’ media or indeed technology) in which 
opposed parties find themselves operating. The idea of hegemony 
enables a rethinking of power in terms of strategic dynamics rather than 
as a matter of static, structural confrontations of parties with clear and 
opposed interests deriving from an exploitative economic base. It rests 
on a conception of politics as autonomous from economic and social 
correlates, and as a domain that involves participants making plays for 
a kind of positive association, or equivalence, with key elements of the 
surrounding culture. By appearing to be more in tune with the concerns 
of the people as a whole, a party or group can shift the ground of debate 
and ultimately win control of the state. In this way, political parties pre-
sent themselves as sharing meanings with the populace. For radical 
democrats, winning hegemony involves such a play of ideas to win rec-
ognition for groups that have been excluded from political representa-
tion. Success in this will change the meaning of ‘society’ and at the same 
time shift the prevailing idea of what is possible. Laclau and Mouffe argue 
that this strategic conception of politics is superior to a more Marxist 
approach that makes direct, reductive appeal to class or other interests.
Just as with the terms of political discourse, hegemony in technology 
design works through the imposition of a determinate articulation of 
elements that reflect the interests of one group, while excluding those 
who do not count.
The technical code defines the meaning of technology and sets limits 
on what it can be expected to do, in the same way that political hegemony 
encourages a restricted idea of what society can be. As Gramsci already 
understood, the illusion that technology is an independent power over 
which people can exercise no control plays a key role in both these 
scenarios. The phases of a standard constructivist account of technology 
development can be recast in light of Laclau and Mouffe’s ontology of 
lack, disclosing their fuller, theoretical significance.
For them, political struggle emanates from a primal antagonism that is 
held out of view by politics. This antagonism is, in their terms, displaced 
by political agonistics.17 The goal of radical democracy is to change the 
terms of this displacement, so that those who have traditionally only 
been subject to domination by hegemonic power can instead play an 
active role in shaping society. The notion of a realm of antagonism that is 
located outside the field of representation but which nonetheless shapes 
it applies equally well to technology. Faced with absence, or a generalised 
incapacity in the face of nature, there is perhaps an omnipresent struggle 
to create, to make something out of nothing, which is primal to the 
human condition yet poorly understood.
Enigmatic and in some ways unrepresentable, invention gives rise 
to new technological elements which form the basis of the competitive 
dispute between ‘relevant social actors’ described by constructivism. In 
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the early stages of a technology, often the focus of constructivist studies, 
design appears to be an open field associated with free creativity and play 
unencumbered by substantive or historical determinants. This is covered 
over when the process becomes agonistic, or in constructivist terms 
when the meaning of an invention is questioned and disputes arise, per-
haps fuelled by a justified sense that different, equally practicable designs 
working with the same capabilities serve opposed social interests.
Establishing the dominant, hegemonic image of technology as a 
whole (in modern societies as the authoritative and exclusive domain of 
expertise) is both a condition of victory in this struggle and one of its 
outcomes. When technology has been subject to hegemonic codification 
this is because creativity and experimentation have given way to conflict 
over meaning and representation, culminating in the decisive impress 
of hegemony. This is understood by constructivism as ‘stabilisation’. At 
this point, the technical code confers a seemingly fixed, ontologically cer-
tain identity on the resulting technology, making it appear as part of the 
technological given and, as such, immutable and beyond question.
Feenberg envisages progressive technical politics as attracting ‘a demo-
cratically constituted alliance of actors, embracing all those affected’ 
(2010: 80) by specific technologies. Technical politics is a matter of intro-
ducing different social logics into the operation of the technical code and, 
in this way, changing what counts as legitimate technical practice. He 
gives a number of examples of this, such as his account of Minitel users 
who transformed an early French computer network from an electronic 
phone book into a dating agency (Feenberg 1995,  chapter 6). In so doing, 
he argues, they shook the equipment free from its symbolic association 
with the state, organisation and efficient communication and broadened 
its range of uses. He also discusses the example of HIV and AIDS patients 
(1995:  chapter 5) who, faced with the prospect of having to wait for new 
drugs to pass through extensive trials, campaigned to change the rules on 
drug testing so that they could participate and, in so doing, gain earlier 
access to life- saving medicines.
In both these cases technical practices were opened up and modified 
by groups who had previously been thought of merely as recipients of 
technologies. Their activities were aimed at securing a more active role in 
which they gained representation as agents who could ‘speak’ for them-
selves, and as a result they reconfigured the operation of the technical 
code. The first changed the image of the computer network, overwriting 
predefined functions and forcing it to accommodate communicative cul-
tural uses. The second asserted an active role for patients in choosing 
what level of risk they were prepared to take in their search for a cure. 
In both cases this re- articulation of the code creates equivalences 
(networks  =  communication  =  culture; experiment  =  risk  =  choice) 




82  Technical politics
implausible, if a little bit speculative, to suggest that these local changes 
were associated with wider changes to the meaning of technology, 
reflected in the place people subsequently assigned to it in their mental 
image of society.
Feenberg suggests that examples like this illustrate the possibility 
of a democratic challenge to the operation of the technical code. He 
gives several reasons for construing matters in these terms. First, 
the presence of more people in the design process will in itself have 
consequences for the technical code because larger groups will be 
more sensitive to risks presented by new technologies. More vulner-
able members of society are often disproportionately affected by such 
hazards, so their inclusion in the design process will mitigate this. In 
this way, wider public involvement will necessarily create resistance 
internal to the design process. The overall goal of radical democratic 
technical politics is to safeguard the scene of design so that it is free 
from influence by powerful social groups. Success in this should be 
seen as creating a ‘protective umbrella under which social creativity 
can operate at the micro- level of particular institutions and workplaces’ 
(Feenberg 1991: 61).
Potential is protected beneath the umbrella and glimpsed in different 
articulations of the technical code. Resistance to dangerous or hazardous 
innovations, for example, might tip over into different articulations, 
as when workers succeed in imposing safety standards on the design 
of boilers. New potentials that would be overlooked by the existing 
hegemony become available in the course of the design process and 
might, in principle, be developed at any time. Feenberg is cautious on this 
point, however, because the aggregate effect of multiple new articulations 
expressing counter- hegemonic social logics that will ‘guide the design of 
future technology’ (1991: 125) would be a new technical code, producing 
different rules for the selection and concatenation of technical elements. 
It is more important to retain the idea of potential as something that 
haunts the current hegemony than to linger too long on the question of 
its possible future as a new, utopian technology – a point I return to in 
Chapter 5.
The question of potentiality is closely related to the theme of agency 
at the scene of design. Designs shaped by the hegemonic articulation of 
the technical code will tend to re- enforce the impression that technology 
is beyond people’s control, discouraging non- credentialised people 
from participation. Feenberg expresses optimism about deepening and 
extending agency – it is the motor principle of his technical politics. But 
of particular importance here is the extent to which human individuals 
now have agency within the technical sphere, and the contrast between 
this and the situation in other areas of culture. As Feenberg notes, ‘des-
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sphere is on the rise’ (2010: 55). He associates this with changes to the 
technical infrastructure itself, writing that in digital culture,
We are witnessing the end of dystopia as the defining technology of 
our time shifts from great centralized systems such as electric power 
and broadcasting to the more loosely structured world of the com-
puter. (Feenberg 2010: 57)
Far from being put off by Laclau and Mouffe’s exclusion of systemic prop-
erties from the sphere of radical contingency, Feenberg’s use of radical 
democratic theory is to some extent a colonisation of it as well, such is 
his sense of the importance of technology to contemporary social and 
political dynamics. He writes, for instance that, ‘the social imperatives of 
capitalism are experienced as technical constraints rather than as polit-
ical coercion’ (2002: 69). This suggests that struggles over the articulation 
of the technical code are not running in tandem with contests for control 
of political discourse but actually supplant the significance of the latter. 
Feenberg is not only saying that he has identified in technology a chink 
in the armour of the hegemonic system but is also making the stronger 
claim that it is the only opening available. Traditional politics and even 
other areas of culture are less important in the dual sense that they do 
not play the leading role in administering contemporary society and, in 
contrast to technology, they present no realistic possibilities for active 
resistance.18
4 Moving the boundary of technique
The technical code reifies objects that had previously been open to 
further determinations and social disputes over their meaning and 
ultimate form.
This brings them into a chain of equivalences with other technical 
objects, which ensures they all appear to be technology, with the authori-
tative presence entailed by that in modern societies.19 For this to occur 
under current, capitalist conditions means that any technical object thus 
constituted contributes to the centralisation of power in a hierarch-
ical social system and enhances the operational autonomy of managers 
within the production process.
Feenberg emphasises that technology is a dependent social variable, 
something that is shaped by social activity all the way down: indeed, it is a 
‘social battlefield’ (2002: 15). This activity is always ongoing and dynamic; 
technological reality is in a permanent condition of flux. As we have seen, 
for Latour and others, the idea of technology is a contingent product of 
multiple social situations and nothing more. In other words, it is an idea 
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that it pulls it apart, so to speak. In that circumstance, the idea of tech-
nology would simply lose its practical salience and cease to function as 
what Latour calls a ‘collector’ (2013b).
This description of the reality of technology as a process that might 
cease to coagulate in a singular social entity comports with Feenberg’s 
suggestion that technology’s essence is thoroughly historical. However, 
for critical theory the imposition of discursive identity cannot be 
abstracted from questions of social power. The dominant representa-
tion of technology is something more than a mere idea, and loosening 
its hold is not the straightforward matter that Latour seems to think but 
involves social conflicts and political struggle. Technology is a mode 
of appearance of objects that has real social consequences, including 
those that were the focus of the last chapter. The solidification of tech-
nology into the ‘material framework of modernity’ (Feenberg 2002: 19) 
is wrought through social processes, but these are not only linguistic 
choices – they reflect the balance of power in society. Reification brings 
the contested aspects of any given technology development to an end 
and imposes stasis. This fixes its identity and pins it down in relation to 
the prevailing idea of technology as such, which includes a prescriptive 
sense of what it is for, who may use it, and under what circumstances.
What Feenberg calls ‘the boundary of technique’ is the inscription 
of necessity in technologies:  the sense that they must be accepted and 
complied with because they embody the ‘correct’ technical solution. 
Whereas in technocracy this boundary was set by large corporations 
and few would ever have thought to question a machine beyond learning 
how to operate its front end, in recent decades the increased willing-
ness of diverse social agents to challenge technical designs and subvert 
authorised patterns of use has created more instability.20 This change 
discloses that ‘the boundary of technique is never clear. In fact, identi-
fying that boundary is one of the most important stakes in the struggle 
for and against alienated power’ (Feenberg 1991: 58– 59).
Democratic technical politics aims at shifting the boundary of tech-
nique by making more technical practices open to exploration and 
experimentation by wider segments of the population. This process, 
which Feenberg calls democratic (2002: 92; 2003), subversive (1992) or 
sometimes progressive (2017:  220– 222) rationalisation, will bring the 
operation of established technology more into line with society’s needs 
and interests. To achieve this, democratic agency has to temporarily de- 
reify technology, which must involve ‘coding’ it in a way that is heteroge-
neous to the technical code as currently constituted.
As seen above, Feenberg gives examples of popular interventions 
in the field of technology design that succeed in altering technical 
practices and perhaps in displacing the overall meaning of technology. 







Technical politics    85
85
what technology is, sometimes by restoring a sense of its true purposes. 
In the example of the patient- activists, the established image of medical 
experts and scientists in lab coats working in accordance with abstract 
protocols that laypeople had to respect without really understanding 
gives way to a more straightforward representation of scientific and tech-
nical practices as involving real people making decisions that are conse-
quential for other human beings. In this way, technical- political action 
breaks down the illusion of technique and replaces it with something 
more sociologically messy, but also more realistic.
The extent to which agency is now present in the technical sphere 
means that, for Feenberg, the age of technocracy has passed and it is 
meaningful to think of ‘technical politics’. The process of reification that 
created technology as a fixed institution is now prone to challenge in the 
sense that people can discern their own role in producing what counts 
as technology, and this means that they can make choices that change 
the technical code, with potentially far- reaching implications for what 
technology is and what it might become. This is a political radicalisa-
tion of the constructivist thesis that different social groups may challenge 
technology design and that these contests ‘shape’ the resulting artefacts. 
It adds to that argument the observation that when they are successful, 
democratic interventions in technology design can change the meaning 
of technology by moving the boundary of technique.
As seen in the previous section, according to radical democratic 
theory, power differentials are the consequence of an ontological contra-
diction concerning the necessary yet impossible character of society. 
A social imaginary must be achieved, and yet the social idea can never be 
finished, completed and stabilised as self- identical. Since it is both utterly 
necessary for everyone to know that there is a society and objectively 
quite impossible for them to achieve this, there is an endless struggle to 
establish institutions, patterns and stability that can retain the confidence 
of the majority of social subjects. In a sense, they are all compensating for 
the fundamental lack identified above. This struggle defines the polit-
ical, and the fact that different groups seek to make theirs the dominant 
representation makes it agonistic. Feenberg’s technical politics, indeed 
Feenberg’s entire dialectic, rests on construing technology, and especially 
the politics of technology design, on this model.
The point of radical democratic technical politics is to widen the scope 
for technical interventions by individuals and groups whose current rela-
tion to technology is the subordinate one of the worker- user. For them, 
technology is encountered as something overbearing and authoritative 
and this is associated, by the hegemonic articulation of the technical code, 
with its effectiveness. Behind the reified appearance, though, there is real 
antagonism which technical politics brings into view. Interventions like 
hacking a communications system, modifying a drug testing regime or 
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demanding better safety standards on industrial machinery break down 
the illusion of technology as objectively necessary and create new spaces 
for agency and resistance. In this way they restore a sense of the technical 
as a locus of antagonism. Once the use and design of technology has been 
problematised and brought into the realm of meaningful choice for non- 
expert groups, then the question of social power looms large.
Laclau and Mouffe’s theorisation of the political invokes a particular 
relationship of politics to ontology, which in some ways is highly felici-
tous for Feenberg’s project. Just as constructivism rests its struggles over 
meaning on the assumption of underdetermination, so technical politics 
is underscored by the indeterminacy of technical elements, whose con-
catenation in different designs produces social conflict and competition. 
Feenberg’s contention is that technical politics is an agonistic struggle 
involving diverse technology users on one side and dominant social 
interests, especially managers, on the other. The struggle waged by these 
actors is primarily a struggle over the kind of technology society gets, and 
is conducted at the scene of design or use, but because technical politics 
involves breaking down the illusion of technique its ramifications add up 
to establish the possibility of what Feenberg envisages as a more demo-
cratic technology. This would involve moving the boundary of technique 
to a position consistent with socialist transition.
Progress in technical politics, then, disabuses us of what Feenberg 
calls the ‘technical illusion’. Technology is widely perceived as liberating 
because it appears to free people in various ways from tricky world- 
entanglements. While acknowledging the efficacy of technology  – it 
really does solve problems, enable societies to do things differently, 
achieve more with less effort, etc. – Feenberg emphasises that there is 
also an illusory element to this. By opening up technical practices to a 
wider range of social logics, democratic technical politics is a struggle 
over the dominant representation of technology.
It is clear from this that Feenberg’s ontology is not at all the same 
as the essentialist one of some substantivist philosophers. Technology 
is whatever it appears to be in any given social formation, but this 
appearance, Feenberg argues, has a distinctive, albeit illusory, solidity 
and permanence that qualifies it as ‘technology’. As technical infrastruc-
ture, technology seems to perdure, to be something more or less immut-
able, yet at the same time it is a human product susceptible to redesign 
and even obsolescence and replacement. The illusion of technology’s 
solidity is an instance of reification, in which a human product comes 
to appear as something alien, powerful and beyond human control. This 
way of thinking about what technology really is – as contingency that 
manifests as a certain kind of permanence, somewhere between illusion 
and reality  – comports well with Laclau and Mouffe’s negative social 
ontology.
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Technical politics, then, has two layers or aspects, one concerning the 
war of position over current technical designs, the other more forward- 
facing and concerned with the place and character of technology in an 
alternate civilisation. The first lies within the field of articulation as just 
described, and involves opening up the technical code to diverse social 
logics that may subvert the hegemonic ordering. The second layer draws 
on the negative ontological conception of technology with its source in 
antagonism to identify neglected potential as the basis of a future with a 
different technical reality. As we will see in the next chapter, this second 
layer of technology transformation involves an infusion of meaning and 
value into technical practices.
For Feenberg, the second layer is essential to critique because it is 
the realisation of human potential for a more meaningful world- relation 
that connects up the multiple real- world instances of technical politics, 
from computer hacking to patient activism. These activities are unified 
through the idea of released potential. Once technology has been opened 
up to democratic participation, critique faces the question of what it is in 
any given articulation or ‘sort’ that connects it to others, and permits the 
theorist to align them as manifestations of a single counter- hegemonic 
strategy. The ontological layer of technical politics is Feenberg’s frame-
work for answering these questions.
The essence of Feenberg’s proposal is that there is a kind of unifying 
thread that connects such instances of unexpected popular intervention 
in the previously circumscribed domain of the technical. Ultimately, he 
believes that interventions like this have the political potential to facili-
tate the kind of transformation of technology that will add up to whole-
sale civilisational change. Pursuant to this, he suggests that the meaning 
of technology has already changed as modern societies have left the 
‘dystopian’ constellation that preoccupied his critical theory forebears. 
This coincides with digitisation,21 and the primary result is that the social 
logics that might articulate the technical code have become more diverse 
and in consequence its entanglements with other dimensions of social 
power more complex. The fault- lines, therefore, where contests over 
technology design and use occur and shape the meaning of technology 
have also moved. Feenberg acknowledges this, but his model for tech-
nical politics remains premised on a confrontation between technological 
hegemony on one side and potential- releasing, democratic participation 
on the other.
Feenberg’s emphasis on hegemonic technological rationality leads him 
to posit radical democracy as the privileged counter- value through which 
space might be created for rival social logics to articulate the technical 
code. This accommodates a widening of the range of values that might 
apply to technology design, which makes feasible the kind of civilisational 
transformation he envisages. However, the new constellation, in which 
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more people are actively shaping technology and technical objects are 
themselves more active in diverse, unpredictable ways, is different, but 
it may not take us any closer to machines whose design contributes to a 
more humanised world.
As we saw in the last chapter Feenberg insists that democratic ration-
alisation cannot proceed in an instrumental fashion and, equally, that it 
cannot be a (utopian) matter of wishing nicer machines into existence. 
Technology holds a distinct structural position in society and has internal 
protocols that must be respected in any account of the reform process. 
This means that while design is an important opening for political prac-
tice, it must be embedded in an account of wider transformation. While 
constructivism enables Feenberg to open up the scene of design, so as to 
think the possibility of people making demands and shaping technolo-
gies in a politically motivated direction, he is also wary of the charge of 
utopianism.22
5 Ambiguities of rapid politicisation
Feenberg’s idea of the technical code represents a significant advance 
over earlier versions of constructivism. Without this idea, construct-
ivism cannot account for the persistence of the distinction between tech-
nical and non- technical objects, still less explicate what that distinction 
connotes in contemporary culture. Through it, Feenberg also succeeds in 
giving renewed political impetus to critical theory, bringing its sense of 
contradiction and antagonism to the study of a growing arena of political 
struggle.
The idea of technical politics is, then, a major enhancement to con-
structivism, giving it a political relevance it otherwise lacks. Feenberg’s 
concept restores the critical tension between technological reality, which 
is messy and disparate, and the salient conception of technology as 
something authoritative and final. Where hackers, game modders, social 
media users, etc. run up against corporate platforms and state controls 
on internet and technology use, he has identified a burgeoning area of 
contemporary experience in which critical theory might both gain some 
traction politically and facilitate a fuller understanding of the meaning of 
these conflicts.
Using the constructivist insight that technology is socially malle-
able and susceptible to reform by the power of redescription, Feenberg 
suggests that it is now the principal medium of political struggle, dis-
placing other forms of public discourse and contested institutions. His 
examples demonstrate that small- scale technical interventions can have 
extensive consequences, up to and including effects on the very meaning 
of technology as a whole  – its place and significance in society and 
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culture. In this way, Feenberg redirects critical theory’s traditional suspi-
cion of expert discourses into a political opposition of the perspective of 
ordinary ‘users’, who for him represent democracy, to those whose tech-
nical credentials are a condensation of knowledge (of how things work) 
and power (over those who only use the things).
Feenberg’s work is therefore optimistic about the prospects for demo-
cratic reform in the sense that he finds progressive significance in much 
of what is currently going on and interprets the vibrancy of contem-
porary techno- culture as confirming his thesis of an emergent tech-
nical democracy. There are reasons to be doubtful about this, however. 
Feenberg’s favoured theory of radical democracy might be considered to 
promote a positive outlook, with lots of activities available to be easily 
cast as manifestations of democratic resistance because they represent 
non- compliance with the hegemonic articulation of the technical code. 
However, if an agonistic model of activity is presupposed, then this may 
dispose the analyst to find resistance everywhere, especially if the tech-
nical has itself been construed as co- terminous with the political.
Earlier versions of critical theory understood the problem of tech-
nology in terms of experts using the authority of technology to dictate 
terms to technology users and, ultimately, imposing an unquestioning 
compliance on the rest of society. Technical politics is Feenberg’s way of 
thinking through openings that have ruptured this scenario, and dem-
ocracy is an important value in that process. However, with the change 
of cultural horizon involved in breaking with dystopia, technology has 
already shed its association with the unquestionable authority of experts, 
or even with narrow efficiency as a goal. The diffusion of digital technolo-
gies has encouraged the development of diverse cultures of experimenta-
tion, dabbling, reconfiguring, sabotage and so on. To the extent that the 
Internet, for instance, is a place where everyone periodically plays with 
technology, and mobile phones have become toys that people trust and 
incorporate into every aspect of their lives, what Feenberg calls the tech-
nical illusion has already evaporated.
Much of this activity would have been unthinkable just a few decades 
ago, and this must be at least partly attributed to the fact that technology 
now exists in networks that extend into places not primarily associated 
with work and control. These networks produce and are produced by 
articulations of the technical code that are embedded in cultural values 
like play and learning, rather than control or efficiency. Technology is 
as likely to be held equivalent to things that can be trusted, that are life- 
enhancing, individual, even eccentric, as it is to be associated with cor-
porate power or government control.
This is not to say that the technical code has lost its connection with 
social domination. On the contrary, the entwinement of technology’s net-
work with those of social power seems to be as profound and pervasive in 
90  Technical politics
its consequences as ever. Under this changed cultural horizon, however, 
the technical code is no longer subject to one or two kinds of articulation. 
Feenberg himself makes this point when he writes that ‘technical ration-
ality consists of various loosely related dimensions with different social 
implications’ (1991: 178), but he does not draw the necessary conclusion 
for technical politics from this observation. If diverse rationalities are 
present in technology, then the competing values at stake are also already 
multiple rather than binary.
The usefulness of the technical code idea is compromised by Feenberg’s 
imposition of a binary political battle concept onto it. His conception of 
technical politics as an agonistic struggle between democracy and hege-
monic technological rationality effaces sociological and political details 
that are, in consequence, left out of account in the theory of technical 
politics. As we have seen in this chapter, Feenberg’s claim that technology 
is the principal or even the only vehicle of hegemonic power in contem-
porary society even threatens the wider theory of radical democracy with 
absorption into technical politics. His assertion that the technical code is 
the vehicle of contemporary hegemony may be a feature of theories, like 
Laclau and Mouffe’s version of radical democracy, that rest on negative 
ontological foundations. A fundamental antagonism defines the field and 
gives it its agonistic structure, but it also seems to entail that other fields 
cannot also be fundamental.
Lois McNay has argued that this kind of overreach is a pervasive fea-
ture of theories she characterises as pre- emptively motivated to present 
aspects of social reality as political. In her critique of Mouffe’s work 
in particular, McNay argues that ‘the logic of social being exceeds the 
explanatory force of the one- dimensional antagonistic logic of significa-
tion’ (2014:  8). In other words, those processes that stand beyond the 
reach of political discourse are not merely amorphous, or the locus of 
an unrepresentable antagonism, but reflect the presence of important 
dimensions of social reality studied by other disciplines. She points 
out that social processes, including those involving symbolic violence, 
recede in radical democratic theory to become an undifferentiated ‘blob’, 
obscured by the overbearing, fascinating logic of the political.
In this respect technical politics mirrors radical democracy’s ‘lin-
guistic universalism’ (McNay 2014:  18), assuming that everyone is 
involved with technology in much the same way that Laclau and Mouffe 
assume everyone would have the capacity to participate in political 
speech, were it not for the way that politics is currently structured. The 
under- representation of social groups (women, some ethnic groups, 
people with some disabilities) in technical professions is a long- standing 
concern of sociologists of technology (Wacjman 2004). Technical pol-
itics neglects to include any space for the multiple social causes of their 
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consequences of hegemonic technological rationality, perpetrated by 
formal bias in technology design. This fails to address the exclusion of 
groups of people who never encounter a codified technical object, some 
of whom decide at an early age that technology is ‘not for them’, perhaps 
as a result of internalising a sense of inferiority to experts and know-
ledgeable men. Sociological processes that limit and inhibit women’s 
interest in technology, for example, are not themselves reducible to the 
codification of technology as male – it is one factor among many, and it 
needs to be understood through a wider, sociological lens. The danger 
here may be that in rushing to conceive technology as politics, critical 
theory fails to challenge the fine- grained, social processes through which 
privileged forms of access and technical control are reproduced, or to 
accommodate any account of the social processes through which those 
who are excluded from a role in technology might thematise their exclu-
sion, gain recognition for it and turn it into a political issue.
If Feenberg’s use of radical democratic theory effaces sociological 
questions around human agency, it also obscures the active, substantive 
role of specific technologies, which also tend to be viewed in binary terms 
either as threats, because they instantiate the hegemonic technological 
rationality, or as signs of an as yet quite abstract potentiality. Feenberg’s 
thought remains conservative in this sense. While it might be expected 
that democratic challenges to capitalist hegemony would create openings 
for new ideas and designs that embody different values, his discussion 
of the latter never strays beyond recurrent reference to the notion of a 
currently neglected potentiality. The social (ontological) reality of tech-
nology, he argues, is matched by an idea of latent human or social poten-
tial. He writes that ‘it is important to retain a strong notion of potentiality 
with which to challenge existing designs’ (2002: 33), but this allusion to 
potential is as far as the theory goes in projecting an alternative version 
of the technical code.
The question of potential brings us to a further problem with the theory 
as currently formulated, which is that the benefits of democratisation are 
nearly always presented as essentially negative, or defensive. As we saw 
in the last chapter, Feenberg opposes conservative strategies aimed at 
containment of technology from positions in culture outside technology 
(for example, restrictions on embryo research), yet he is equally clear 
that the primary beneficial consequence of democratisation will consist 
in checking certain kinds of technology design from within. This might 
seem to betray an ongoing concern with technology as a threat, reflecting 
Feenberg’s belief that current technology is a reified version, shaped by 
capitalist interests. Defining technology as a social process, he envisages 
democracy as a restraining force within technology design, holding nega-
tive developments back, rather than an externally imposed cultural con-
straint. However, while inhibiting hegemonic distortions from within in 
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this way is, perhaps, a necessary first step, it is not clear that installing 
cultural constraints as internal to the design process is a sufficient condi-
tion for further progressive change.
If Feenberg is evasive on the nature of this positive potential, he 
exaggerates the extent to which the multiple interventions that con-
stitute democratic rationalisation really are internally connected as 
manifestations of progress, with the overarching implications for 
the system that he ascribes to them. It is not clear that subversions of 
established uses of technology are always steps towards democracy, even 
when they improve the lives of specific groups of individuals. Patient 
activism has shortened the time spent testing new drugs and saved lives, 
but it is questionable whether it amounts to, or even contributes to, pro-
gress in any wider sense. A  popular challenge to expertise cannot be 
considered a step in a progressive direction merely because it questions 
technical authority, illustrated by the fact that Europe and North America 
are currently in the midst of a measles epidemic, perhaps partly caused 
by popular scepticism about vaccinations.
Similarly, computer hackers have shifted the boundary of technique 
in the sense that they have promoted the idea of the computer net-
work as something non- expert people may use as a medium of self- 
expression, but the sociology of this does not involve enhancements to 
democracy. Instead, the diffusion of accessible networked computing 
has been associated with the emergence of cultures (such as those 
associated with hacking and gaming) in which informal hierarchies of 
expertise and patterns of social exclusion are rigidly and often aggres-
sively enforced. These developments have been associated with crim-
inal organisations’ use of networks and, partly in consequence, with 
repressive legislation that criminalises certain forms of computer 
use (Chandler 1996) and constructs a new, normativised conception 
of the ‘user’. It is true that in the digital era, customising technology 
and shaping it to one’s own requirements has become a normal part 
of life for perhaps the majority of people. However, inequalities persist 
and proliferate within this culture of diffuse technical know- how, and 
there has been no corresponding progressive change that might merit 
description as ‘democratisation’.
Democracy, it seems, does not play the transformative role in tech-
nical politics that Feenberg assigns to it, even if popular interventions 
of the kind he identifies do create space for alternative values which 
might shape the technical code of the future. Moreover, when it has 
been applied to technical systems democracy has not always led to their 
ethical improvement when viewed in historical perspective. There is no 
easy association of democratisation with the ethics (or aesthetics) of a 
superior civilisational model. Feenberg envisages ‘mutually supporting 
transformations’ (2002:  27) as if they were a natural consequence of 
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loosening the grip of the technical code. But numerous examples, such 
as the practice of eugenics in Sweden in the 1970s, suggest that the finest 
democracy can go together with abusive medical (and other) technolo-
gies. Perhaps the underlying problem here is that the very conditions that 
make democratising technology design thinkable also vitiate any notion 
of progress: in pure democracy the future has no direction aside from the 
one people choose to give it.
It is perhaps for this reason that Feenberg approaches the notion 
of a future technical code with a degree of caution. There is inconsist-
ency between the idea of technical politics as an open- ended play of 
articulations, widening the circle of included participants while always 
struggling against hegemony (against a background of antagonism), 
and Feenberg’s Marcusean orientation towards reconciliation and har-
mony (with something like Marx’s ‘end of history’ providing a sense of 
direction). Perhaps the multiple struggles over technologies and the 
changes they bring about do not add up to anything like progress in the 
Marcusean sense. This probably depends on the kinds of values that get 
imposed on technology and the extent to which they finesse Feenberg’s 
notion of potential. The next two chapters address this.
Notes
1 ‘Manual’ here is a placeholder for the authority that guides users in their initial 
engagements with machines and other artefacts. It includes instructions from 
the boss at work, conventions and patterns of use sedimented in the bodies of 
workers as habits, and even visual metaphors in a graphical user interface.
2 The idea of hegemony antedates Gramsci’s intervention, though the latter has 
become the definitive point of reference. Perry Anderson traces the origins 
of the modern concept to nineteenth- century debates over nationalism and 
the state, where it signifies the role of a unifying power, and notes that with 
Gramsci’s intervention, ‘hegemony … acquired two enlargements of meaning 
in tension with each other. It now included both the extraction by rulers of 
consent from the ruled, and the deployment of coercion to enforce their rule’ 
(Anderson 2017: 21).
3 This does not mean he was any less perceptive a critic of the negative effects 
of reification on psychological and cultural life. As Boggs puts it, ‘Gramsci 
pointed to Taylorism in the US and the fascist corporate state in Italy as 
harbingers of the most sophisticated mode of capitalist domination, in which 
workers would be totally subordinated to machine specialization and the cult 
of efficiency. The diffusion of bureaucratic- technological norms would mean 
the destruction of all intellectual, artistic, and even human content to produc-
tion and, in the end the grinding down of the workers’ life to virtual nothing-
ness’ (1976: 47). Gramsci refers to the spread of psychoanalysis as a symptom 
of ‘the increased moral coercion exercised by the apparatus of State and society 
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4 The affinity with reification is clear when Gramsci writes that ‘One of the 
commonest totems is the belief about everything that exists, that it is “nat-
ural” that it should exist … and that however badly one’s attempts to reform 
may go they will not stop life going on, since the traditional forces will con-
tinue to operate and precisely will keep life going on … One may say that no 
real movement becomes aware of its global character all at once, but only 
gradually through experience – in other words when it learns from the facts 
that nothing which exists is natural … but rather exists because of certain 
conditions’ (cited in Boggs 1976: 110).
5 In his Prison Notebooks, which were scrutinised by a fascist censor, Gramsci’s 
phrase for Marxism was ‘the philosophy of praxis’ (Gramsci 1982). A similar 
emphasis on praxis is found in other Hegel- inspired Marxist scholarship, 
such as the work of Karl Korsch (1970) and, of course, Georg Lukàcs (1981). 
Steven Vogel (in Arnold and Michel 2017) provides an interesting discussion 
of the epistemic function of praxis in Feenberg’s thought.
6 Even Marcuse’s notion of a new technics as the exit point from one- 
dimensional society is suggestive of a social imaginary in which technology 
and technologists play a controlling role.
7 This point is emphasised in some constructivist studies. For example, Bowker 
and Starr suggest that ‘classifications and standards are material as well as 
symbolic’ (1999: 39). It tends to be assumed that the two aspects are insepar-
able: motivated relabelling drives physical amendment and substantive alter-
ation is reflected in changes of terminology.
8 ‘Technology must really work. But it is not merely because a device works that 
it is chosen for development over many other equally coherent configurations 
of technical elements’ (Feenberg 2002: 79).
9 ‘The more one studies technological arrangements, the more one considers 
their ins and outs, the less chance one has of unifying them in a coherent 
whole’ (Latour 2013b: 213).
10 Wiebe Bijker acknowledges that in most constructivist scholarship there is a 
‘missing link’ between these details and the question of power (1997: 261). It 
is this link that Feenberg’s idea of a technical code tries to provide.
11 Feenberg refers to a scale of meaningfulness for technological artefacts, ran-
ging from ‘semantic impoverishment’ to ‘richest object relations’ (2010: 175).
12 In this it corresponds to what Bowker and Star describe as a classification 
system, forming ‘a juncture of social organization, moral order, and layers of 
technical integration’ (Bowker and Star 1999: 33).
13 And all other practices: their theory has been accused of ‘absolutising’ lan-
guage (Geras 1987), in common with its post- structuralist sources.
14 ‘To enumerate is never an innocent operation; it involves major displacements 
of meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 62– 63).
15 ‘The hegemonic form of politics only becomes dominant at the beginning of 
modern times, when the reproduction of the different social areas takes place 
by permanently changing conditions which constantly require the constitu-
tion of new systems of differences’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 138).
16 Laclau and Mouffe write that in ‘industrial society there is a growing unifica-
tion of the social terrain around the image of the mechanism’ (1985: 36), which 
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on their thought and surely represents a regression behind Gramsci’s insights, 
cited above.
17 Allan Dreyer Hansen usefully describes Laclau and Mouffe’s theory in the 
following terms:  ‘Discourse theory’s ontology consists in a set of limits 
and impossibilities, and its theorizing is based on these. It starts from the 
basic claim of the “impossibility of society” and the essential unfixity of all 
possible social objects. Society is impossible because it is “haunted” by an 
unsurmountable negativity … which cannot be sublated in any dialectical 
movement … Radical negativity means that it cannot be positivised by a 
deeper objectivity (e.g. the cunning of reason, society’s movement of stages 
towards communism, etc.)’ (2014: 286).
18 Feenberg writes that ‘natural science and technology define the framework 
of capitalist civilization after World War II’ (2002: 167), and that nothing less 
than ‘the meaning of modernity is at stake’ in technical politics (2002: 114). 
He also emphasises that human beings are now in technology  – that is, 
immersed in a technological environment and shaped by it to a new, unpre-
cedented extent.
19 It should be noted that the integration of new technologies into this system 
of representation is not often seamless. New technologies tend to destabilise 
what technology means, with implications for associated power structures. 
Feenberg writes that ‘new technology can threaten the hegemony of the 
ruling groups until it has been strategically encoded’ (2002: 79). After that, 
however, once it has received the technical code, ‘everywhere technology 
goes, centralized, hierarchical social structures follow’ (2002: 24).
20 Latour is the ideologist of this tendency:  he abstracts it from questions of 
social power and presents the dissolution of technological hegemony as if it 
has already happened.
21 Relatively early in the digital transition, Feenberg observed that ‘it matters 
what we do about technology because, perhaps for the first time in history, 
public involvement is beginning to have significant impact on the shape of 
technological change’ (1995: 2).
22 Marcuse was famously accused by Habermas (1989) of naively recommending 
a dialogue with nature because he moved too quickly in developing his vision/ 
















Feenberg draws on the insights of social constructivism to argue that the 
design of technologies is a contentious, disputed and thoroughly political 
process. Technologies come heavily inscribed with symbolic meanings, 
including, in capitalist society, the message that they are authoritative 
and determinate. One of Feenberg’s innovations has been to show how 
these social inscriptions not only construct technology in line with the 
conceptions of specific social groups but, at the same time, tie artefacts 
into wider social networks (2010: 76). Enlarging the picture in this way 
reveals that, as a social process, creating and shaping technologies is 
not bracketed off from other practices but always closely entwined with 
them. It also suggests that the symbolic inscription of technical artefacts 
is a richer process than the mere communication of function to putative 
users: here too there is a politics, which Feenberg understands in terms 
of aestheticisation.
Feenberg politicises technology design not by reducing the process 
to purportedly more profound layers of the social formation (which 
was, perhaps, the old Marxist way of achieving the same thing) but by 
demonstrating the connection between technology and social power as 
this is manifest in the technical code. An object is recognisable as tech-
nology precisely when and because it bears certain significations that 
speak of (and to) wider social relations: it is efficient; it is an enhance-
ment to what was done previously; it represents the future; and so on. 
These things are written into the symbolic aspect of the artefact along 
with the specific instructions on its operation, concerning which tasks 
it performs and what problems it solves, on its user interface. These 
inscriptions make it recognisable as technology and, in so doing, they 
position it in a wider web of social meanings and values. None of the 
latter (efficiency, the future) are specific to technology, but in modern 
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This chapter explores Feenberg’s argument that modern technology 
stands in need of ‘re- aestheticisation’. Aesthetic critique connects the 
political analysis of specific contexts of social shaping to the wider goal 
of civilisational change. As indicated in the previous chapter, there is a 
theoretical difficulty in connecting the ontic concerns of politicised con-
structivism to such a wider project of transformation, which seems to 
be ontological in its implications. Feenberg’s conception of aesthetic 
critique serves as the normative linchpin that connects these two parts 
of the theory. Progressive re- articulations of the technical code result 
in alternative concatenations of technical elements in designs that are 
superior because they serve more people’s interests more effectively 
than capitalist ones. Aesthetic critique adds to this the idea that progres-
sive reinscriptions also have consequences that extend beyond practical 
alterations to the performance of the technology, to change the values 
operative in technology design and thereby alter the meaning of tech-
nology as a social institution.
Feenberg argues that there is an inherent affinity between progres-
sive technical politics and the aesthetics of naturalistic modernism, and 
that design changes inspired by this association will bring about the 
kind of profound cultural transformation necessary to take us forward 
to a superior civilisational model. This part of his argument rests on an 
organicist, holistic approach to social totality, in which reconciliation of 
the human with nature and technology, fulfilled in part by technology 
that humanises nature, are key values. I will suggest that on this point 
Feenberg’s argument has been historically superseded. Precisely the kind 
of aesthetic modernism he recommends is now hegemonic in contem-
porary design, and it has not brought about any progressive advance in 
terms of economic justice or democratic politics. Notwithstanding this, 
both the notion of an aesthetic critique and the political significance 
assigned to it are important to Feenberg’s overall advance in relation 
to other varieties of constructivism or rival critical approaches to tech-
nology. The chapter recommends a modified version of aesthetic critique 
that is based on difference rather than wholeness, and on the principle 
that there is no inherent correspondence of aesthetic standards with the 
ethics immanent to technology design.
The aesthetic aspects of design are an important issue at stake 
between different constituencies who seek to make artefacts comport 
with their definitions of technology and what it is for. Aesthetic critique 
addresses the sedimentation of values associated with past technologies 
(and their codifications) in the foundations of contemporary cultural life. 
If democratising the scene of technology design allows user groups and 
workers a voice in shaping machines that are more pleasant to work with, 
this aesthetic dimension also bears upon the attempt to reposition tech-
nology in wider webs of meaning.
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There is a connection here with environmentalism and movements 
that sometimes appear to be ‘anti- technology’ in their orientation. When 
he discusses this aspect of aesthetic critique, Feenberg often refers to 
essentialist critics of technology (especially Heidegger and Marcuse), 
for whom the question of civilisation change, predicated on the devel-
opment of a radically different kind of technical infrastructure, was a 
key concern. The notion of aesthetic critique is the bridge in Feenberg’s 
theory between his embrace of constructivism, with its emphasis on con-
tingency and local, contemporary struggles, and his attachment to the 
long- term historical concerns of such essentialist philosophies of tech-
nology. Feenberg has stated that the normative or critical imperatives 
of his theory are in fact grounded here, writing that ‘aesthetics provides 
the normative basis for the reconstruction of technological rationality’ 
(Feenberg 2005: xv).
Section  1 places Feenberg’s ideas about aesthetics in the context of 
his technical politics, positioning them within his critical version of con-
structivism as part of the codification of technology  – a process that 
includes technology’s ‘neutral’ appearance as a decisive outcome. This 
relates to the question of the aesthetics of technology as the focus of a 
kind of locally initiated reform that might herald wider changes with 
implications for the character of civilisation. Section 2 positions aesthetic 
critique thus defined at the intersection of constructivism and traditional 
critical theory, where it carries the values of a wider project oriented to 
civilisation change and makes it possible to bring them to bear upon con-
temporary technology designs while evading the charge of utopianism, 
or flouting the rationality conditions that must preside over technical 
thinking.
Section  3 describes the thesis of re- aestheticisation of capitalist 
technology with reference to Feenberg’s argument that all technology 
includes what he calls primary and secondary ‘instrumentalisation’. The 
first of these involves an originary violence, without which there can be 
no technology, while the second is restorative and compensates nature 
by mediating the result through symbolic meaning. In capitalist soci-
eties the second of these moments is stymied, resulting in a cold, one- 
dimensional technology and a correspondingly shallow way of life. Here, 
Feenberg’s notion of an aesthetic dimension re- presents Marcuse’s 
thesis of an enlarged or transformed mode of technical reasoning, com-
patible with a new kind of civilisation. I question whether the idea of an 
aesthetic transformation can bear the weight of these essentially uto-
pian ideas and, in the concluding section, recommend an alternative 
understanding of the place of the aesthetic in contemporary technical 
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1 Aesthetics in technical politics
In presenting technology as a phenomenon of social connection, Feenberg 
stresses that he is making an anti- essentialist move. As we have seen, 
he argues that ‘technology is a dependent variable in the social system, 
shaped to a purpose by the dominant class and subject to reshaping to 
new purposes under a new hegemony’ (Feenberg 1991: 35). The import-
ance of such a definition is multiple. It is historically accurate, because 
people have not always talked about technology in the same ways that 
they do today. It is important to register differences like the foregrounding 
of the word ‘technology’, which happens in English in the eighteenth cen-
tury, for example, and heralds a relatively recent framing of devices and 
machines, which were previously described as various ‘mechanical arts’ 
(Jennings 1985; Adas 1989). In contrast, the essentialist view illegitim-
ately projects back contemporary meanings to establish a connection 
among proto- tools used by monkeys, medieval sewing implements and 
nuclear power stations, as if they were all manifestations of the same, con-
tinuous phenomenon. This underestimates the contingency that really 
attaches to technology and other social practices, supporting narratives 
(from socio- biology to optimistic visions of progress) that obscure the 
real, underdetermined1 nature of technology design.
This relational definition marks a cutting loose from ways of thinking 
that place large investments in particular narrative constructions on tech-
nology as a long- standing yet dynamic dimension of the human story. 
For example, Marx presented technology as both the outcome of local 
projects rooted in specific social conflicts and one of the cornerstones of 
human economic development. As discussed in Chapter 1, he states in 
a number of places that capitalist technology is shaped to facilitate the 
domination of workers (e.g. Marx 1990: 562), while, at the same time, 
he identifies technology as historically continuous and even discusses its 
origins in hunting and war (1990: 452). For Marx, human history is the 
growth of productive power – the expansion of the productive forces, 
which includes technology  – and this strongly implies some kind of 
progress, from inferior tools of previous modes of production to the 
advanced machines of capitalism that will ultimately set us free (e.g. 
Marx 1981: 701).
Feenberg’s position on what technology is and on its social- relational 
character is intended to be consistent with Marx’s vision of human self- 
realisation, but it also involves a careful uncoupling of technology from 
the long- term, uni- directional vision of historical materialism. Feenberg 
doesn’t want to abandon the connection with Marx, or the idea that 
history may exhibit a progressive pattern in which technology plays an 
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is crucial because it is part of what puts the ‘critical’ into critical theory 
and, as such, makes Feenberg more than just another constructivist.2 
However, retaining this notion while doing justice to local disputes over 
the meanings of specific technologies is no easy matter. Feenberg has to 
be faithful to the meaning- assignments of proximal social agents while 
at the same time maintaining a connection between them and wider 
struggles with a higher- order significance that are often only appreciated 
by social actors elsewhere in historical time.3
Marx provided detailed accounts of social struggle and more than 
one statement of his theory of history, but he had less to say about the 
cultural mediations of meaning that occur in a society in which tech-
nology is increasingly salient in experience. Following in the footsteps of 
earlier critical theorists, Feenberg identifies Max Weber’s work on soci-
etal rationalisation, but also Heidegger’s critique of modern technology 
and Marcuse’s vision of ‘civilizational transformation’, to expand Marx’s 
theory. Part of Feenberg’s project is to try and maintain a connection 
between these conceptions of the meaning of technology in modern cul-
ture and fine- grained accounts of struggles over technology design, in an 
account of historical change. At stake in the local struggles described by 
constructivists, he maintains, is the issue of what technology means in a 
global sense, and this has a bearing on the kind of society that will exist 
in the future.
Constructivist scholars have provided detailed descriptive histories 
of struggles over the meanings of individual technologies, but they 
have been accused of abstracting them from wider social relationships. 
Langdon Winner (1993), in particular, points out that constructivism 
seems to be blind both to the contexts that condition actors’ interests 
in a given technology and to the wider consequences of their struggles. 
Feenberg’s theory brings relationality and connectedness. He shows that 
the scene of technology design is always already pre- coded as technical, 
meaning that some actors will be empowered as ‘experts’ and (normally) 
that in this designation, knowledge is condensed with the representa-
tion of dominant social interests. Moreover, the imprint that products 
bear as technologies ensures that they will be perceived as ‘neutral’ at 
the end of these social processes. The ‘technical code’ in modern soci-
eties emphasises that technology is value- free and only present in the 
workplace because it enhances efficiency. This appearance of neu-
trality – of technology as the objective solution to a problem – is vital to 
understanding how technology comports with social power.
As discussed in Chapter  2, Feenberg maintains that, like other 
formal systems associated with modernity (bureaucracy, public law), 
technology presents as free of substantive entanglements or biases. 
Technology does not seem to favour any particular social group, 
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common perception of technology is that it is not subject to moral 
questioning: if someone chooses to set it to a ‘bad’ purpose then it is 
the person and not the machine that is at fault. Technical artefacts are 
made to appear as somehow above the political fray of further contest-
ation and dispute. The production of this reified appearance masks the 
disputed design decisions while ensuring that all parties, including the 
people who have to live with the consequences, accept that it is the 
best design because it is the most efficient. As such, the codification of 
technology as ‘neutral’ is a necessary, critical supplement to the con-
structivist idea of ‘closure’.4
Feenberg’s politicisation of constructivism involves using its methods 
to reopen the historical questions that are placed out of view by this 
neutral codification in order to make social actors aware that they can 
challenge individual technical designs and bring their own interests and 
values to bear upon them.5 Feenberg deconstructs technology’s codifi-
cation as ‘neutral’ by reading this appearance both as an instance of 
reification and as a variety of discourse in Foucault’s sense of the term. 
Viewed in this way, technology resembles stretches of language that 
represent and constitute the world for agents, who must find margins 
of manoeuvre within the interstices of authoritative sense- making and 
associated institutionalised forms of domination. Foucault’s rhetorics to 
one side,6 it is clear that real material technologies often dovetail with 
stratagems of power – one thinks of the physical design of prisons, or 
of psycho- pharmacology  – and reference to this enables Feenberg to 
suggest that technology itself functions like a discourse, as well as oper-
ating adjacent to it.
Feenberg’s technical politics distinguishes between strategic 
implementations of technology that both serve dominant interests and 
re- enforce the dominant codification of it as a neutral structure, and tac-
tical operations on the part of resisting subjects. The latter grapple with 
metaphoric ‘technics of domination’, but also with real machinery and 
technologies that establish procedurally correct behavioural templates 
and, in so doing, leave behind spaces for subversion. In the case of 
technology designs, these spaces are occupied wherever social groups 
come together and demand something better from established tech-
nical means. The patients’ groups who oblige medical authorities to 
speed up drug testing, for example, are engaged in a kind of Foucauldian 
counter- practice7 that tries to reshape spaces previously sculpted exclu-
sively by experts. Technical politics, then, accounts for the appearance of 
technology’s neutrality as the outcome of social processes and a deter-
minate codification of technical artefacts, and it specifies a way in which 
this might be challenged. Each time a technology design is subjected to 
democratic challenge, it both improves that technology and, potentially 
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Feenberg’s theory suggests that local struggles to reopen technology 
designs and challenge their objectivity create at the same time openings 
to a larger, wider kind of change involving the meaning of technology 
itself and associated with civilisational change. This marks an opening 
to the critical theory tradition, and its raising of larger questions. If 
modern technology’s appearance of neutral efficiency is contingent on 
social processes, what are the implications for social change? Might a 
technology be envisaged in which the particular and the sensuous are 
foregrounded in the human experience of artefacts  – one in which 
the term ‘technology’ no longer serves as a connector linking all of its 
instances and associating them with other sources of neutral authority? 
This brings us to the aesthetic dimension of the theory.
2 Marcuse, aesthetics and critique
Herbert Marcuse was the Frankfurt School theorist most preoccupied 
with technocracy, a social system defined by its effacement of democracy 
in deference to the rule of technical imperatives, usually implemented 
by experts. Positive advocates of technocracy, of which there have been 
few, recommend finding technical solutions to human problems and 
implementing them in systems that are as efficient as possible without 
regard for the feelings or opinions of affected social subjects, which are 
treated as potential negative feedback to be managed by the system. 
According to technocracy, expertise ought to be authoritative and able 
to circumvent communicative or deliberative procedures aimed at 
securing democratic legitimation. Technocracy was often the implicit, 
dystopic situation for the first generation of critical theorists because it 
represented the clearest formulation of a society whose sole organising 
principle was a narrowly construed rationality, resulting in a society so 
irrational no one would choose to live in it.
Although his work allowed greater scope for political action than that 
of other Frankfurt School theorists, Marcuse’s critique of technocracy 
was, like theirs, aesthetically grounded (Marcuse 1978). He objected 
to the narrow emphasis on function over other concerns in capitalist 
machines, and associated this with the technocratic corrosion of meaning 
in modern life. His aesthetic critique traced these developments to the 
separation of function and form that distinguished capitalist technology. 
Historically, tools and artefacts had combined a concern with effective-
ness with an interest in enhancing the quality of lived human experi-
ence. In pre- capitalist societies, technology’s aesthetic – what it was like 
in a qualitative sense – was not separate or subordinate to quantitative 
measures of its performance but unified in a common purpose of making 
the world more amenable. Capitalist technology reflects (and imposes) 
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a different logic, according to which the prioritisation of function and 
efficiency over what things feel like to use is partly constitutive of tech-
nology. This separation corresponds to a profound division within the 
human psyche, established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The modern period saw the emergence of a mode of subjectivity that 
was premised on distinguishing reality, which was ordered and compre-
hensible using ratiocination and calculative procedures, from fantasy, 
which is the realm of imagination. A  subject structured in this way is 
both a basic outcome of modern social processes and a fundamental con-
dition for modernity, including modern technology. The corresponding 
objective world is inert and neutral, yet also opaque and threatening. This 
conception of subject and object as both internally divided and mutually 
opposed is a founding condition of modernity as understood by critical 
theory. Critique is motivated by the sense that these splits, while histor-
ically necessary, might be overcome in a society based on reconciliation 
and harmony between the multiple elements. The hope that this might 
be so is carried by experience itself, which is always richer and runs in 
excess of the epistemic limits set by this foundation.
For example, external nature is experienced as ‘more’ than just stuff 
to be used by people who, on some level, know themselves to be more 
than just functional cogs in a machine for which their emotions and sen-
suous responses are at best mere lubricants. Critical theory draws on the 
analysis of experience, then, to find out this ‘more’ and direct it against 
the alienating effects of the system. Consequently, critical theorists are 
particularly interested in the aesthetic  – what the world feels like to 
humans – and in the ways that this poses a challenge to the dominant 
codification of life in a ‘rationalised’ society.
The belief that a different model of selfhood would be necessary for 
socialist civilisation was fundamental to socialist thinking in the twen-
tieth century, including, for example, the Soviet project of the ‘new 
person’, who is virtuous because they subordinate their own interests 
to the production requirements of society as a whole. Marcuse gives 
the idea of a new kind of human a distinctive, Freudian spin by envis-
aging the reintegration of the reality and pleasure principles in a new 
subjectivity (Marcuse 1961). This would result in subjects for whom the 
objective natural world is not a mere resource to be used, but a realm of 
sensuous, potentially meaningful experiences, while the imagination is 
not restricted to art and literature but recognised as playing an active role 
in making sense of the world.
This reintegration of the human sense of reality with the powers of 
imagination sounds esoteric, but its influence on Feenberg is important. 
I suggested in Chapter 2 that the immanent ethics of technology design, 
central to Feenberg’s approach, rests upon an implicit thesis that tech-
nology is motivated by the urge to improve life for human beings. 
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Similarly, for all that technology increasingly relies on abstract know-
ledge about materials and so on, it also needs ideas and imagination: in 
this sense, technology is unthinkable without reference to the fantastic, 
and its historical development can be described as a process in which 
imagination has transformed the world. In common with other critical 
theorists, Marcuse suggests that this transformation has gone off course 
in the modern period, in part because it has lost connection with its own 
fundamental mission:
Only if the vast capabilities of science and technology, of the scien-
tific and artistic imagination direct the construction of a sensuous 
environment, only if the work world loses its alienating features and 
becomes a world of human relationships, only if productivity becomes 
creativity, are the roots of domination dried up in the individuals. No 
return to precapitalist, pre- industrial artisanship, but on the contrary, 
perfection of the new mutilated and distorted science and technology 
in the formation of the object world in accordance with ‘the laws of 
beauty.’ And ‘beauty’ here defines an ontological condition – not of an 
oeuvre d’art isolated from real existence … but that harmony between 
man and his world which would shape the form of society. (Cited in 
Feenberg 2008: 1)
The suggestion that reason itself might recuperate technology, setting it 
right again from within, is based on a very specific notion of reconcili-
ation, in which technology, nature and the human subject are all funda-
mentally reconfigured.
Marcuse envisaged a new technology that would reflect an influx of 
imagination into its design and reveal a new world in which the free play 
of the faculties, not only efficiency, becomes part of what people expect 
from technics. This transformation would dissociate technology from the 
struggle for survival that has been artificially prolonged by capitalism and 
connect it with the fulfilment of human desires. Instead of technology to 
dominate and control nature, Marcuse imagined technics that would be 
‘designed and utilized for the pacification of the struggle for existence’ 
(1964: 227). Such technology would be aesthetic ‘to the degree to which 
the productive machinery is constructed with a view of the free play of 
faculties’ (1964: 240), while imagination becomes synonymous with tech-
nology: ‘In the light of the capabilities of advanced industrial civilization’, 
Marcuse asked, ‘is not all play of the imagination playing with technical 
possibilities?’ (1964: 249). For him, a redesigned technology could be the 
basis for a constellation in which humanity, nature and artefacts would 
be reconciled in a softer, more humanised world.
This part of Marcuse’s theory was famously criticised by Jürgen 
Habermas (1989), who accused him of seeking to establish a society based 
on dialogue with nature. The suggestion was that Marcuse was some-
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argued that modern technology is a gain of societal evolution, reflecting 
the progressive differentiation of the systems sphere, which handles our 
relations with a nature that is not susceptible to persuasion. Feenberg 
counters that this view of technology is no less unrealistic than Marcuse’s 
and alleges that Habermas writes as if technology wasn’t implicated in 
environmental degradation and dehumanising work practices, effectively 
idealising it as an agent of social progress.
In contrast, Feenberg praises Marcuse’s vision because it ‘calls for 
change in the very nature of technological rationality’ (2005:  98),8 
and he takes over the idea of an aesthetic revolution in technology 
design. He rejects any retreat from Marcuse’s objective of total trans-
formation in the ‘meaning’ of technology as a regression behind basic 
insights of Heidegger. For Feenberg, if we can’t have a dialogue with 
nature, we are not necessarily committed to being at war with it 
either. Acknowledging that Marcuse lacked any account of how his 
vision of reconciliation might be implemented in practice, Feenberg 
presents his own technical politics as providing conceptual resources 
to fill this gap. The hegemony of modern technology’s rationality need 
not be overturned ‘all at once’. In place of essentialist critique based 
on the possibility of a new ‘world- revealing’, a politicised construct-
ivism with an aesthetic dimension can serve as a better standpoint for 
comprehending the fundamental categorial reorderings that are neces-
sary to develop what he, following Marcuse, envisages as a change of 
civilisational proportions.
At important moments in his elaboration of the aesthetic as a ground 
for the technical politics that mediate this change, Feenberg invokes an 
idea of resonance or harmony between the way that humans apprehend 
the world and an objective reality that is ‘out there’, so to speak, to be 
experienced. For example, in his account of Marcuse’s theory, Feenberg 
refers to ‘consensual notions of beauty’, and to ‘natural harmonies’ 
(2005: 109) between humanity and nature that exceed scientific explan-
ation, even though they are present in things like scientists’ preference for 
elegant mathematical demonstrations (2005: 107). The aesthetic demand 
for a technology that comports with inner and outer nature and seeks 
harmony between them is, on Feenberg’s reading of Marcuse’s theory, a 
matter of meaning, specifically of an influx of previously neglected values 
into technology design and a corresponding alteration to the symbolic 
mediation characteristic of technical practices. For Feenberg the aes-
thetic dimension is central to the critical theory of technology because, 
far from being a superficial matter about the appearance of machinery, 
it concerns technology’s role in mediating the rest of human experi-
ence. Changing technology design to include a different set of aesthetic 
principles will alter its experiential character and ultimately reposition it 
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Feenberg acknowledges that the starting point for this aesthetic 
critique cannot consist in a fixed idea of human nature but must be 
grounded historically and relationally. To this end, he retrieves from the 
young Marx the notion that our sensory apparatus may itself be subject 
to historically (that is, not biologically) driven variations over the course 
of the historical process: there is a ‘historical biology’ of sense perception 
(2005: 120– 121). Drawing on this idea, he proposes to develop his aes-
thetic critique through a phenomenological account of the resonances 
humans can find in the world at any given point. On this basis, he says, 
we can have access to the gains associated with ontological critique – 
namely, a perspective in which technology mediates our world- relations 
in very different ways under various historical circumstances – without 
the essentialist connotations of full- blown Heideggerianism (according 
to which technology in the modern sense would be associated with a 
negative enframing and contrasted with an entirely different, more 
authentic, yet long- lost and barely accessible world- revealing).
In aesthetic critique, then, the variability to be uncovered and used to 
highlight the contingent character of current ‘truths’ (about technology, 
its ‘correct’ form as the one that is ‘most efficient’, etc.) remains thoroughly 
historical, has to be elaborated phenomenologically9 and can be directly 
articulated to technical- political projects, where it might even serve as a 
kind of critical index on the ambition of specific reform proposals rela-
tive to the goal of civilisation change. Here Feenberg recasts Marcuse’s 
notion of a reformed ‘technological rationality’ as a matter of introducing 
variation into the technical code, which he hopes will give the idea of 
aesthetic reform ‘a more concrete sociological element’ (2005: 104). He 
retains from Marcuse, however, commitment to a particular conception 
of progressive change as involving a restoration of natural harmonies or 
reintegration of societal elements thought of as part of an organic whole.10
Moreover, there are dangers in any such project of reconciliation, per-
haps especially when it is to be politically mediated. Part of the motiv-
ation for Habermas’s repudiation of Marcuse lay in a concern about the 
potentially totalitarian implications of a politics based on renouncing 
reason and incorporating feelings into political debate. Theodor Adorno 
also refused Marcuse’s Freudian formula for a better world. The danger 
courted by theories of a new subjectivity in which perception and fantasy 
co- mingle in a modified reality principle is that of moving from the pre-
sent irrational rationality to a potentially worse irrational irrationality. 
While it is clear that the current dispensation favours a narrow, even 
paranoid world- relation, it remains impossible using the resources of 
speculative theory alone to specify a superior one in advance. As Espen 
Hamer points out, this dilemma leads Adorno to favour a version of 
Kantian autonomy over any such prescriptive model for future reconcili-
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experience seeks out moments of resistance to power’s reduction of the 
subject to its representation, or to self- identity.
However, Feenberg contends that Adorno, whose work he compares 
unfavourably with Marcuse’s on this point, regresses behind Kant 
when he offers an aesthetics based on mediated non- identity (Feenberg 
2005:  117– 118). Feenberg also casts this position as an evasion on 
Adorno’s part (2005: 118– 119), because it maintains the non- identity of 
subject and object in perpetuity rather than viewing the cleavage between 
them as historically contingent on alienation and reification and, there-
fore, as open to change in future. Kant’s philosophy demonstrated the 
interdependence of subject and object but, by rendering the object ‘in- 
itself ’ as noumenal and beyond human experience, made their separ-
ation permanent, installing capitalist alienation at the heart of modern 
philosophy.
Historicist philosophy since then, including Marx, has suggested 
that subject and object might be brought back together, based on the 
understanding that they were mediated primarily by labour rather than 
consciousness and that, while capitalist social relations held them apart 
in this fractured totality, they might be reconciled in a more integrated 
future society. Adorno discounts the latter possibility yet embraces the 
historicist contention, leaving readers with what Feenberg considers an 
untenable dilemma:
It is impossible simply to choose between identity and non- identity, 
reconciliation and resistance. Regression to pre- Kantian idealism is 
excluded by the whole history of modern philosophy, but the bare 
assertion of a mysterious dissonance at the core of reality makes no 
sense in the post- Kantian context. How would such a dissonance enter 
experience? Under what concept would it be understood? How could 
it avoid becoming a becoming a component in the apparatus of iden-
tification, for example, an aesthetic point d’honneur legitimating the 
everyday ugliness and violence of the established order? If it fell under 
no concept, how would it differ from mental illness as an incoherent 
breakdown of meaning? The endless oscillation and mutual correction 
between subject and object, history and nature, recommended by 
Adorno is not so much a solution to the enigma as a method for cancel-
ling any solution, most especially of course the bad ones that currently 
prevail in the societies of ‘total administration’. (Feenberg 2005: 118)
Adorno’s position turns critical theory into endless reflection on suffering 
caused by power’s repeated attempts to impose identities, and all the 
twists and turns of resistance that shadow them. In contrast, Feenberg 
argues, Marcuse presents a compelling account of one- dimensional, 
dystopic society but matches this with a positive ‘utopian alternative that 
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Feenberg’s repudiation of Adorno as regression behind Kant and his 
elevation of Marcuse as a visionary of reconciliation are not completely 
compelling, however, and the questions he asks here can be answered 
with reference to Adorno’s work. After all, Adorno also writes of the rec-
onciliation of subject and object but in a manner that respects their irre-
ducible difference, writing of a constellation he calls ‘Peace … the state of 
distinctness without domination’ (Adorno 2005: 247). For him, it is only 
after such a reconfiguration of subject and object has happened that ‘the 
concept of communication, as an objective concept’ might ‘come into its 
own’ (Adorno 2005: 247).
Feenberg’s question about how the dissonance of non- identity enters 
experience is answered by Adorno’s emphasis on form, which he presents 
as an integral moment in the experience of the artwork (e.g. 2002: 123). 
For him, the role of form is pre- eminent over that of meaning. In his 
Aesthetic Theory, for example, Adorno describes how, in the encounter 
with an artwork, ‘the I becomes aware, in real terms, of the possibility of 
letting self- preservation fall away, though it does not actually succeed in 
realizing this possibility’ (2002: 245) This might correspond to or even 
be described in terms of mental illness – the sense of an incipient, per-
vasive threat to one’s identity is enlightening but far from joyous most 
of the time and might be likened to some experiences of depression. 
Similarly, as a defender of aesthetic modernism it might sometimes seem 
as if, applied to technology, Adorno could run the risk of being an apolo-
gist for austere technology designs, but this would abstract his argument 
from its wider dialectic, in which technology and art interpenetrate and 
the criteria of quality applicable to each are not reducible to the sensuous 
properties of either.
It seems, then, that the real point at issue in the difference Feenberg 
explores here between Adorno and Marcuse is not whether there can 
be reconciliation but rather how that state should be grasped concep-
tually and how the transition to it should be thought. For Feenberg it 
is mediated through technical politics, while Adorno restricts himself 
to identifying spaces in contemporary culture in which its possibility 
alone might be experienced. Adorno prioritises form over meaning and 
seems to envisage modification of the subject– object nexus happening 
in a way that anticipates, perhaps conditions, new possibilities of sym-
bolic meaning. For him, experience may be more or less autonomous 
depending on the degree to which its formal capacities maintain a space 
for subjective reflection and facilitate action according to the model of 
peace. What separates the two views is the priority of form and meaning 
in their understanding of the aesthetic. Because Feenberg places meaning 
before form in his account of experience, he is able to construe the aes-
thetic in overtly political terms, while, as we have seen, Adorno is much 
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Perhaps as a result of his rush to interpret technical designs in terms 
of their imputed and sometimes self- proclaimed political affiliations, 
Feenberg commits to some very specific aesthetic principles, which 
seem to me to foreclose on the actual course of contemporary design aes-
thetics and the role of technology in them. His attachment to modernist 
principles in particular is clear when he invokes Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
architecture, for example, as a model of the integration of nature and 
artifice in designs that are conducive to pleasurable human experience 
(Feenberg 2001: 155). Feenberg writes that,
Like the early twentieth- century avant- garde, especially the surrealists, 
Marcuse believed that the separation of art from daily life could be 
transcended through fusing reason and imagination. Marcuse thus 
proposes the Aufhebung of the split between science and art in a new 
technical base …
Although this program sounds wildly implausible, it makes a kind 
of intuitive sense. For example, we easily recognize the difference 
between the architecture of Mies van der Rohe and Frank Lloyd 
Wright. Mies shows us technology as a manifestation of untrammeled 
power, the technological sublime, while Wright’s structures harmonize 
with nature and seek to integrate human beings with their environ-
ment. We will see that it is possible to save Marcuse’s essential insight 
by developing this contrast. (2001: 155)
Designs informed by naturalistic modernism will resonate with the 
senses of the emancipated human creature by responding to its desire for 
harmony and integration.12 These comments on aesthetics must be seen 
alongside Feenberg’s placing of stress on the desirability of technologies 
that enhance human connection and facilitate communication. Feenberg 
perceives an alignment or affinity of strengthened communication and a 
reformed perception in which other people and the world are felt to be 
accommodating rather than hostile, or resistant and in need of control.13
Feenberg’s confidence concerning the kinds of change aesthetic cri-
tique will demand is partly informed by the success the environmental 
movement has had in broadening the dominant conception of technology. 
The technology- ness of a thing now includes the issue of its ‘sustainability’, 
which is to say that this value has become part of what we think of and 
ask about when we encounter a technology for the first time – there is 
almost no technology use that does not now feel the pull of this question. 
The argument that a relatively new connotation of technology has been 
established here is not something that I want to take issue with,14 but I do 
want to query the grounds Feenberg presents for endorsing it, because it 
is here that we can detect both the centrality of aesthetic critique to his 
theory and the fundamental ambivalence of the idea between positions 
that are consistent with his emphasis on contingency, relationality and 
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and reconciliation. This discrepancy becomes clearer when we look more 
closely at Feenberg’s account of what distinguishes capitalist technology.
3 Instrumentalisation theory
As discussed previously, one of Feenberg’s most important contributions 
to the philosophy of technology has been to introject a social and his-
torical component into the definition of technology itself. The notion 
that modern, capitalist technology is different from other kinds is foun-
dational for his project. His critical theory does not target technology’s 
transcendental essence but only its specifically capitalist manifestation. 
An obvious way to approach this would be with direct reference to the 
historical process itself; there are numerous studies of the emergence 
of capitalism in terms of a series of technical and social innovations, 
not the least of which are those provided by Marx. However, this is not 
Feenberg’s approach. He prefers instead to parse historical insights about 
modern technology through what he calls instrumentalisation theory, 
within which aesthetics plays a central part.
Viewed in this way, what is distinctive to modern, capitalist tech-
nology is not that it is uniquely violent or indeed that it is the source of 
a specifically horrible enframing of the world, but rather that it fails to 
compensate nature for an original violence that is present in all technolo-
gies. According to instrumentalisation theory, technology always has two 
moments, primary and secondary. These are not temporally discrete but 
coeval as dimensions of any present technology.
Primary instrumentalisation involves forcing nature into new 
shapes that comport with our wishes and entails ‘a series of moments 
through which the object is isolated and exposed to external 
manipulation’ (Feenberg 2001:  176).15 At this point the influence on 
Feenberg of essentialist notions of violence against nature as con-
stitutive of modern technology is particularly clear.16 However, pri-
mary instrumentalisation is not specifically modern or capitalist and, 
importantly, not something Feenberg considers regrettable in itself. 
The difference between modern and non- modern technologies is that 
the latter compensated for primary instrumentalisation, which is gen-
eric, with culturally specific secondary instrumentalisations17 that 
restored harmony to the world.
According to Feenberg, ‘all earlier cultures are based on substantive 
worldviews rather than formal rational principles, which, where they 
exist at all, are confined to very narrow functions’ (2002: 167). In those 
cultures, technology ‘is contextualized by practices that define its place in 
an encompassing nontechnical action system’ (2002: 177). What makes 
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with) and yet more brutal is the fact that, rather than being developed to 
serve wider social goals that comport with cultural values, modern tech-
nology is viewed under the horizon of efficiency. Feenberg writes:
Technology is not value neutral but rather, under capitalism the neu-
tralization of the traditional values that governed it in earlier times 
adapts it to the pursuit of profit and power. These narrow capitalist 
values no longer respect the object, human beings or limits of any 
kind. (2005: 100)
In primary instrumentalisation, then, objects are decontextualised and 
reduced to their useful aspects. In this process human beings detach 
themselves from the objects so manipulated and come to assume a pos-
ition of control over them. In pre- capitalist or ‘traditional’ societies, 
‘there corresponds an integrative moment’ in which the objects are 
assigned new meanings and new symbolic status, while their users come 
to acquire a vocational identity in connection with them. In capitalist 
societies this compensatory moment is ‘severely restricted’ and only vis-
ible as a trace or ‘remnant’ (2002: 177) in medicine, or in artistic practices 
that use technology as raw materials.
It is this conception of the specificity of capitalist or modern tech-
nology that underscores Feenberg’s belief in the necessity of an aesthetic 
critique, which would take the form of a demand for re- aestheticisation of 
the technical relation. Here there is an affinity between worker and user 
demands for technology that is more pleasant to use and the wider goals 
of progressive social change. The kind of civilisational transformation 
Feenberg envisages would result when such demands lead to changes 
that rewrite the technical code so that the horizon on technology devel-
opment is broadened, altering the prevailing notion of ‘efficiency’ itself. 
The terms of such a broadening would reflect the infusion of aesthetic 
values associated with a recharged secondary instrumentalisation. ‘An 
alternative modernity’, Feenberg writes, ‘would recover the mediating 
power of ethics and aesthetics’ (2010:  77). It would involve a changed 
technical code, ‘oriented towards the reintegration of the contexts and 
secondary qualities of both the subjects and objects of capitalist tech-
nique’ (2002: 184).
In addition to his strategically construed technical politics of design, 
then, Feenberg envisages a ‘deep democratization’ (2002: 159) of tech-
nology in which it is finally ‘subordinated to humanistic objectives’ 
(2002: 165). The aesthetic critique is a crux of Feenberg’s theory because 
it provides the bridge between these two aspects of his project. On one 
side, workers and others contest technology designs. On the other, each 
instance of success in democratising technology corresponds to a re- 
aestheticisation, through which progressive change touches the very 
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The difficulty with the latter idea, however, is that it rests upon a largely 
unthematised presumption in favour of a harmonious relationship with 
nature, in which human senses are disposed to an enriched percep-
tion of the world as meaningful, while the world is made more habit-
able as a result of redesigned technology. This reflects an organicist bias 
in Feenberg’s thinking, which he inherits fairly directly from Marcuse. 
Since technology is a potential source of disruption to the society- nature 
whole, the theory of secondary instrumentalisation is a normative pivot, 
on which critical theory of technology turns from description to pre-
scription. The demand for re- aestheticisation is part of this, and its logic 
is integrative and restorative.
Feenberg’s notion of a primary instrumentalisation that violates 
nature and which ought to be redressed through aestheticisation seems 
to be inconsistent with a strictly relational definition of technology. 
The difficulty becomes apparent when confronted with the radical 
empiricism of some varieties of social constructivism, including actor– 
network theory (ANT; Law and Hassard 2006). Bruno Latour in par-
ticular has pointed out that the idea of critique has long deployed, and 
to an extent been predicated on, a loaded definition of the act of making, 
in which the human agent is implicitly cast as coming at the world in 
a domineering fashion. In fact, writing in very different contexts (the 
sociology of religion and of art respectively) Latour and some ANT- 
influenced sociologists of art have suggested that ‘making’ need not 
carry any such connotation; it can involve simply letting be; it can 
happen even without humans being present. As Latour puts it, ‘to the 
humble and honest work of making, they’ve [critical theorists] surrepti-
tiously added a crazy hypothesis about the craftsman’s domination of his 
oeuvre’ (Latour 2013a: 142).18
The importance of this point lies in the discrepancy it opens up 
between a strictly relational definition of technology, which emphasises 
its constitutive entwinement in a variety of social networks, and an 
approach that stresses its entanglement in a dialectic of human domin-
ation and potential, in relation to inner and outer nature. If technology 
has no founding moment of violence that requires compensation through 
a second, restorative moment, then, as Latour (2013a) points out, cri-
tique loses its purchase. There is no deep violence to be compensated 
and no inherent human potential bound up with further development 
of the technological mission to overcome nature. Sharpening the rela-
tional turn in social theory, ANT prohibits postulating connections that 
cannot be traced through actual webs that social actors themselves rec-
ognise as connecting them and their actions to others, and which we can 
see tie them into other networks (Latour 2005). As Hennion writes in 
connection with the sociology of art, ‘adding a superior, more coherent 
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forbidden to create links when this is not done by an identifiable inter-
mediary’ (Hennion 1995).
This line of argument threatens to cut Feenberg’s theory off at the root 
by severing the relational definition of technology operative in technical 
politics from the larger project of cultural transformation. The challenge 
it sets for critical theory of technology is to identify a ground or source 
for critique that is strictly immanent to the technical relation and to tech-
nical politics. This would have to involve detaching the question of the 
aesthetic from its historically transcendent commitment to organicist 
reconciliation and repositioning it more securely in a strategic concep-
tion of the politics of technology design. In a way it is relatively straight-
forward to see what the call for more democracy in technology design 
might entail (there is an established literature to draw on regarding the 
kind of arrangements that might count as democratic), but the meaning 
of a progressive re- aestheticisation is much less clear. In my view, 
Feenberg’s Marcusian loyalties (that is, to a dialectical reconciliation 
within organicist parameters) lead him into a peremptory preference 
for naturalist- modernist design aesthetics of the kind associated with 
Wright’s architecture.
The ‘aesthetic objection’ to capitalist technology was never simply 
a matter of what it looked like or felt like to use. As Feenberg makes 
clear, it concerns the position occupied by technology in the wider cul-
ture and the global meaning of ‘technology’ that results from that 
positioning. Notwithstanding the example of environmentalism,19 the 
re- aestheticisation of technology has been proceeding apace in the post- 
industrial era with little or no associated democratic advance. Nearly all 
of the digital technology that we use from day to day has a customisable 
interface, for example, enabling people to incorporate devices seamlessly 
into their lives, often transforming their embodied routines in the pro-
cess. Since the late 1980s, interfaces on digital artefacts have been shaped 
by a design culture whose naturalist biases are largely consonant with 
Feenberg’s approved aesthetic. The emphasis has been on creating ‘envir-
onments’ that support both work and play, within which the human user 
does not have to think about their activity in a technical way (Kirkpatrick 
2004/ 2017).
This revolution in the way that technology is presented to its users 
was in some ways anticipated by Feenberg. Applying the categories of 
his theory to computing in the late 1980s and 1990s, he maintained a 
clear correlation between the then nascent tendencies towards a friendly 
design aesthetic and progressive social forces, contrasting them with a 
more technical aesthetic influenced by engineering disciplines, which he 
associated with hierarchies and social control:
Systems designed for hierarchical control are congruent with ration-
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to command or replace workers … Democratically designed systems 
must instead respond to the communicative dimension of the com-
puter through which it facilitates the self- organisation of human com-
munities. (Feenberg 2002: 108)
He anticipated that the result of more ‘democratic’ design tendencies 
would be ‘a doubling of real social space by the virtual space of computer 
networks’, which ‘opens new communicative possibilities for everyone’ 
(2002: 119). Feenberg’s version of re- aestheticisation rests on an assumed 
correlation of a particular aesthetic (naturalistic modernism) with pro-
gressive social and political forces, so that he approves design principles 
that amplify the symbolic dimension of technology, turning computers 
into a ‘communications medium’, and condemns those that would pre-
sent the computer in a more austere fashion, perhaps with command line 
interfaces requiring expert programming knowledge. The latter kind of 
design would, he argues, withhold it from mediations that involve sym-
bolic meanings accessible to everyone.
It is clear that visually pleasing, graphical and tactile interfaces have 
helped groups of people to access digital technology who otherwise could 
not have done so. The famous architect and entrepreneurial polymath 
Nicholas Negroponte (1999), for example, has described how working 
with computers with such interfaces enabled him to overcome obstacles 
society places in the way of dyslexic people. This comports with widening 
participation in computer culture and, viewed through the lens of tech-
nical politics, is a democratic advance.
At the same time, however, user- friendly interfaces also enlarge the 
numbers of people who depend on digital technology as a mediating 
element in their cultural experience while having little or no idea how 
the technology works. Complex machines that are made easy to use 
have a manipulative aspect in which work- related imperatives can reach 
through symbolic communicative processes and steer people into pre-
ferred courses of action. As I  have suggested elsewhere (Kirkpatrick 
2015), devices that are natural to use and which pass seamlessly into users’ 
routines have almost certainly been shaped by the very social processes 
invoked by Boltanski and Chiapello in their account of capitalism’s recu-
peration strategy, which obliges workers to enjoy their work and to feel 
that it belongs to them.
Reflecting on the entanglement and implication of ostensibly progres-
sive aesthetic projects and values in contemporary strategies of control 
leads Hal Foster to suggest that modernists should:
Beware of what you wish … because it may come true – in perverse 
form. Thus, to take only the chief example, the old project to recon-
nect Art and Life, endorsed in different ways by Art Nouveau, the 
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but according to the spectacular dictates of the culture industry, not 
the liberatory ambitions of the avant garde. And a primary form of this 
perverse reconciliation in our time is design. (Foster 2002: 19)
In sum, it is not clear that the only ‘good’ use of computers is com-
municative while more ‘technical’ or instrumental employments are 
always implicated in strategies of domination. Technical knowledge can 
involve difficulty but acquiring that understanding can be profoundly 
empowering, while ‘easy’ operating in sumptuous online environments 
makes people prey to corporate marketing and leaves them vulnerable to 
government and corporate spying activities.
It does not follow from this that a more austere aesthetic is preferable, 
only that aesthetic commitments do not fall neatly into line with political 
ones. Feenberg’s enthusiasm for friendly computers reflects his critical 
perspective, in which technology’s instrumental aspect and its aesthetics 
are divided and awaiting dialectical reconciliation, in the Marcusean 
scenario described above. Progressive ‘re- aestheticisation’ is premised 
on the notion of a primary instrumentalisation in need of compensation, 
but this framing of the issue obstructs the development of a more prag-
matic, context- sensitive approach to the aesthetic dimension of technical 
politics.
The underlying problem here is the continued hold on Feenberg’s 
thinking of an organicist conception of society and nature. He favours nat-
uralistic modernism because his critique of capitalist society emphasises 
its fragmented, disjointed character and argues that it needs repair and 
reintegration of its elements to become healthy. Reform proposals are 
assessed in light of this model of progressive change and, viewed in this 
way, the reconciliation of subject and object in the historical process 
becomes a matter of finding new forms of social life in which antagonism 
and domination are minimised by establishing higher levels of consist-
ency between agents’ purposes and the social whole. This approach is 
basically Marcusian, and as we have seen, its logic contrasts with that of 
Adorno’s aesthetic critique.
The goal of harmonious integration is potentially tyrannical because 
capitalist society is against the individual. Adorno’s dialectic was ‘nega-
tive’ because it asserted both the necessity of reconciliation and its 
radical impossibility. This is not an evasion as Feenberg alleges, but is 
based on acknowledgement that the subject finds no reflection of itself 
in the prevailing reality, apart from the fact that it seems to have been 
constructed to ensnare and persecute them. Attractive, user- friendly 
devices like smartphones can be read precisely as traps in this sense. 
Adorno’s attention to the aesthetic as an experiential domain led him 
to conclude that it is only in connection with difficult artworks that 
human beings can find a reflection of the suffering caused by their 
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presence- as- absence20 in an inhuman social system. While it was 
conceived through reflection on so- called high arts, however, this con-
ception of the aesthetic and its relation to political domination need not 
be alien to technical politics.
4 From thwarted reconciliation to superimposition
In contemporary experience the technical and the aesthetic are increas-
ingly superimposed upon one another, and the effect is that, rather 
than producing a single, hegemonic truth to be overcome, possibilities 
multiply where users meet devices: the game is often on to establish what 
new technology is for, and the prevailing attitude is playful. Identity is 
not fixed in advance, in the sense that users co- design their artefacts by 
experimenting with their devices and probing their capabilities, which in 
turn set fresh challenges and open up new possibilities for their human 
users. Aesthetic experience is routinely encountered, then, as a moment 
in the contemporary culture of pervasive technical dabbling, and as such 
it is immanent to the ongoing politics of technical design.
The aesthetic, rather than being absent by design in a hegemonic, 
stripped- down, brutal and false neutrality and then infused with sym-
bolic meaning by progressive forces, is always already entwined in the 
technical and part of its politics. Within contemporary digital tech-
nology design, the functional and the symbolic are not held apart; rather, 
for designers the challenge is to produce interactive software that gives 
access to designated functionality through mediatic elements that relate 
it to the purposes of the user and enable them to access it in a way that 
feels natural because it comports with already ingrained, habituated 
patterns of incorporation. This involves a politics of visibility/ invisibility, 
concerning how much of the technical infrastructure (coded levels, etc.) 
the user needs to know about and what needs to be concealed to ensure 
they keep to the desired interactive routines. In design circles this is 
discussed in terms of keeping the user on track and guiding them where 
they want to go as seamlessly as possible.
This design practice has sociological co- ordinates in which aesthetic 
values map to power and strategies of control in unpredictable ways. 
As Maurizio Lazzaroto (2014) has pointed out, seamlessness of use is 
both aesthetic and ideological in contemporary capitalism, where the 
emphasis is on the smooth flow of consumerist experience and resolving 
any trace of antagonism in positive, pleasurable experiences.21 This aes-
thetic effaces social agonistics and reflects the imposition of norms of 
conduct in ways that can bypass any need for discursive thematisation – 
a model of Foster’s ‘perverse reconciliation’. In this context, reflective cri-
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there is an absence of discrepancies or recurrent breaks in experience 
that might provide it with openings.
Rather than being marked by a division of functional and symbolic 
that is in need of reconciliation, contemporary technological aesthetics 
involves this kind of superimposition. The aesthetic is not lacking or 
absent, and neither is it a deceitful sheen that conceals a systematic failure 
to integrate, or lack of contextualisation. Rather, it is implicated in strat-
egies of misdirection based on false promises. In these circumstances 
Adorno’s normativised aesthetic theory, with its insistence on mediated 
non- identity, is more relevant than ever because we are confronted not 
with a system of shocks22 and jolts, reflecting the contradiction between 
hegemonic power and dispersed resistance, but rather with a diffuse 
regime whose demands are felt only in so far as subjects suffer the effects 
of false identification or empty performance  – in other words, when 
they feel a sense of their homelessness in this fabricated, choreographed 
world.23
If the aesthetic is understood as a superimposition that eludes the crit-
ical metaphor of ‘dominant codification’ – as when we find, on reflec-
tion, that we were ‘steered’ towards buying an ‘app’ we didn’t know we 
wanted, or that we were only able to proceed in one of two ways because 
a (charming) interface presented no third option – then the problem is 
not a lack of technical- aesthetic reconciliation. Rather, it is that the two 
aspects work together very well, so that authoritative demands seem nat-
ural because they cohere with our expectations and tastes to re- enforce 
established predispositions favoured by power.
The politics of this involve technical knowledge and the ability, or lack 
of it, to access, understand and operate on multiple levels, or through mul-
tiple vantage points, on the device. The struggle to feel at home, to have 
an authentic world- relation, is played out in efforts to master different 
levels that are superimposed on one another in technology design. This 
might be a matter of unlocking functionality that is not advertised on the 
front end, or of learning extra skills to get more from an app than it seems 
initially to offer. It might involve altering some code to modify software, 
but equally it could be about calibrating one’s use more effectively with 
other software programs, network protocols or users. There is a politics 
of expertise and deepening understanding here that is better understood 
by drawing on the later Foucault’s (2005) idea of an aesthetics of self-
hood, a relation to oneself, than on his earlier ideas on knowledge- power.
The shaping of artefacts increasingly falls within the scope of a 
Foucauldian aesthetics of self- fashioning in contemporary society, and 
this territory is being shaped by connections that people are making for 
themselves in ways that are dissolving, perhaps have already dissolved, 
the hegemonic codification of technology as ‘efficient’, for example. 
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it’s not clear that there is one: do people choose their mobile phones on 
grounds of efficiency? This is progress, in the sense clarified by Feenberg’s 
theory, because it means that people are participating in contesting 
and shaping technology:  that its representation is in question. Under 
these circumstances, long- established dominant meanings are perhaps 
more likely to be destabilised, with implications for gender norms that 
restrict access and use; proprietary claims over software; the right and 
wrong ways to use a computer network, etc. When technology itself is 
in question and people ask about its meaning, the rewriting of categorial 
orderings that, in Feenberg’s terms, define a civilisation can be brought 
into the open and discussed as a part of the ongoing micro- sociological 
detail of democratic technical politics.
At the same time, refocusing aesthetic critique in this way is problem-
atic because of the emphasis it places on individual subjects as against 
collective action. As others have described in detail, contemporary power 
works precisely by disposing people to adapt themselves to the demands 
of an increasingly pervasive system, rather than through the application 
of external, coercive force. As Dardot and Laval (2014) point out, in neo- 
liberalism everyone is made responsible for everything that happens to 
them. Technology is one of the means at their disposal through which 
people are encouraged to respond to this situation. Given this, it will tend 
to dovetail with developments that fold real devices into the apparatus 
that Foucault figuratively described as ‘technologies of the self ’. This can 
represent an extension of domination in which aesthetic strategies of 
power emphasise technology’s seamless, ‘natural’ and harmonious char-
acter, while resistance will often run in the opposite direction, disrupting 
this appearance. Under these conditions, critique should eschew identifi-
cation with any specific set of aesthetic values and focus instead on those 
occasions when the meaning of technology is placed in question – any 
kind of question – by social actors.
The dominant idea of technology operative in such experiences cor-
responds not to that of a centralised hegemonic power but rather to a 
presence that is always also a representation, which can be placed in 
question and reworked with the relevant skill and acquired knowledge. In 
the revised account of the role of the aesthetic suggested here it remains 
central to technical politics. However, it is not a bridge between the prox-
imal concerns of groups competing for control over the meanings of new 
technology designs and wider questions of civilisation change. The aes-
thetic provides no privileged point of connection with such wider shifts 
and does not facilitate prejudgements concerning what kind of design 
might be ‘progressive’, with reference to whether it fits more or less well 
in a utopia of restored wholeness. Rather, when people think about the 
aesthetics of a technology and how it resonates with their experience, 
this creates an opening to questions about its design, the desirability of 
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their activity, what made it necessary and so on. Aesthetic experiences 
often lead into technical politics, and once this happens aesthetic consid-
erations may inform the demands of oppositional movements as they set 
out alternative design proposals.
There is no firm basis for identifying such demands with any particular 
aesthetic project or movement. Rather, the kind of technology that is 
preferred (including its aesthetics) will be more or less ‘authentic’, in 
Adorno’s sense, in so far as its design respects the non- self- identity of the 
technical object and maintains the openness of work (and other) spaces 
to intelligent determination by the person who has to operate there. 
This might be accomplished by creating sumptuous environments that 
are comfortable to occupy, but that is not likely to be straightforwardly 
true for all cases. Contrary to Feenberg’s preference for holistic and nat-
uralistic modernism, the aesthetic values that inform a design may be 
austere, deliberately challenging and kept thoroughly instrumental for 
perfectly good reasons other than those of domination. Designers may be 
concerned to subvert easy and obvious linguistic constructions on visible 
phenomena, for example, in the interests of encouraging users to think 
harder and acquire more skills. Ugliness and even brutalism may be valid 
aesthetic strategies: their correlation to hegemonic power is loose at best, 
and their consequences for technical politics unpredictable.
Notes
1 Perhaps the unifying theme of constructivism is the belief that technology 
designs are all fundamentally underdetermined  – that is, that there is no 
preordained purpose that the bicycle, to use the most commonly cited 
example, was invented to serve. The problems technologies help to solve 
emerge in the course of their development and design process, rather than 
being clearly elaborated at the outset (Bijker et al 1989).
2 Hence, in Transforming Technology Feenberg writes that ‘what defines critical 
theory is that it seeks out a forward- looking demand in the trace of damage 
that has been done to a negatively interpreted nature’ (2002: 34).
3 Bruno Latour discerns a kind of condescension in critical theory, and sociology 
generally, when it finds meanings in situations other than those presented by 
actors in the situation. He urges his readers to ‘resist pretending that actors 
have only a language while the analyst possesses the meta- language in which 
the first is embedded’ (2005: 49), and goes so far as to state that ‘it is never the 
case that the analyst knows what the actors ignore’ (2005: 22).
4 The classic constructivist idea of ‘closure’, or ‘stabilisation’, rests on the idea 
that the disputes that shape a technology are ‘forgotten’ once the dominant 
meaning has been established (e.g. Hughes 1983: 14– 15; Bijker 1997: 84– 88). 
Feenberg’s argument is more than a supplement, in that he is suggesting the 
form taken by closure (neutrality) is itself a product of the struggles over 
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under capitalism. In presenting it as an instance of reification he is adopting a 
dialectical approach, both showing that technology is produced as inert and 
immutable and allowing that, as such, it acts.
5 Ian Hacking (1999) notes that this kind of unmasking has been a central part 
of the appeal of constructivism for critical theories.
6 Foucault is a difficult source for philosophy of technology because his denun-
ciation of social arrangements as ‘techniques’ and ‘instruments’ is important 
to his polemic but nowhere substantiated as a reason to view them with 
suspicion.
7 Feenberg’s preferred source on this point is de Certeau (1984), who builds on 
Foucault to distinguish between ‘strategies’ that constitute power and ‘tactics’ 
that mark resistance to its smooth operation.
8 Marcuse describes how in modern society, ‘[p] re- technological and techno-
logical rationality, ontology and technology are linked by those elements 
of thought which adjust the rules of thought to the rules of control and 
domination’ (1964:  138), concluding that, ‘scientific- technical rationality 
and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social control’ 
(1964:  146). These ideas anticipate Feenberg’s own concept of ‘hegemonic 
technological rationality’.
9 ‘Only a phenomenological account of values in action can make sense of the 
notion that aesthetics provides the normative basis for the reconstruction of 
technological rationality … when Marcuse imagines aesthetics incorporated 
into everyday sensation as a critical force, his hypothesis implies a phenom-
enological conception of experience.’ (Feenberg 2005: xv).
10 As when he writes of a synthesis of science and art, or the reintroduction of 
art into daily life.
11 Hamer (2005:  58) points out that Adorno’s strategy is to use psychoanalysis 
to interpret the limits and threats currently posed to autonomy, and thereby 
to focus on human suffering. The implicit norm is of non- repressive and non- 
coercive subjecthood with a capacity for open- ended thought, rather than revo-
lutionary praxis aimed at politically mediated reconciliation of self and society.
12 This is another instance of Feenberg making the move to incorporate a socio-
logical element into the definition of technology but then finding that the 
content has changed when he goes to draw on it. Just as technology has 
ceased to play the authoritative role assigned to it by technocracy, so its aes-
thetic has already largely embraced naturalistic modernism.
13 In contrast, Adorno views communication with a degree of suspicion, 
contrasting it to the formal- expressive dimension of aesthetic experience, 
which can work precisely to undermine the reifying effects of discursive 
mediations.
14 Although it could be pointed out that much contemporary environmental 
discourse on the theme of climate change in particular takes the form of 
saying ‘leave science to scientists’, which is not consistent with the idea of a 
democratic, or anti- technocratic, technical politics, at least as Feenberg has 
presented these ideas so far.
15 In Between Reason and Experience Feenberg refers to this as ‘de- worlding’ 

















Aesthetic critique    121
121
16 Indeed, Feenberg writes that ‘primary instrumentalisation is the orienta-
tion towards reality that Heidegger identified as the technological “mode of 
revealing”’ (2002: 175).
17 As well as aestheticisation, secondary instrumentalisation involves system-
atisation (artefacts make sense alongside others of their kind); vocation 
(people are defined through their use of the technology), and initiative (the 
artefact enlarges its user’s scope for ‘free play’) (2002: 178). Instrumentalisation 
theory is discussed further in the next chapter.
18 Working in the Latourian vein in sociology of art, Emilie Gomart and 
Antoine Hennion write that action itself is sometimes best understood as ‘an 
unanticipated gift’, rather than a heroic play in the struggle of subject and 
object (Gomart and Hennion 1999: 222).
19 Writing about the ongoing environmental crisis, Latour points out that the 
earth, ‘does not play either the role of inert object that could be appropriated 
or the role of higher arbiter’ (cited by Alexandre Leskanich in his 2017 review). 
In other words, nature is not passive raw material, but neither is it awaiting 
reconciliation and integration into the historical process.
20 The basic idea here comes from Marx:  human beings have to be there to 
operate the system but their real needs are irrelevant. The modernist art-
work is isomorphic (Witkin 1998) with this, presenting people with music, to 
use Adorno’s favourite example, that stimulates and defies human efforts to 
include it in an easy, or even pleasurable, experience of listening.
21 Discussing the role of information technology in contemporary capitalism, 
Lazzaroto refers to ‘asignifying signs’ that ‘act directly on the real’ (2014: 40). 
Asignifying semiotics depend on signifying ones but subvert them too, giving 
rise to experiences of sense without meaning. Diagrammatic sign machines, 
he says, ‘shape sense’. This mirrors Adorno’s emphasis on the priority of truth 
or form over meaning and, in the terminology of critical theory, is suggestive 
of a portentous reconfiguration of lived experience.
22 We should note that Adorno’s use of this term is not limited to appraisal 
of violent or arresting images, or to the harsh conjunctions of modernist 
works:  ‘The shock aroused by important works is not employed to trigger 
personal, otherwise repressed emotions. Rather, this shock is the moment 
in which recipients forget themselves and disappear into the work; it is the 
moment of being shaken. The recipients lose their footing; the possibility 
of truth, embodied in the aesthetic image, becomes tangible. This imme-
diacy, in the fullest sense of relation to artworks is a function of mediation, 
of penetrating and encompassing experience; it takes shape in the fraction 
of an instant, and for this the whole of consciousness is required’ (Adorno 
2002: 244).
23 In his study of Adorno, Witkin says that working with the materials of 
everyday life ‘enables the artist to oppose the false reconciliation of sub-
ject and world, while preserving the subject’s identity negatively through 
establishing a distanced and ironizing relationship between the subject and 



















From critique to utopia
This chapter argues that his attachment to the idea of critique inhibits 
Feenberg from delivering fully on the radical, utopian aims that motivate 
his theory of technical politics. Feenberg defines critique as a form of 
thought that is marked by ‘persistent reference to nature, reflection and 
individuality’, and which, on this basis, opposes ‘the totalitarian power of 
technology’. He adds that this critique of technology, ‘distinguishes crit-
ical theory from various forms of postmodernism and post- humanism’ 
(2002: 33). At the same time, however, Feenberg accuses other thinkers in 
the Marxian tradition of ‘trivialising or evading’ the question of what the 
socialist technology of the future might be like, and asserts that this issue 
must be confronted if critical theory is ‘to carry conviction’ (2002: 18). 
He tries to develop a theory, then, that is both true to the definition of 
critique just cited and delivers on this promise to address the question of 
the nature of future technology.
As we have seen, the critical theory of technology provides concep-
tual resources with which to understand aspects of contemporary tech-
nology design as a negation or distortion of technology’s true potential. 
Feenberg asserts the necessity of affirming that potential, but the crit-
ical nature of the theory means that it can only conceptualise potential 
negatively, as that which is not currently realised. This antinomy arises 
out of Feenberg’s attempt to combine critique with utopian thinking, or, 
more precisely, to use critique to achieve utopian ends. Critique entails 
endless suspicion of the technical (and everything else), while uto-
pianism requires openness to the possibility of fantastic, technologically 
facilitated modifications of human society and culture. Feenberg has a 
foot in both camps and consequently, even as he opens the door to uto-
pian thinking, he steps back to a fairly orthodox Marxian position that 
restricts speculation about future technology, and imposes a check on 
his own insistence that critical theory must be prepared to say something 
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In this chapter, Section  1 returns to Feenberg’s account of the ‘his-
torical essence’ of technology, which is where he repudiates the notion 
that technology’s threat (to culture, to nature) is intrinsic rather than 
historical. In his alternative, relational definition, technology is found 
in artefacts and activities distinguished by a characteristic intersec-
tion of function and meaning. Here, Feenberg identifies the technical 
object with the former, referring to this as the ‘stripped down’ version of 
artefacts, but emphasises that it only becomes technology proper when 
it is incorporated into the meaning- making practices he theorises as sec-
ondary instrumentalisation.
As we have seen, under capitalism functional objects become 
technology in a way that is lacking the all- important shell of recon-
ciliation with human meaning. This accounts for the distinctively 
technological appearance of modern, capitalist society, while dis-
closing an important sense in which it is actually less technological 
than other cultures. The latter implication, however, is not elaborated 
by Feenberg and never becomes a positive principle in his theory. 
Instead, in the context of reflection on the meaning dimension of 
technology, function is presented as the truth of an object, and as 
such it conditions what that object can mean. Because of the nega-
tive entanglements of technology with bureaucratic and other forms 
of power in modern societies, function also tends to be construed 
negatively, especially by philosophers, as the locus of a fundamental 
violence done to nature.1
There is a version of this argument in Feenberg’s theory of primary 
instrumentalisation. There he asserts that a basic decontextualisation of 
objects from their place in nature is part of the historical essence of tech-
nology. As we saw in the previous chapter, some rival theorists, especially 
Bruno Latour, have questioned this. In Section 2, attention turns to Peter- 
Paul Verbeek’s post- phenomenological critique of Feenberg, in which he 
suggests that primary instrumentalisation might be better understood in 
terms of a less controversial notion of patterning, or imposing form on 
experience, which is then subject to cultural mediation and made mean-
ingful. The benefit of this approach is that it allows a more active role for 
objects as part of the technological situation, since they participate in 
shaping the sense they make, so to speak, rather than always being cast 
as passive or violated. This idea seems to comport well with Feenberg’s 
Marcusean search for a design practice based on harmonies rather than 
coercion.
However, the danger in Verbeek’s position is that the notion of an 
ethics immanent to technology design becomes entirely relativised to 
a context that is understood in post- human terms. The threat here is 
that ethics are actually made subordinate to a techno- aesthetic prin-
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Feenberg’s attachment to some notion of directionality in social and his-
torical processes serves as a counterweight to this. Section 3 discusses 
his use of Gilbert Simondon’s idea of concretisation as a way to con-
tain the relativism with respect to outcomes that haunts constructivism, 
without lapsing into Marxian technical determinism.
Section 4 suggests that Feenberg’s attempt to steady the ship in this 
way reflects a one- sidedness in his theory, according to which the discur-
sive and the political are always both subordinate to the technical (which 
carries the historical process forward through concretisation) and super-
ordinate to it (politics redeems technology development after the fact 
and provides ideas that determine its meaning). The focus of technical 
politics is, then, the discursive mediations applied to technology rather 
than its substantive dimension. In his presentation of technical politics 
Feenberg is limited by his attachment to critique to offering a politics of 
technology, neglecting the utopian question of a positive technicisation 
of politics. He locates the operations of oppositional and dissenting 
agents with an interest in technology in discourse, rather than in tech-
nical practice itself. This imbalance in his theory precludes the utopian 
operation of advancing technical solutions to human, social and cul-
tural problems. In this respect, his attachment to critique means that 
he is behind concrete developments in contemporary technical politics, 
where activists now develop software that changes the material realities 
of social and political struggle, while discourse plays a secondary role in 
mediating their activity.
In technical politics, as Feenberg theorises it, discourse out-
side technology is the source of ideas but is always obliged to follow 
behind technology development. This is the traditional position of cri-
tique, as negatively portrayed by Latour – it is condemned to turn up 
after the fact and explain why things turned out badly. In Section 5,  
I  suggest that, in order to deliver on his utopian promise, Feenberg 
needs to include space for progressive substantive bias in technology 
design and positively identify willed technical transformation as the 
privileged vehicle of socialist transition. If technical politics is to be 
more than just a category- mistake, in which technology is judged by 
criteria that were developed for something else, then it also needs to 
include reflection on the technicisation of heretofore political questions. 
According to this argument, technology designs inform the value basis 
of the socialist model, rather than merely bearing their impress. Any 
vision of socialism worth its salt must include employments of tech-
nology that shape human subjectivity and rules of co- existence to create 
new forms of social life. Since power here operates below the level of 
discursivity, or deliberation on meanings, the Marxian or critical for-
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1 Historical essence
Feenberg rejects essentialist definitions of technology that construe it as 
inherently menacing to human values, arguing instead that technical advance 
is itself a human value. At the same time, he rejects the kind of determinism 
which maintains that culture is in the position of ‘keeping up’ with tech-
nical development and embracing the potential it presents. His alternative 
involves recognising the pervasive entwinement of technology develop-
ment with questions of meaning and value, but also the ways in which that 
entwinement gets obscured beneath one of its effects, namely the prevailing 
perception of what technology is. Here reification – the abstraction of tech-
nology from the real social and historical processes that constitute it – enters 
the philosophical definition of technology. What makes Feenberg’s theory 
a critical theory is his conviction that the task of unmasking abstraction 
and breaking down reification, while informed by philosophy, is also a vital 
moment in the creation of a different kind of technics.
He works here from within a Marxist problematic, which is concerned 
with the historical abstraction of human properties. Human action 
makes history and drives the development of human productive power, 
including technology. But in the course of that process, human powers 
become abstracted, or alienated, and appear as special properties of dom-
inant social classes, or ‘reified’ entities, like the market (often credited 
with the rapid wealth creation of the last two and a half centuries) or 
technology itself (often viewed as something that acts on history from 
outside). Critical theory understands itself as charged with the task of 
dissolving these illusions to reveal the human, social processes that 
underlie them, and, at the same time, unmasking the operations of power 
that make them seem autonomous of those processes. Critique is a way of 
thinking that removes false appearances, and in Marx’s version it is allied 
to emancipatory social activism and politics. Critique confirms its truth 
by becoming active in the situations it describes, bringing people of like 
mind together and empowering them not only to see through dominant 
illusions but also to forge new social realities grounded in co- operation 
that prefigure a society free from alienation and reification.
As we saw in Chapter  1, Feenberg sets himself the challenge of 
developing a theory that includes technology among the concerns of cri-
tique and incorporates an account of technical transformation into crit-
ical theory’s ideas about agency or praxis. In this way he hopes, by way 
of the theory of ‘democratic rationalisation’, to reconstruct the idea of 
progress. In this version of critical theory, technology, bureaucracy and 
other edifices of modern society are to be taken back, as it were, by the 
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To this end, Feenberg advances a non- reified, properly historical def-
inition of the essence of technology, in the following terms:
I will define the essence of technology as the systematic locus for the 
sociocultural variables that actually diversify its historical realizations. 
On these terms, the essence of technology is not simply those few 
distinguishing features shared by all types of technical practice. Those 
constant determinations are merely abstractions from the socially con-
crete stages of a process of development. It is the logic of that process 
which will now play the role of the essence of technology. (2001: 201)
The ‘logic’ Feenberg favours is the combination of two aspects of techno-
logical development that must be present in any society whatsoever, 
which he calls primary and secondary instrumentalisation. As we saw 
in Chapter 4, ‘Primary instrumentalization [PI] characterises technical 
relations in every society, although its emphasis, range of application and 
significance varies greatly’ (Feenberg 2001: 202). PI (sometimes referred 
to as functionalisation) has four elements, which Feenberg describes as 
‘four reifying moments of technical practice’ (2001: 203):
 1. Decontextualisation, in which objects are abstracted or separated 
from their natural contexts. Feenberg also refers to ‘isolating’ them 
and, notably, to their ‘reifying extraction’ (2002:179). The latter seems 
strange, because it means that any and all technology has a ‘reifying’ 
moment. In reification, what is true is transformed into a falsehood, 
and what is false is also a kind of concealed truth. Reality is present in 
a reified entity but in deceitful guise. It seems as if Feenberg is saying 
that when natural objects are abstracted in this way it involves seeing 
them more clearly but from a perspective that is somehow false or 
inauthentic.
 2. Reductionism, in which objects are assessed for their promotion of 
affordances, or in relation to a programme of purposes. This places 
technology firmly within the problematics of presentation and 
representation. Reduction re- presents what is given in nature with a 
focus on useful properties, and Feenberg equates the qualities of the 
object that get excluded or put into the background by this process 
with objective ‘potential’ (2001: 204).
Feenberg emphasises that 1 and 2 are objectifying moments of PI and 
adds two more features of the process, which he says are moments of 
‘subjectivation’ (2001: 208):
 3. Autonomisation, which means that once isolated and related to pur-
pose, the object confers a new freedom on the subject, namely to act 
in a given domain without consequences, or with protection from 
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 4. Positioning, which refers to understanding and using the laws of nature 
to gain strategic mastery in a given context.
The relational definition of technology locates it at the intersection of PI 
with secondary instrumentalisation (SI). In other words, there may, in 
principle at least, be instances of reifying practice, reduction to function, 
autonomisation and positioning that are not technological. Only when 
conjoined to SI would they be part of the process that Feenberg says 
constitutes technology. SI (which he sometimes refers to as ‘realisation’ 
or ‘concretisation’) involves:
 1. Systematisation, in which objects are integrated into networks of 
people and other objects: long tightly linked networks in modern soci-
eties, shorter and with looser connections in traditional ones.
 2. Mediation, which involves ornamentisation or decoration and the 
application of symbols conferring meaning: a common practice in rela-
tion to pre- modern tools, less so in the case of industrial machinery.
These are aspects of the objective life of technological artefacts, while the 
second two moments of SI concern their relation to human users.
 3. Vocation, which refers to the emergence of a group of people who 
develop an affinity with the new technology in processes through 
which the tool ‘produces’ its user.
 4. Initiative, which is the opening up of a margin of manoeuvre for users, 
in which they can experiment with uses of the technological object. 
This is important to the tactical dimension of technical politics.
By focusing his definition on the intersection of PI and SI, Feenberg 
inserts a sociological dimension into the philosophical definition of 
technology. Here, ‘the underdetermination of technological develop-
ment leaves room for social interests and values’ (2001: 205). Technology 
emerges where it is socially shaped and ‘insure[s] congruence between 
technology and society’ (2001: 205). Feenberg describes how, in this pro-
cess, technology often initially destabilises, then comes to work with 
and re- enforce, established social arrangements, including those based 
on power.
Instrumentalisation theory is a quasi- transcendental, pragmatic 
theory of technology as a social process. PI and SI stipulate core features 
of that process that Feenberg considers must be present for a thing or 
situation to count as technology. He elaborates on them with refer-
ence to other theories of technology. Of PI, for example, he says that 
its first two moments correspond to Heidegger’s account of technology 
as ‘enframing’, while the third and fourth he compares to Habermas’s 
characterisation of money and power as social steering media, which 
are present in most human societies. However, both of these theories 
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famously oppose technology to the communicative, cultural dimen-
sion of human experience. Indeed, Feenberg accuses Habermas 
of trying to get ‘a whole social critique’ out of this by opposing the 
system to the cultural lifeworld while overlooking their embodiment 
‘in technical devices and disciplines that include [both and] much else 
besides’ (2001: 203). Feenberg’s own theory preserves the opposition of 
technical- instrumental and communicative reason, with the difference 
that he locates it within technology.
In this way Feenberg’s definition introjects meta- level reflection and 
reflexivity into technology. Definitions, including Habermas’s, that cast 
technology as outside of the scope of cultural, meaning- making processes 
are themselves a uniquely modern version of this kind of theoretical reflec-
tion. They comport with the notion of the detached expert who comes at 
social situations from outside, with manipulative intent and little or no 
regard for the human consequences of their actions. In Habermas’s theory 
this occurs because, as part of the systems sphere, technology is ruled 
by an action orientation that eschews time- consuming deliberation and 
is thoroughly guided by technical imperatives (Habermas 1985: 202). In 
contrast, from Feenberg’s perspective the understanding of technologists 
and technical action reflects the influence of reification. While Feenberg 
sometimes characterises technical action in similar terms to Habermas, 
his explanation of its character is different. In short, it is not true that 
technologists in modern society have no idea of what they are doing in a 
meta- sense – only that, having internalised these discourses, they tend 
not to see that having such an idea is important to what they do when 
they are doing it.
Feenberg interprets this situation politically and identifies it as the 
reification of technology in hegemonic technological rationality, which 
he counterposes to technical activism. He presents instrumentalisation 
theory as superior to other philosophical definitions of technology 
because they invoke ahistorical abstractions (instrumentalism, 
enframing) from the reality of technology, which is better understood 
as socially contested and thoroughly political. The introjection of these 
latter elements into the very meaning of technology is a welcome theor-
etical advance. However, in defining technology as the ‘logic of a process’, 
it is questionable whether Feenberg really proffers a definition that is less 
guilty of abstraction than other theories.
His analysis of technology as a process concentrates on the historic-
ally contingent and contested character of efficiency and draws out the 
purported play of this and associated concepts in determining the meaning 
of technology. By contrast, in Marx’s work the ‘systematic locus’ of tech-
nical activity is empirical; it involves the historical interface  of labour, 
knowledge and the productive forces. Feenberg’s account,  specifically 
in the theory of PI, includes a historically continuous, even incorrigible 
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element of reification, which is confusing because elsewhere in the theory 
he emphasises that reification is a feature specific to modern, rationalised 
societies. If PI includes reification then modern technology involves a 
reified or reifying perspective on an activity that already reifies part of the 
world. This doubling of reification is unsettling and strikes one as symp-
tomatic of a problem in the theory.
Feenberg’s argument is that people’s encounters with technology 
differ from their experiences with other (natural) objects because ‘an 
initial abstraction is built into our immediate perception of technolo-
gies’ (2001:  211). As we’ve just seen, with technical objects a ‘primary 
function’ is foregrounded and defines the interaction, and this ‘seems 
to set us on the path towards an understanding of technology as such’ 
(2001: 211). Even as people encounter a technical object for the first time, 
they experience an unusual mediation in which linguistic and aesthetic- 
sensory interpretative moves and accommodations are punctured or 
disrupted by a prior objective structure that inflects the reading of this 
particular class of things. The seed of reification is present in PI and 
cultivated by modern technology’s SI, and this explains the persistent 
self- evidence of technology in its reified form, as authoritative, rational, 
efficient, etc.
In the theory of PI, Feenberg characterises this objective structure in 
terms that are openly derived from substantivist and essentialist phil-
osophies. In his effort to get a sociological component into the philo-
sophical definition of technology, he includes negative associations of 
technology  – such as enframing, or reducing worldly interactions to 
instrumental purposes  – while separating them from the philosoph-
ical positions that gave rise to them. His idea is that these negative 
characterisations have traction because they correspond to a basic level 
of experience or common sense, rather than as special insights of the 
late Heidegger. It makes sense, therefore, to recast them as historical 
contingencies. Feenberg makes an important contrast with traditional 
societies, where, he writes, ‘the functional point of view … co- exist[s] 
peacefully with other points of view … none of which are essentialised’ 
(2001: 211).
Feenberg’s hermeneutics of technology, then, insists that social and 
cultural meanings are always integral to technology: there is no unme-
diated experience of technology. This point has critical import because 
it makes it clear that technology cannot be properly understood without 
acknowledging that it always combines function with some kind of 
meaning that makes it comprehensible to human beings, who inter-
pret the world from a particular embodied and cultural standpoint. 
At the same time, the PI is intended to do justice to the fact that the 
element of function continues to be definitive for technology, without 
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in terms of mere function, which Feenberg says predominates in capit-
alist modernity, is a reification because it is a socially induced distortion 
of technology’s truth, caused by the pre- eminence of professional, tech-
nical disciplines2 and their implication in social domination. Feenberg 
writes that ‘[a] s the prestige of these disciplines spreads, their approach 
to technology becomes the model for common sense and philosophy 
alike’ (2001: 212) – that is, it is hegemonic.
Identifying technology with its function is, in Feenberg’s terms, a kind 
of abstraction, a reification. This dimension (functionality) is not simply 
wrapped in signs that tell putative users what the artefact can do. It is 
as social- relational as any other aspect of technology:  ‘[a] s mere phys-
ical objects abstracted from all relations, artefacts have no function and 
hence no properly technological character at all’ (2001:  213). There is 
a problem for this position, however, which arises out of the argument 
made in the last chapter about the changed aesthetics of technology. 
The character of the technical inflection, or the way in which the tech-
nical object intrudes (obtrudes) on sense- or meaning- making activities 
seems to have shifted even in the years since Feenberg first made this 
accommodation with his substantivist precursors in the philosophy of 
technology. In particular, the notion that when encountering a technical 
object one is guided or steered by a reified function, and that this defines 
the interaction as coldly instrumental or spiritually empty, jars with the 
experience that most people have of contemporary, especially digital, 
technologies. In other words, it is no longer common sense. The rela-
tionship people have with their smartphones, activity trackers or other 
digital gadgets of everyday life does not match the description this seems 
to imply of them, as reified and authoritative.
2 Hermeneutics and the object
Post- phenomenology considers Feenberg ‘humanist’ because he only 
treats of technology as it is constructed or discursively mediated. Peter- 
Paul Verbeek, for example, agrees with Feenberg that there is no transcen-
dental meaning of technology (instrumental efficiency gains, narrowed 
worldview, etc.) that underpins (or overrides) socially constructed ones 
(Verbeek 2013). He proposes to approach technology at the level of 
individual artefacts rather than viewing them all as the expression of a 
way of thinking or as occupying a particular predetermined place in our 
social imaginary (Verbeek 2006: 196). Technologies are as they manifest 
in context and not instances of a universal class sharing common prop-
erties, or dependent social variables subject to the rule of their human 
designers. They are entwined with other situated elements and agentic, 
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all social actors. Technologies are always both emergent in this sense 
and irreducible to other levels of description, including the idioms of 
explanatory physical science that might be expected to account for their 
behaviour in advance.
While Feenberg’s instrumentalisation theory is not essentialist, or 
even substantivist in the accepted sense of that term, it does stipulate, 
in a pragmatic invocation of the idea of function, what historical tech-
nical artefacts are – what makes them all technology. This definitional 
move is refused by Verbeek. Instead, he proposes that technology has 
the constant feature that it ‘gives form to human existence’ (2006: 48) 
and ‘imposes form’ on our experience of the world (2006: 209). In this 
sense, it plays a role in shaping human existence but one that operates 
outside of linguistic mediation and symbolic meaning. Crucially, more-
over, the form it confers is not specifiable in advance or deducible from 
essentialist premises or historical constants, including reification. From 
this perspective, all of the moments in Feenberg’s instrumentalisation 
theory are only contingencies, features of a historically specific experi-
ence of technology. Technology produces a ‘pattern’ (2006:  180) 
in human existence, but which pattern it produces varies between 
instances.
Like Feenberg, Verbeek postulates two layers to the technical arte-
fact  – one embodied, shaping form and conferring pattern, the other 
involving symbolic appearance, meanings and discourse. For him, each 
artefactual encounter involves the becoming of things and people, 
shaping a world that appears a certain way to humans. Verbeek’s thesis 
is post- phenomenological because of the active role he assigns to objects 
as agents in the process of their own production:  they exist in a sense 
that goes beyond (and conditions) their appearance to and meaning for 
human beings. He calls for a design culture that anticipates the moral 
consequences of artefacts’ agency, as part of the process of their produc-
tion. Rather than deferring normative or moral questions to the abstract 
consideration of their likely impact on social contexts, he regards norms 
as immanent to the design process, and assigns ethical weight to the 
artefacts themselves as part of this. For this reason, Verbeek writes of the 
intrinsic desirability of transparent designs (2006: 228) that would enable 
users to see the full workings of a given device, rather than more simpli-
fied interfaces tailored to meet requirements anticipated by designers, 
which then become prescriptive and limit in advance what artefacts may 
say or do.
This sounds similar to technical politics, in that Verbeek places ethics 
as internal to the technology design process, but, unlike Feenberg, he 
does not understand this in terms of opposed instrumentalisations (PI/ 
SI).3 For Verbeek, Feenberg’s technical politics is restrictively humanist 
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developmental trajectory, he identifies the source of progressive ideas 
as outside of it in the realm of public political discourse.4 Describing 
the historical process in which technology has been shaped by capit-
alism, Feenberg observes that the exclusion of values from the technical 
sphere sees them resurface outside it, so that ‘[t] he very same process in 
which capitalists and technocrats were freed to make technical decisions 
without regard for the needs of workers and communities generated 
a wealth of new “values,” ethical demands forced to seek voice discur-
sively’ (2002:  22). Technical politics, then, involves the importation of 
these discursively formulated values into the technical sphere as cur-
rently constituted. It is in light of this that Feenberg argues that one of the 
goals of the critical theory of technology is ‘to account for the increasing 
weight of public actors in technological development’ (2002: 24).
Elsewhere, when he discusses the example of changes to computing 
in the 1980s, Feenberg describes matters differently. There he identifies 
progressive elements within the technical professions as Foucauldian 
‘specific intellectuals’ (2002: 100). Efforts to make computers into com-
munication tools rather than sources of top- down management con-
trol, he says, were brought about by ‘specific intellectuals act[ing] in the 
margin of maneuver associated with a technical domain in order to trans-
form the code establishing that domain’ (2002: 101). The two accounts 
are not contradictory, and in practice Feenberg wants us to believe that 
both things are true:  non- technical publics lobby for change and pro-
gressive members of technical professions can act with similar values in 
mind, or even be influenced by putative users.
The ambiguity over whether this occurs from the outside, as action 
upon the code to change it, or as a mutation from within the code itself 
matters, though, because it suggests a one- sidedness in the critical theory 
that is not present in Verbeek’s argument. Technical politics is concerned 
with values formulated outside of the technical sphere  – communica-
tion, education, democracy, the aesthetics of usability and so on – and 
the progressive nature of some intra- technical action is identified as such 
only in so far as it appears to comport with those values. Yet this neglects 
what is specifically technological about technology, and what it might 
do to enhance politics and alter prevailing social and cultural values. 
Instead, we are told that ‘everywhere technology goes, centralised hier-
archical social structures follow’ (2002: 24), which preordains the failure 
of technical politics. Feenberg writes as if the technological aspect of 
technology, which in the dystopian technological imaginary has always 
been on the side of power, can take care of itself and needs no protec-
tion or advocacy from philosophy. For Verbeek, in contrast, design is 
not the domain of codes that provide openings for extraneous norms, 
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technology development is not an ‘after the fact’ assessment controlled 
by the (mournful) wisdom of hindsight.
Consequently, Verbeek points out, ‘it is precisely the failure to rec-
ognise that things have a moral valence that gives rise to technocracy’ 
(2006: 216). This point is very close to Feenberg’s suggestion that capit-
alist formal bias involves not a socially induced distortion of the technical 
object so much as a failure to control or contain it in a SI. But comparing 
the two views reveals the limits set by Feenberg’s attachment to critique. 
Verbeek’s point is that there seems to be no reason in principle why a 
failure of SI, of the kind that is central to Feenberg’s diagnosis of mod-
ernity, might not result in spectacularly benign or beautiful devices unen-
cumbered by the impress of extraneous political or ethical valuations. 
The difference here is subtle but important because Feenberg’s quasi- 
transcendental characterisation, while cautiously formulated, appear to 
be basically concerned to combat a technology historically associated 
with power, rather than to positively affirm its capacity to substantively 
alter social reality.
Instrumentalisation theory draws too much on a hermeneutics of 
suspicion applied to technology to be able to facilitate the conceptual 
pivoting that Feenberg requires from his theory. To move from critique 
of technology to utopian projection concerning its role in a more benign 
future, its ambivalence needs to be cancelled and its transformative 
power affirmed. The idea of function is less useful here than the notion 
of form, invoked by Verbeek in the comments just cited. The abstrac-
tion and isolation of technical elements described in instrumentalisation 
theory can be retained, but describing these as drawing out function 
already presupposes an understanding of the way that technology is 
integrated with social purposes – in other words, it strays into describing 
the capitalist SI.5 In contrast, the idea of PI as the imposition of form that 
conditions meaning helps to clarify the idea of a ‘systematic locus’ that 
defines the historical essence of technology.
However, a problem remains with Verbeek’s position, namely that 
it involves a post- modern relativism about values in technology that 
Feenberg rightly wants to avoid. While he feigns to disavow such rela-
tivism, Verbeek acknowledges that his theory is ‘motivated by the post-
modern aversion to context- independent truths’ (2006:  115). If all the 
relevant values and norms are immanent to the technology situation and, 
importantly, there is no way to specify what technology ought to be for 
that is not some kind of ‘humanist’ imposition, then it seems that any-
thing might go. Feenberg attempts to reconstruct the notion of techno-
logical progress in order to establish and clarify a sense of the overall 
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3 Concretisation, subjectivation and the technological monad
When Feenberg defines technology in terms of its social logic, he invokes 
a specific entwinement of the dimensions of function and meaning, 
which he clarifies with reference to Gilbert Simondon’s idea of con-
cretisation. In this concept notions of form and function are, helpfully, 
combined. Simondon distinguishes ‘technicity’ in artefacts from their 
usefulness, arguing that it is characteristic of technical systems that their 
structures felicitously incorporate uses and relations to the environment, 
in a process of ‘elegant condensation’ based on ‘the discovery of synergies 
between the functions technologies serve and between technologies and 
their environments’ (Feenberg 2001: 217).
Feenberg takes over this account of technology’s tendency to expand 
and to incorporate new purposes as it unfolds, and argues that its logic is 
progressive. He writes that ‘[t] he process of concretisation has a progres-
sive character: design can be ordered in a sequence going from the most 
abstract to the most concrete’ (2001: 217). Since new knowledge is mani-
fest in new technical structures, technology development combines cog-
nitive advance with social and cultural development. Finding purposes 
that technology can fulfil is part of a ‘reflexive accommodation’ to the 
new capacities that technology presents as it differentiates itself. This 
progressive movement includes enhanced economic efficiency but, 
potentially at least, other things as well.
Feenberg attempts to adapt Simondon’s perspective by opening it up 
to constructivism, arguing that ‘functions’, in Simondon’s sense, ‘gather 
social groups’ (2001: 218), and in this way technology forms a ‘system-
atic locus for the sociocultural variables that … diversify its historical 
realizations’ (2001: 218). However, this marriage of Simondon and con-
structivism is, at best, problematic. Constructivism’s social processes 
select from technological properties that are inherently contingent, 
even haphazard, in their development, because they are technically 
underdetermined. Moreover, and especially in Feenberg’s version, these 
processes involve social struggle and antagonism, and their outcomes are 
strongly contingent on how those political contests are resolved. In con-
trast, Simondon’s theory of concretisation follows a very different logic, 
which he likens to the process of crystal formation out of a chemical 
milieu. There is a clear discrepancy between the proposition that techno-
logical designs tend to acquire functions as they unfold in accordance 
with such a strong sense of pattern and the argument that they are shaped 
by social and political struggles.
Feenberg acknowledges that constructivism is ‘obviously incompat-
ible with Simondon’s tendency to determinism’ (in de Vries 2015: 3), 
but tries to create a synthesis based on ‘ambiguities’ in Simondon’s 
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acknowledging that while constructivism excludes any idea of abstract 
or autonomous technicity, Simondon’s theory appears to allow no 
role for social shaping in the genesis of technologies. Feenberg’s syn-
thesis involves assimilating formal technicity to generalities of social 
theory, especially the idea of rationalisation. He writes that ‘ever 
since Marx and Weber, the mainstream social critique of modernity 
has emphasised technification, the cultural generalisation of what 
can loosely be called technicity’ (de Vries 2015: 3), a move that aligns 
Simondon’s concept to the idea of societal rationalisation. It is difficult 
not to consider this rather forced, however. There is, it seems to me, 
an affinity between the idea of technicity and Verbeek’s notion of form, 
but it is tendentious to attempt to align these ideas with anything like 
societal rationalisation.
In Feenberg’s hands, then, Simondon’s concept of concretisation is pri-
marily normative – that is, it describes the logic of technology develop-
ment as it ought to be (2001: 219– 220), if its potential were not thwarted 
by modern society. Simondon rejects the application of ‘external’ criteria 
of quality, including profit and utility, to technical artefacts. The idea of 
concretisation emphasises that the becoming of technologies involves 
movement from abstraction in design towards what he calls the ‘super- 
abundance’ of acquired functions, in excess of anything that might have 
been anticipated at the outset:
Concretisation brings not only new properties, but complementary 
functions, beyond those sought after, which we might call ‘superabun-
dant functions’. … These properties of the object surpass expectations; 
it is a partial truth to say that an invention’s purpose is to attain an 
objective, to produce an entirely predictable effect. An invention is 
brought into being in response to a problem, but its effects extend 
beyond the resolution of the problem, due to the superabundant effi-
cacy of the created object when it is a true invention. (Cited in Chabot 
2013:15)
Simondon’s concept has utopian implications, since it implies a progres-
sive logic of technology development involving the open- ended accrual of 
functions to technical elements. This logic combines social and technical 
factors, and it suggests a polyvalent, rather than ambivalent, account of 
technology’s relationship to social change. Simondon does not sharpen 
the opposition of concretisation to capitalist distortion in the way that 
Feenberg does – he describes how particular points in capitalist mining 
operations become lively centres of innovation (Chabot 2013:  13), for 
example, rather than decrying capitalism’s distorting effects.
Feenberg identifies concretisation as setting out a ‘path to wider inclu-
sion through redesign’ (2017: 181), and his proposal is to use this con-
cept to outline a suitably ‘complex trajectory of progress’ (2001: 218). But 
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discrepancy is apparent when Feenberg writes of ‘strategies of concret-
isation’, which aligns it not with tactics and the perspective of grass roots 
technology activists but rather with the ‘positioning’ moment of PI, in 
which technology is articulated to the interests of power working through 
a depleted SI. The fact that societal rationalisation (or differentiation), 
stripping down, and so on, run into the future, while, on his reading, 
concretisation repeatedly brings value questions back in, leads Feenberg 
to call concretisation the ‘technological unconscious’ (2001: 220) of mod-
ernity. At this point, concretisation becomes the intuitive foundation of 
critique; a reminder of harmony and integration as lost features of our 
relation with the natural world, rather than a method of utopian future- 
projection. The ‘technological unconscious’ pulls us back to the truth of 
a more integrated technological trajectory but, as such, it is a kind of 
repressed memory that surfaces in the wake of technical advance, to call 
for the reassertion of imperilled human values.
As we have seen, Feenberg refers to neglected potential in modern 
technology caused by its shaping by capitalist purposes. He argues 
that an alternative civilisation might recover what he calls ‘traditional 
technical values’ (especially vocation and self- realisation through tool 
use), or it could produce its own version of SI, invoking new values and 
strengthening concretisation. In this way, technical politics combines 
the ‘themes of substantivist critique’ with opposition to capitalism.6 
Simondon’s theory can help with this if it is articulated to more future- 
facing parts of Feenberg’s theory.
One of the challenges faced by critical theory of technology is the 
absence of a thoroughly immanent standard of evaluation for technical 
design practice – a standard of the kind that Verbeek seems to be after. 
Feenberg’s attempt to grasp the ‘historical essence’ of technology provides 
resources with which to think that issue through, not least because it was 
developed in part to counter post- modern and relativist arguments. The 
difficulty is that if technology is only as constructed, or as it emerges in 
the technological situation as described by post- phenomenology, then 
there is no way to place its development in relation to wider questions 
of social advance or progress.7 Verbeek’s immanent ethic of the techno-
logical object is, in this sense, insufficiently robust because it doesn’t 
facilitate the evaluation of technologies against the wider backdrop of 
questions of civilisational value or historical directionality. Simondon’s 
ideas of technicity and concretisation can help with this, since they pre-
sent an idea of the relational essence of technology (its form, as against 
the more sociological ‘function’) and a theory of the logic of its unfettered 
development, which is both aesthetic and normative.
These ideas might facilitate an alternative theorisation that 
accounts for the way in which changes at the level of ontology (alter-
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ontic meaning- making processes wherein people gain familiarity with 
techniques and operate with them from day to day. As we saw in the 
last chapter, this is the goal that Feenberg sets for theory in his idea of a 
re- aestheticisation of technology. The underlying difficulty is to recon-
cile the fact that some descriptions of technology seem to grasp its more 
fundamental aspects with the equally true proposition that ‘an adequate 
definition of real technology, as opposed to the narrow, idealised cross- 
section studied by engineering involves much besides the formal- rational 
properties of devices’ (2001: 216). That is, there can be social disputes 
and contests over design in which critical theory can take an interest, 
but some perspectives on the technical object yield more truth about 
it than others – which is problematic because these are the ones most 
likely to be monopolised by expert groups aligned with power. Feenberg’s 
suggestion is that technology’s truth can be a distinctive marriage of 
formal function and human interests, of the kind we find in medicine and 
sedimented in the vocational practice of doctors, engineers and others 
who are technologists, and who faithfully create themselves as subjects 
through the technical encounter that defines them and their tools. 
Feenberg’s notion of a technical subjectivation provides the framework 
within which to think this technical- political relation.
The theory of SI places technology in the problematic of representa-
tion central to Adorno’s conception of critical theory. Adorno’s version 
of critique seeks to loosen the hold of established epistemic models by 
showing that each identity has a ‘natural history’ (Hullot- Kentor 2006) 
involving an excess that is both essential and excluded. One of the aims 
of this approach is that of allowing objects to speak, which is achieved 
by highlighting the resistances concealed within any act of naming. This 
can be illustrated with reference to cultural practices like music, which, 
at its most ‘stripped down’, is just noise that can be heard by humans 
but which becomes something more than that when its bare mechanism 
is incorporated into culture. Experiences of the new within music (or 
art generally, and perhaps also technology) raise the question of what is 
included in the definition, and by emphasising this as a point of meth-
odological principle, Adornian analysis generates glimpses of music as 
such as it passes between moments of relative fixity and those in which 
the raw material escapes the nomological net. Moments like that of the 
captivating movement of a mechanism detached from any function or 
purpose are indicative of how this argument, developed in connection 
with art, might apply to technology.8
Adorno writes of a ‘shudder’9 produced by some artworks, when 
the subject temporarily loses the conviction of self- identity and is open 
to the truth of its ontological precarity. The pervasive uncertainty 
concerning what counts as real on either side of this encounter gives rise 
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representation: ‘The I is seized by the unmetaphorical semblance- seeking 
consciousness that it itself is not ultimate but semblance’ (2002:  246). 
Now, the shudder is a moment in the mediation of form as the objective 
within the subject. Adorno compares the role of critique here to that of 
psychoanalysis in relation to dreams or other psychological symptoms 
(2002:  137). Only critique is able to distinguish the presence of form, 
which serves as a kind of curative insight, much as psychoanalysis helps a 
neurotic to identify the real source of their suffering and thereby liberates 
them from intrusive or compulsive thoughts. Critique leads the subject 
to move with the resistant or oppositional content of the artwork itself 
as it refuses the dominant ordering of reality. Critique here creates a 
back channel between the inner content of artworks (their form) and the 
unconstrained freedom of thought that would be an emancipated sub-
ject – Adorno refers to ‘logic without conclusion’ (2002: 137) – that is 
implied in the critically mediated encounter with authentic artworks.
In artistic subjectivation the experience of form implies a change of 
constellation, a new reality in which subject and object are reconfigured 
and towards which true or authentic thought is inclined. Adorno’s theory 
is Marxist in the sense that it retains belief in both a form of subjectivity 
worthy of a better life and a historical truth adequate to it. In aesthetic 
experience they are both contained within what he calls the ‘aesthetic 
monad’ (2002:123) to indicate how this relation is abstracted from social 
and historical reality, mirroring it in a way that resists and repudiates 
it. In the changed techno- social configuration that is digital culture, it 
makes sense to adapt this line of thought to develop Feenberg’s notion 
of a technological subjectivation. The role of critique is to bring the 
technological unconscious to consciousness in connection with specific 
concretisations. Its truth, like that of art, is the promise of a better world 
that cannot be represented directly. Faithful to this, the technologist’s 
action is always a procedure that both explores (differentiates) and 
concretises. Fidelity to technological truths becomes, then, the effort to 
delineate a new world within the old.
Technological subjectivation differs from that of art, however, in 
that rather than opening a back channel to history it almost invariably 
involves a play for future significance.10 Rather than rejecting technical 
reason as intrinsically instrumental and in need of compensation or 
correction, it should be understood as necessitating precisely the kind of 
openness to the object that is invoked in Adorno’s theory. Invention is a 
process that involves an intuition of the ways in which materials behave; 
whether this involves an appreciation of mechanism and movement or 
of the intrinsic elegance of lines and blocks of code, all true invention 
has an aesthetic dimension. Technical subjectivation involves the kind 
of profound questioning that Adorno associates with the aesthetic, in 
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Feenberg’s reference to technology as a subjectivation: through it, indi-
viduals become something substantively different than they were before. 
An encounter with the technological event and the decision to embrace 
a particular meaning subjectivates its human participants at the same 
time as it allows objects to say something new. It is also, of necessity, a 
political development because it simultaneously involves a wider claim 
to relevance, as a vision of future society. Whenever a technological 
subjectivation occurs it implies an (often very radical) agenda for social 
change.
Feenberg’s version of this process involves vocation: a calling to work 
in an area that is often the basis of specialisation and expertise. There is 
a strong resonance between this calling to and love of technology and 
Adorno’s analysis of the transformative potential of the artwork. A sub-
ject of technology is one who knows its potential from the inside, so to 
speak: who embodies the mesh of technical and human in its experimental 
phase. Their being rests on a decision or decisions about new technical 
capabilities, which they select and attach themselves to. This is a two- 
way process in which the loosening of prior subjective identifications11 
creates a space in which objects can speak and act.
There is a connection here with Verbeek’s thesis that the techno-
logical artefact is an ethical agent in excess of the descriptions applied 
to it by technologists. The latter’s post- modernism amounts to the idea 
that adopting an inclusive approach to artefacts as agents can be under-
stood as ethical practice, without postulating any connection to wider 
narratives, in particular to any idea of progress. This is unsatisfactory 
because normative claims of the kind that are important to technical pol-
itics must submit themselves to the judgement of the historical process 
as movement towards greater human self- realisation. The cultural con-
dition of post- modernity highlights the lack of any political bridge from 
localised concern with ethics in design to history as arbiter in this sense, 
since there are apparently no historical narratives within which the ethics 
of increased sensitivity to objects acquires socio- historical significance. 
Here, Simondon’s idea of concretisation provides a starting point, since 
it entails a reconfiguration of subject and object that will be an enhance-
ment of both.
4 The reification of critique
The idea of technical politics was to some extent conceived in response to 
a situation in which increasing numbers of people started to demand an 
active role for themselves in technical decisions that affected their lives or 
concerned them. As seen above, Feenberg emphasises that the interven-
tionist consciousness required for technical politics is an extra- technical 
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mediation. He argues that those who are excluded from decision- making 
‘have recourse to discourse’ (2002:  153), where they can discuss tech-
nology and formulate their own demands. However, if technicisation is 
stripped of its associations with the negative formulations in the theory 
of PI, then the question of the technicisation of politics and culture is a 
positive, potentially optimistic one. The fact that Feenberg never asks it is 
the legacy of a critical theory that thinks of itself as the locus of a special 
kind of rationality that is opposed to instrumental reason. Attachment 
to this figure of thought prevents Feenberg from fulfilling one of his own 
strictures on what a critical theory must do. Critique prevents us from 
thinking through the transformation of technology, technical infrastruc-
ture and technical practices as part of the transition to a new civilisation, 
and from thinking technically about that transition.
Epistemically, critique first defined itself as defence of a non- technical 
way of understanding the world.12 Its fundamental task is to distinguish 
dimensions of human culture that should not be subject to scientific 
analysis and routinised through the application of technical ‘solutions’. 
Feenberg’s attachment to critique is therefore in tension with his goal 
of progressive rationalisation implemented through democratised tech-
nology design. In his theory, even though technology and rationalisation 
are now held to be open to alternative configurations, it seems that they 
are still to be comprehended from within a framework that is inher-
ently suspicious of them. But if alternative, democratic or subversive 
rationalisations are possible then there is reason to expect that technical 
designs inspired by them might be compatible with, for example, family 
meals and the management of interpersonal relationships.13
A basic principle of technical politics is Feenberg’s argument that 
ethics applies to technology design. This leads him to approve of some 
tendencies within technology design over others, so that he writes, for 
example, that ‘any technology that enhances human contact has demo-
cratic potentialities’ (2002:  91). However, the normative foundations 
for this judgement are never clarified, and this creates the impression 
that they are not immanent principles but seem to be brought to the 
technology situation from outside. The obvious source for Feenberg’s 
choice of communication as the core value is Habermas, who identifies 
agreement and consensus as conditions of possibility of linguistic com-
munication and, for that reason, serviceable as the basis for an immanent 
ethic of non- systematised social situations. However, Feenberg rejects 
Habermas’s opposition of communication to the systems sphere, because 
it makes technology amoral and places it beyond the reach of demo-
cratic control. If he is unable to endorse communicative ethics because it 
excludes technology and technical action in principle, it is difficult to see 
how Feenberg reaches his own prescription for good technology design 
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move is whether a technology might be deleterious to human connect-
edness, perhaps fostering more privacy or enabling people to avoid one 
another, yet still be good technology.
Here, as elsewhere, Feenberg endorses the sentiments but not the 
thinking behind an essentialist criticism of technology and its erosion 
of culture. The problem is that these sentiments are not in themselves 
uncontroversial and, separated from the arguments that gave rise to 
them, they appear as personal preferences. Politically, critique conceives 
itself as involved in the defence of democratic politics, as the domain of 
free, undistorted communication against the incursions of ‘the system’ 
(including technology). Feenberg’s attachment to this opposition, not-
withstanding his attempt to install it internally to technology, prevents 
him from developing a theory of willed technological transformation, 
which is a necessary point of departure for utopian thought.
The theory of technical politics opens up technology and technical 
reason to discussions about values and politically motivated transform-
ations, but, as we have seen, the model for reform is always a matter of 
impressing values onto technology; it never concerns the technical trans-
formation of social or political practices and values. Defining the core of 
technology in terms of PI, Feenberg locates interventions and struggles 
over meaning only at the level of SI, where technological forms are 
socially mediated. In other words, what is at stake in technical politics is 
the meaning of technology, rather than its form or what it does in a sub-
stantive, physical or material sense.14
In consequence, technical politics as Feenberg conceives it involves an 
imposition of politics (its values, ends and rationality) onto technology. 
But if it is not to be based on a category-mistake, in which technology is 
simply judged by criteria that were really developed for something else, 
then technical politics also needs to include space for the technicisation 
of heretofore political questions. The idea of technical politics needs to 
be rebalanced to reflect the fact that, as Verbeek points out, technolo-
gies bring their own arguments to bear upon issues of normative import. 
In a fully developed dialectic of technical politics, technology should be 
part of politics; and technical values, once they are drawn out through 
liberated technical practice, should be inscribed in political solutions and 
cultural innovations.
Activists are already creating technologies that propound alternative 
values as a matter of their substance rather than shaping technology in line 
with ideals and values (like communication) derived from discourse. An 
example of this is the ‘Universal Automation’ browser extension software 
created by hackers in the UK in 2013, in response to the government’s 
‘Universal Jobmatch’ programme.15 Universal Jobmatch was a job search 
website for unemployed workers which enabled the Department for Work 
and Pensions to monitor benefit claimants’ job- seeking activities. People 
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who failed to apply for enough jobs would be subject to reductions in 
benefit, or ‘sanctions’. Under the slogan ‘Workers of the world … Relax!’, 
Universal Automation software automated the job application process, 
enabling benefit claimants to circumvent the regime by applying for 
hundreds of jobs in a few seconds.16
In Feenberg’s terms, the Universal Automation program is an example 
of progressive substantive bias (a category he rejects  – see Chapter  2 
above), since it has no other use than supporting unemployed workers 
in their struggle to live free from state harassment. The concept of tech-
nical politics needs to be rebalanced to reflect this kind of development 
in which, just as technology is opened up to receive values, social and 
political goals are formulated and implemented in and through technical 
action. Although it is only a piece of software, Universal Automation is a 
more articulate statement of the right to social security than any number 
of blog posts, magazine articles or books of critical theory. To compre-
hend and move with this kind of development, critique needs to shed its 
own self- identity, its image of itself as something that is not technical. 
When critique stops reifying itself it will be able to identify positively 
with thought that is active in the world, and attach itself to objects that 
actively shape the future.
5 Technologically authorised socialism
As we have seen, through his idea of the technical code Feenberg has 
demonstrated that technology is open to multiple articulations and iden-
tified this as an opportunity for progressive politics. In this sense, his 
work marks an important advance over previous Marxian scholarship, 
when he writes that:
Scientific- technical rationality is not an ahistorical monolith that 
must be defended or rejected as a whole but an evolving complex of 
attributes that can be configured in a variety of ways with diverse social 
implications. Alternative rationalisations depend on which among 
these attributes is emphasised. (2002: 131)
Technical politics is the field of struggle opened up by this insight. 
The competing social agents described by constructivism, who seek 
to impress different meanings onto artefacts in the development pro-
cess, are now understood as the bearers of values related to political 
perspectives. Successful ‘rationalisations’ alter the significance of tech-
nology and its place in society and, potentially at least, correspond to a 
wider process of democratisation. Feenberg draws technology into pol-
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The ultimate aim of technical politics is to trigger a global transform-
ation affecting what technology means. Feenberg writes of a series of 
‘mutually supporting transformations’ (2002: 27), leading to a superior 
civilisational model. His vision of technical politics can be represented as 
a series of oppositions:
Technical rationality Communication
Hierarchy Democracy
Brutalist aesthetic Naturalist aesthetic
Managerial control Social connection
Neutrality Ethics
Capitalist modernity favours the tendencies in the first list but leaves a 
series of openings through which people can push for items in the second. 
Ultimately, this kind of grass roots activity will tip the whole meaning of 
technology over into something compatible with human self- realisation 
and not subordinate to the demands of the capitalist social system.
Feenberg argues that technology should subserve the societal goal of 
widening democracy, and that enhanced democratic control over tech-
nology design is the way to achieve this. His model of socialist transition 
retains Marx’s emphasis on the contradiction that capitalism engenders 
between the need for skilled, knowledgeable workers to operate 
sophisticated machinery on one side and the requirement that they serve 
as docile, unquestioning subordinates on the other. As workers become 
more educated, so they are more likely to perceive the iniquities and inef-
ficiencies of capitalism and to use their expertise to change the situation 
(1991: 30). Feenberg argues that this contradiction is manifest today and 
is part of the explanation for the growing interest in technology design. 
Even if, most of the time, squabbles over the meaning of a technology 
are mundane reflections of sectional interests with no obvious bearing 
on larger questions, it remains the case that a great deal ‘is decided … 
by the shape of our tools’ (2002: 19). Feenberg maintains that ‘the very 
definition of modern life is up for grabs’ (2002: 120) in disputes over tech-
nology design.
Verbeek’s post- modernist version of technical politics maintains that 
we can benefit from the critique of this or that individual technology – 
indeed, that such critique is part of what technology design involves – 
but that there is no wider historical eschatology that helps to orient 
these decisions. This is unsatisfactory because it relativises the ethical 
dimension of technology design and defers the larger questions per-
sistently raised by technology development. We can summarise this by 
saying that Verbeek wants to let objects speak but has no deep interest 
in what they have to say. Embracing concretisation as a utopian moment 
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as it meshes with the human material of history. Within this, techno-
logical events are not straightforwardly deterministic but are mediated 
through subjectivations founded on human decisions, and utopian pol-
itics affirms those decisions when they are guided by the conscious belief 
that a better future is possible – that is, they correspond to the immanent 
ethics of technology design.
Feenberg rightly challenges those who seek a quicker, more direct 
route to a superior civilisation to explain how such a transition will be 
possible without social action aimed at challenging the technical division 
of labour – that is, the deep entanglement of technology with expertise 
and hierarchy- reproducing knowledge practices. However, the one- sided 
nature of his theory reveals itself here: Feenberg’s assumption is that the 
goal is democratic technology, whereas from the standpoint of techno-
logical subjectivation a superior civilisation primarily requires better 
technology. This is a matter not so much of bringing technology under 
political control as of allowing technologies political speaking rights. Just 
as art establishes an inner connection between a non- identical subject 
and a more authentic future, so technology too can inspire the convic-
tion that a new world is possible: indeed, this is the benign promise of all 
technology before it gets thoroughly entangled with capitalist and other 
societal logics. More than that, it can begin to implement that conviction 
as part of a pre- configurative utopian strategy.
Rather than bearing the impress of particular, contingent values, better 
technology would have implications for the meaning of those values in 
practice, including democracy. What that technology consists in, its fun-
damental orientation, can itself be a focus for political will- formation. 
Technology design can be politicised by raising value questions within 
its design, and, as Feenberg points out, there is evidence that changes like 
this have already happened to design culture. However, seeking better 
technology as part of a superior society is not only a matter of imagining 
a world where workers can determine what technology is from day to day 
(the grass roots conception of technical- political freedom); it also involves 
imagining a world in which technology acts on people to produce new 
dispositions, habits of mind – in short, different kinds of sociality.
I submit that a rebalanced technical politics should take seriously 
the polyvalent, multi- dimensional, immanent logic of technology itself 
and incorporate the possibilities it presents into theoretical reflection 
on the future. This properly expands on the utopian moment implicit in 
the notion of new concretisations, by establishing conceptual space for 
a willed transformation of technical infrastructure. It involves acknow-
ledging technological subjectivation as a moment in technical prac-
tice that is fundamentally autonomous of political considerations but 
invariably consequential for society and politics. Thinking this through 
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requires that we accept the technicisation of politics as the dialectical 
corollary of the politicisation of technology.
As the later Foucault showed, the modern subject is a product of 
structured predispositions that are often technically implanted. Other 
experiential forms of subjectivity will be selected and foregrounded by 
different technical apparatus in the future. In recent decades the intern-
alisation of work discipline and performative norms by a ‘streamlined 
subject’ have been facilitated by technologies that produce individ-
uals who justify themselves and their actions in terms of efficiency and 
rational self- interest, not because they have deliberated or reflected on 
these values but because they were sedimented in the socio-technical 
environment. For the most part, social media notwithstanding, civic 
responsibilities have not been part of this reprogramming of the self.
In the age of social media it is anachronistic to pretend that questions 
of privacy, meaning, the nature of love and so on may not be suscep-
tible to technical ‘solutions’. A  rebalanced technical politics could 
focus on substantive alterations to existing social media technolo-
gies, with the goal of inclining human behaviour in specific, desired 
directions. The values of any new society will be played out in a change 
of fundamental attitudes on the part of citizens, and there is no reason 
to expect them to do this on their own. Instead, new concretisations 
of subject and object can be envisaged that incline people to be 
socially responsible citizens, that promote and support acts of soli-
darity and kindness, personal traits of courtesy, good manners and 
tact. Social credit systems which track peoples’ behaviour and reward 
them for good conduct, stimulating a more co- operative disposition, 
have alarmed some left- liberal commentators (Greenfield 2018), but 
working with the form of technology to bring about substantive social 
change almost certainly means being prepared to countenance similar 
projects, in which technology changes the meaning of ideas like 
freedom and democracy.
Notes
1 This is what leads Feenberg’s critics to discern an ambivalence in his work 
on the issue of essentialism  – see earlier discussions. In this chapter I  am 
suggesting that the real issue is his attachment to critique.
2 These disciplines embody a refined understanding of function, detached from 
considerations of meaning; hence, in the terms mooted above they contain 
truth but in a false perspective.
3 Similarly, Douglas Kellner argues that since aesthetics and function are ‘equi- 
primordial’, there is no reason for Feenberg to hypostatise their separation, 
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4 It is worth noting that this is the condition of application for Feenberg’s own 
work, or of its link to praxis. Critical theory, it seems, cannot be parsed into 
technical manuals or engineering textbooks.
5 As when Feenberg writes that ‘The concept of function strips technology bare 
of values and social contexts, focusing engineers and managers on just what 
they need to know to do their job’ (2001: 213).
6 Feenberg writes that this is the ‘heady air we must breathe if we want to make 
a fundamental difference to the shape of technical advance’ (2001: 224).
7 Indeed, there seems to be no non- culture- specific way to identify it as 
technology.
8 An illustration of this idea of form which can pass between functional 
settings, acquiring different meanings when it gets re- embedded in a new 
context of use, is provided by mechanical alphabets created in the century 
before the development of industry in Europe. These proto- machines were 
wooden models, whose ‘functions’ are obscure or non- existent, but which 
each instantiate a principle of mechanism (Snickars 2017). The science of 
mechanism was dubbed ‘kinematics’ by German engineer Franz Reuleaux, 
himself a source for Marx’s study of capitalist machinery (Frison 1988: 303). 
It has since declined as a branch of engineering (Moon 2003).
9 ‘True, the annihilation of the I in the face of art is to be taken no more literally 
than is art … aesthetic experiences are as such psychologically real, it would 
be impossible to understand them if they were simply part and parcel of the 
illusions of art. Experiences are not “as if ”. The disappearance of the I in the 
moment of the shudder is not real; but delirium, which has a similar aspect, 
is nevertheless incompatible with artistic experience. For a few moments the 
I becomes aware, in real terms, of the possibility of letting self- preservation 
fall away, though it does not actually succeed in realizing this possibility’ 
(Adorno 2002: 245).
10 It is plausible to construe this activity as involving a ‘technological monad’, 
since in opening up and re- forming their identities on the basis of their tech-
nical activity, technological subjects also become independent reflections of 
the whole of social reality. Here, though, the relation is not past- oriented and 
critical but rests on a utopian decision about the future.
11 This relates to changes in habitus associated with technology use, such as 
learning to use a computer mouse when previously one had only ever used 
pen and paper. Such changes have implications for the symbolic mediation of 
personal identity – see Kirkpatrick (2015) for discussion of this in connection 
with computer gaming.
12 The defensive function of critique has a lineage stretching back to Kant, whose 
1781 Critique of Pure Reason (1992) initiated the modern critical tradition by 
demonstrating the limits of scientific deduction as a method for addressing 
questions of a metaphysical nature. Kant placed his faith in a reason opposed 
to technical artifice when he argued that ‘Men will of their own accord grad-
ually work their way out of barbarism so long as artificial means are not delib-
erately adopted to keep them in’ (1992: 59).
13 Feenberg argues that ‘the substitution of “fast food” for the traditional 
family dinner can serve as a humble illustration of the unintended cultural 
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14 There is an interesting irony here in that while Srnicek and Williams (2017) 
and contemporary accelerationists are willing to imagine substantively 
different technologies, like spaceships for interstellar travel, they have nothing 
more than wishing to offer in relation to its reform, while Feenberg offers rich 
accounts of how technology has been shaped but only ever concerns him-
self with changes to its meaning, fighting shy of utopian recommendations 
concerning the technology of the future.
15 The software can be downloaded from: www.automation.strikenow.org.uk.
16 It seems to me that Universal Automation is not merely ‘socially shaped’ as 
part of a contest over meanings, but is better understood as technology that 
deliberately favours some ways of living, and even some people’s interests, 
over others. Viewed in this way, it is less an intervention than an experiment 
in the development of infrastructure for a future society. To deliver on its 
utopian aspiration, the theory of technical politics needs to include the pos-
sibility of technology like this that is substantively biased by (progressive) 
design and has the capacity to force a new situation, every bit as much as 
the production- line imposed capitalist labour conditions onto generations of 
workers. The model here is not discursive but authoritative, even coercive, 






My purpose in this book has been to show that Feenberg’s intervention 
constitutes an important and much needed development of Marxian and 
critical theory in relation to technology. I have also argued that his work 
is a vital counterweight to other, non- critical tendencies in contemporary 
philosophy and sociology of technology, especially constructivism, ANT 
and post- phenomenology. In concluding, I  will summarise the sense 
in which his work constitutes an advance and then review some of the 
suggestions I have made, in an effort to contribute to the further devel-
opment of the theory.
As far as critical theory is concerned, Feenberg has continued and 
updated the tradition, retaining its focus on individual human self- 
realisation and the centrality of that idea to any meaningful conception 
of historical progress. Pursuant to this, his work takes as its problem-
atic one of the most important questions of contemporary Marx schol-
arship, concerning the paradoxical relationship between technology 
and progressive social change. He is almost alone among Marx scholars 
of the past three or four decades in taking this question seriously and 
making it central to his attempt to reconstruct Marxist theory. That 
forms of social organisation and power familiar to people in capitalist 
societies also pervaded life in the Soviet Union and restricted its progress 
towards anything like socialism has been widely observed, but much of 
the theoretical reflection on this has involved genuflections to the role of 
‘technical reason’ in domination, rather than investigating the concrete 
mediation of rationality and power that constitutes the technical. This 
evasion is somewhat of a travesty, and Feenberg’s intervention must be 
seen as bringing some urgency to a question that has been deferred for 
far too long.
As part of this, Feenberg has also challenged the critical theory 
tradition’s suspicion of technology, including the well- worn trope that 
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technological rationality is integrally or essentially opposed to ‘human’ 
values of communication and meaning. Demonstrating that a humanist 
approach need not involve any such essentialism, Feenberg addresses 
this by incorporating social and historical factors into the definition of 
technology, and this is perhaps his most significant innovation. In this 
way, he has made it possible for critical theory to engage with technology 
as not merely a problem but also a locus of possibilities and potential. 
This move is also an important step towards clarification of the ways in 
which technology can become problematic for progressive politics, and 
has led to a corresponding sharpening of the analytical resources of crit-
ical theory. This is illustrated by the valuable concepts of technological 
ambivalence and progressive or democratic rationalisation, which are 
essential foundations for understanding technical politics.
None of the rival positions in contemporary critical theory have 
produced concepts with similar purchase on the technology– society 
relationship. Jürgen Habermas (2003) has written an interesting study 
of genetic medicine’s potential to undermine the neuro- physical basis of 
democratic culture, but his basic model remains the dichotomy in which 
aspects of the technological system present a threat to the value basis 
of the cultural lifeworld. There is little sense in this work of the positive 
possibilities presented by genetic medicine. There are good reasons to 
be cautious, of course, when it comes to identifying political potential in 
the genetic modification of the unborn, but a theory that includes this 
opposition at its foundation seems likely always to be caught on the back 
foot when new technical capacities open up. Other contemporary crit-
ical theorists simply have nothing to say about technology. This becomes 
increasingly odd when so much of the empirical substance of society 
is technologically mediated. Critical theory’s assumption that the fun-
damental processes are human- communicative, with technology only 
contemplated as some kind of historical accretion, feels increasingly out 
of touch in the age of social media.1
In contrast, Feenberg introjects social elements into the definition of 
technology. This undermines essentialism, while he retains many of its 
critical insights, and makes it possible to develop a richer, more nuanced 
conception of the entwinement of technological capabilities with human 
ones and their joint development through social and historical processes. 
The notion of technical politics as a site of struggle where these processes 
are mediated and subject to challenge is an important theoretical devel-
opment. Understanding technical action in terms of political hegemony 
enables us to view the various interventions, hacktivisms and grass roots 
initiatives in terms of their wider significance.
Feenberg’s work is also markedly superior to the depoliticised efforts 
that dominate in science and technology studies (STS). As we have seen, 
his embrace of constructivism enables him to develop ideas from critical 
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theory in a new, productive conceptual space. Focusing on the processes 
through which social forces shape technological artefacts in develop-
ment secures greatly enhanced relevance for critical social theory at a 
time when so much of life seems to involve these contests. Beyond this, 
though, drawing on ideas from contemporary political theory to develop 
the concept of technical politics, Feenberg has grasped the wider, polit-
ical potential in such contests and articulated this to the reconstructed 
version of critical theory in his theory of progressive rationalisation. In 
place of catastrophism or implausible and unappealing doctrines of rup-
ture, he offers a political theory of technical change that might be built 
upon in a practical sense, rather than leaving people hoping for divine 
intervention.
Having said all this in support of the idea of technical politics, though, 
a number of limitations must be acknowledged to the theory as currently 
formulated. First, technical politics is located in language, specifically in 
the processes through which technology is interpreted and its capabil-
ities named, and we have seen in this book that the boundary between 
description and substantive reality is a repeated source of difficulty for 
the theory. Technology does not only exist as described but must be 
understood as involving objects that also act at the scene of design and 
elsewhere. A  properly materialist philosophy of technology should be 
focused on opening up space in which objects may be heard. Retrieving 
the category of substantive bias, which Feenberg clarifies but then rejects, 
turns out to be a way to identify missing potential as well as identifying 
real evil in technologies of the past.
Secondly, the linkage from technical politics to civilisation change is 
fragile and requires some further support. Feenberg’s conviction that 
more popular involvement in design will necessarily make for ethically 
superior technology  – a conviction seemingly shared by Verbeek  – is 
not obviously supported by the historical record. Similarly, the notion 
that more aesthetic technology designs, which play more easily on the 
senses and connect people and nature, will necessarily be less exploit-
ative or susceptible to entanglements in strategies of domination must 
be approached with caution. The linkages between local interventions 
that alter specific devices and civilisation- defining shifts in the global 
meaning of ‘technology’ require further thought.
Finally, the rush to politicise, while justified with reference to the con-
servative apoliticism of much STS, runs the risk of obscuring a range of 
sociological questions. Feenberg follows STS into the analysis of situations 
and processes already defined as ‘technical’, and this is hazardous because 
many people, perhaps even the majority, do not get to play a shaping role 
or are restricted to marginal levels of participation. There is a sociology 
of access and exclusion that is largely left out of focus in the theory as it 
stands, and this is a particularly acute failing when technical politics is 
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the only kind available. Critical theory of technology would benefit from 
engagement with a wider range of sociological theories to address this.
Having said this much, it is also surely the case that a dialogue with 
wider sociological theories would benefit them as much as it would 
Feenberg. In particular, recent sociological work on changes to the nature 
of labour and workplace organisations would benefit from engagement 
with constructivist ideas in a critical framework. In this book I  have 
referred to Boltanski and Chiapello’s important study of the ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’, which focuses on how the system has recuperated itself 
essentially by feigning to address the concerns of a generation of workers 
who refused to take up their roles in boring management and technical 
professions. The changes they describe were largely facilitated by tech-
nology that was shaped to the purpose, yet they completely overlook the 
issue. Similarly, Lazzaroto (2014) and Dardot and Laval (2014) have made 
arguments about the changing dynamics of subordination and domin-
ation in the workplace, which increasingly turn on subjects’ internal-
isation of behavioural and other norms, accompanied by an ideology in 
which people are made to feel responsible for everything that happens 
to them. These important works neglect to discuss how digital tech-
nology has been moulded to facilitate and enforce these processes. The 
changes these authors describe have implications for the critical theory 
of technology, since capitalist technology extends its hold over people 
into deeper recesses of their inner lives and social relationships. At the 
same time, though, it must be noted that none of them have discussed 
the shaping of technology, especially digital technologies, to meet these 
new system requirements.
Peter- Paul Verbeek has criticised Feenberg’s theory for lacking a 
properly ethical dimension specific to technology. It is true that Feenberg 
tends to view ethical criteria for technology as deriving from extra- 
technical discursive contexts. The problem with this approach comes 
into view when he seems to conflate better technology with more demo-
cratic involvement in design. Unfortunately, in contests over technology 
designs the fact that large numbers of people favour one option over 
another, or attribute some meanings to the exclusion of others, is not in 
itself sufficient to ensure that those designs are ‘best’. It is entirely con-
ceivable that large numbers of people, perhaps even a majority, operating 
within a democratic regulatory framework might choose unethical, even 
immoral technologies. Feenberg supposes that in a more democratic 
context, space will be created in which people can deliberate on the best 
course and that this will tend to result in more progressive designs. He 
suggests that superior designs will be those that are more attentive to the 
communicative aspect of technology, especially its symbolic integration 
into the wider life of the community. This preference, however, is not jus-
tified in any explicit account of design ethics.
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Verbeek rightly suggests that what is needed is an ethics immanent 
to the technology design process, although this is something that he 
then fails to articulate in any detail. In contrast, Feenberg’s theory of 
bias creates the theoretical conditions through which this idea might be 
advanced and, drawing on the rich heritage of critical theory, he did so 
well in advance of post- phenomenology’s fashionable ‘post- humanism’. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that for all his attempts to distance himself 
from Feenberg’s approach, Verbeek only ends up joining him in calling 
for greater democracy in technology design.
Feenberg’s theory includes resources to develop an immanent ethics 
of design because he identifies, in humanistic and pragmatic terms, the 
basic motivation of technology. His preferred example here is medicine, 
which he sometimes presents as paradigmatic for the positive techno-
logical employment of scientific knowledge (e.g. 2010: 81). For all that 
essentialists and others view technical action as marked by a kind of 
primal violence, Feenberg shows that this is intimately paralleled by a 
concern to make the world a better place. His dialectic of primary and 
secondary instrumentalisation includes this paradox at its very core, and 
its historical unfolding is what produces technology’s ambivalence and 
the possibility of democratic rationalisation. His embrace of Marcuse’s 
organicism leads Feenberg to frame the possibilities opened up by this 
theorisation in terms of a logic of reconciliation, according to which 
democratisation will restore technology to its original, beneficent social 
purposes.
I have tried to show that an Adornian position on this issue can 
sharpen the focus on an immanent ethics by focusing on identity and 
non- identity as this applies to technology itself. Presently, as technologists 
move to improve the world, so they instrumentalise it, themselves and, 
ultimately, everyone else as well, but they do so with at least some sense 
that they are contributing to progress. The prospect that, as Sartre put it, 
‘liberated society will be a harmonious enterprise of exploitation of the 
world’ (1969: 224) seems fantastic now, but it is nonetheless conceivable 
that the benign motivations bound up in technological creativity might 
find themselves, if not emancipated, at least differently thwarted in a new 
social arrangement. If this sounds unpromising, it opens onto a technical 
politics that is not framed by the binary opposition of communication to 
instrumental domination, but rather presents multiple possibilities, each 
to be assessed through a utopian, future- facing calculation of their likely 
world impact. The ethics of democratic technical politics, then, start 
with a dialogue between people and things, with a renewed emphasis on 
responsibility as the basis of autonomy, rather than faith in the possibility 
of ultimate reconciliation. Utopianism here serves as a methodology for 
thinking the future, rather than a blueprint for utopia.
 
 
Beyond critique: utopia    153
153
In this context, there is something to Bruno Latour’s repudiation of 
critical theory from which Feenberg’s theory might benefit. Latour iden-
tifies critique as a kind of impediment to thinking and acting differently, 
suggesting that it actually inhibits a different world- relation by tying sub-
jectivity to a narrow conception of reality. For him, critical theorists are 
the ‘ghouls’ of social theory (2013b: 348), who are always equipped with 
explanations, normally of why things turned out so badly, but bereft of 
useful recommendations. His own suggestion is that theory should rec-
ognise that reality exceeds the ‘truth’ associated with various kinds of 
correspondence theory and elevated into disciplines positively associated 
with ‘science’. That most people most of the time are not seeking scien-
tific legitimacy for the beliefs with which they operate, and that these 
beliefs are nonetheless productive of determinate realities, ought to be 
experienced, he suggests, as liberating. The category- mistake checker 
that academic social scientists have been applying to their theories is 
itself a kind of category- mistake (Latour 2013b).
Latour presents this view as anti- critical because critical theory, which 
from its inception was concerned with setting limits to scientific reason, 
is one of the factors that prevents theory from simply strolling onto the 
ground he has identified  – the social and cultural territory produced 
every day without reference to whether its operative statements are ‘true’.2 
This is an interesting challenge to critical theory because it turns one 
of its own long- established arguments against it, namely the suggestion 
that reification is an illusion produced by those who are in thrall to it. 
Critical theory has often alleged that others are in the grip of a ‘fear of 
freedom’ or other kinds of false consciousness that lead them into con-
formist behaviours, which in turn reproduce a system that is not in their 
interests. Latour’s argument is that by maintaining the dominant illusion 
that science and technology embody the only valid knowledge, critical 
theory is in fact complicit with its own mournful condition.
Socialist society will need its own technology and cannot rely upon 
passively inheriting what it needs from capitalism. Following through on 
this insight seems to require a type of thinking that is not compatible with 
‘critique’. Attachment to that figure of thought limits technical politics to 
the introjected binary of technology’s ‘ambivalence’, while the objective 
situation contains more possibilities than can be addressed through a dia-
lectical negation of capitalism’s negation of technology’s potential. A way 
of thinking the future that allows scope for what Adorno called ‘exact 
fantasy’3 seems to be necessary. I have suggested that Adorno’s thought 
has something to offer theory that attempts to broach this question.
Latour’s repudiation of critical theory reflects empirical changes of the 
last 40 years that concern the way that technology is experienced. I have 
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ruled by a technological hegemony, in which coercion is experienced as 
the imposition of technical norms, is at certain points out of step with 
this experience, which involves friendly gadgets and a technical infra-
structure whose primary orientation is communicative, even playful. 
Technical politics must grasp the paradox of a technology that is no 
longer austere or brutal but remains implicated in domination, and relate 
this to its study of ongoing struggles over the meaning of technology.
The difficulty critical theory faces here is that the constellation has 
shifted, with the consequence that the mix of values and standards of 
what might be considered ‘reasonable’ demands on technology varies 
more widely than Feenberg’s technical politics allows. Aesthetics, dem-
ocracy and expertise are not easily assigned to ‘sides’ in an agonistic 
struggle against technical expertise over the shape or meaning of future 
technology. Moreover, while contests recognisable from the earlier 
period (over health, safety, etc.) have lost none of their importance, effi-
ciency in design choices is rarely the central contested term in the way 
that it was before, because other values are now installed at the heart 
of technology design culture. Finally, the connection of technical pol-
itics to other struggles is not bridgeable via the notion of a ‘hegemonic 
technological rationality’ at work behind the scenes, forging a coherent 
web of domination that extends from the design of the latest phone to the 
opening hours of your local clinic.
It is curious that the main theoretical benefit from characterising 
technology as hegemonic should be an optimistic framing of popular 
technical activity that is unconstrained by hegemonic norms as ‘resist-
ance’ or ‘democratic technical politics’, all adding up to a push towards 
a brighter future. From Latour’s perspective, whether it adds up to any-
thing is a matter to be determined by the activity itself, but in the absence 
of a ruling power there is no obstacle to inaugurating many new counts of 
the world, none of them aspiring to include everything that is in it. In his 
vision, however, the question of power remains unaddressed. Feenberg 
points to the entanglement of expert discourses with institutions closely 
allied to the state and to corporations. For most people, who are not 
internationally acclaimed university professors, stepping outside these 
constraints to promote alternative forms of knowing only invites various 
kinds of stigmatisation.
The political success of openly irrational movements in the past 
decade suggests that some kind of breach may have occurred in the 
knowledge– power nexus associated with modernity. Feenberg’s theory 
of technical politics provides conceptual resources with which to under-
stand the issues at stake in this new situation, as well as a strategic the-
orisation that clarifies its dangers and opportunities. He has succeeded 
in formulating a version of critical theory that speaks directly to twenty- 
first- century concerns.
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Notes
1 This observation is not limited to critical theory but applies equally well to 
many areas of contemporary sociology, in which there has been a tendency 
towards ‘micro’ investigations (of ‘art’, ‘music’, even ‘personal life’) that purport 
to de- reify and explain their objects as emerging from strictly limited contexts. 
The absence of any reference to technologies in these studies is often indica-
tive of their deceptive artificiality, or as Feenberg might put it, their abstract 
character.
2 Latour suggests ‘felicitous’ is a more useful term to describe the way statements 
perform their reality- producing functions.
3 ‘“Exact fantasy” was … a dialectical concept which acknowledged the mutual 
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